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'l'his  report  preE<e:ots  "·"'"  analyses  the  overPll  fi n.Ungs  ol'  t!12  '10st 
i·nnortant  public opinion survey ever conducted among  the six  r:our:~sries  cf  'he 
l::U.ropean  Economic  Community  on  b.-;;ti tudes  - and  the  formation  of  these  a ttl  tude~ 
toward  european unification considered in all its manifol<l aspeots. 
It has its origin in the  suggestion of a  group  of spec:lc.li·"ts in '·'"' 
p:roblB-'13  of youth,  •.vho  met  in Brussels  in June  1967,  at  the  init:iai~i·:e  t')f  the 
CoT".T·.1ission  on  European  Communi ties. 
I 
'~ore precisely, its objective ·vas  to go  far beyond 'Yhat  :10<•'·  ori!<'ll~n 
survc;.cx ·rill  perm:i t, i.e.  neither to restrict it to  talting country  by  cout"I'Y 
snap~>Lots of the attitudes of young  people  toward european unification,  r,or 
simply  to  study  briefly how·  these  attitudes are distributed accordinz  to  sex, 
age,  socio-economic  or socio-cultural settings,  and  so  forth.  ]'or  t1,e  first 
time,  it involved questions  of studying what  is the  precise meaning of  ·the ·qords 
"Europe"  or "europeans"  for  the younger generations  ;  ·.vhat  content young  people 
attribute  to  the  notions  of union,  unif'ication,  integrc...tion,  and  so  forth  ;  ·/.:hat 
motivations undGrlie  tLe  attitudes  expressed  ;  what  are  the  centers  of.'  ir.terest 
of  those  persons  w·ho  ::-eneive,  directly or indirectly,  informational  or educational 
messages with  "european"  content  ;  am.,  what is the  influence of varivus  coCJ:nuni- --- cation channels. 
A first  stab'-•  uio.ntely  the  exploratory  phase.,  was  planned.  It included 
a  small  number of in-depth interviews  made  up of three groups  of youngsters,  agefi 
respectively ll to 12,  15  to  16 ans  19  to  20 years  old.  These  interviews were 
condu.o~"" ouring  the first half of 1968  by  professional  psychologists  ·vho  used 
non-dir< cti  ·,·c  techniques  in order to  obtain  the  maximum  in recollections  and  free 
a<sor.i<.i.:  ·:·~  r>f  ideas,  spontaneously expressed by  the  responde1:ts  abou"  '"ords 
suoh  as  "Europe",  "Europ"an U,;i!'ication",  "Common  Market",  etc...  In all,  216 
young  people  in the  Community  countries,  excluding Luxembourg,  ·.vJre  interv~e·ved 
by  use  of similar methods, yet with  the widest  ossible freedom given  to  the II 
institutes responsible  for  the field research.(x) 
The  second phase,  conducted in ~arch-April,l969, aimed at the  cons-
truction of questions  or sets of questions vrhich  would make  it possible to measure 
adequately,  in qualitative or propositional 7rays,  the attitudes uncovered  during 
the  exploratory  phase.  In all,  486  interviews ·vi th young  people  aged  15  to  I 5  and 
19  to  20 years  old,  each  age  group  representing half of the  so.mples,  \Vere  conduc-
ted in five countries  of the  Co·omuni ty.  Since it was  a  pretest survey,  the  sample 
was  not  representative,  but it was  made  as heterogeneous  as  possible  ;  it also in-
cluded,  nevertheless,  as  many  boys  as girls (xx).  The  analysis of the  collected 
data,  carried out  by  the International Research Asocciates  (Belgium)  under the  di-
rection of Robert  GIJS,  allowed us  to identify clusters of questions,  each  cluster 
measuring  a  basic  dimension of manifest  opinions  or of underlying attitudes related 
(x)  These  polling institutes xere  selected among  the  two  main international 
groups  : 
- the International Research Associates  (INRA)  group 
C::JFRE:,!CA  (France) 
Institute for Demoscopy  (GE~many) 
INRA  - Brussels  (Belgium) 
- the  International  Gallup group 
DOXA  (Italy) 
IFOP  (France) 
NIPO  (Netherlands) 
Each institute conducted  36  intervie':Vs,  for which  the  tape  recordings  and 
the  ~ritten transcriptions are  available.  In addition,  under  the  supervision 
of Lucien :.!ironer  and Jacqueline  Bissery,  the French Public Opinion Institute 
(IFOP)  carried out  an  interesting experiment with graphic  displays  of  Bu. rope. 
For this research,  see  "Les  jeunes  et l'Europe"  (IFOP,  mai  1968),  as well  as 
two  articles by J.  Bissery:  "Comment  l'idee de  l'Europe vient  aux  plus  jeunes" 
and  "Comrnent  les  jeunes  franc;ais  voient  1 1 Europe  poli  tique",  in "Communaute 
europeenne"  n°  131, June  1969  and  n°  134,  3eptember 1969. 
(xx)  The  follo·ving institutes took  part in this stage of the  survey 
Institute for  Demoscopy  (Germany) 
INR~>.  (Belgium) 
IFI'P  (France) 
NIPO  (Netherlands) 
DOXa  (Italy) 
102 interviews 
75  " 
100 
70 
139 
" 
" 
" to  european unification  (~). 
Finally,  the  third  phase,  conducted in }'ebruary-'larcr, 
a  survey  based  on  representative  samples  of the  entire  populr.,ctO< 
the  six  countries  of the  European  Community  (xx).  1'he  JecisJchl 
(x)  It consisted of a  multi  variate ana.lysis  uf rel.,tionsln pe,  ''" 'o ...... 
ses  to  each  pair o1'  items,  i.e.  to  eaciJ  eleo,ent  of infor:,,c,,,j,, 
each  question.  Tile  analysis,  carxled  out  by  a  mathematical  , ~~ 
in  a  technical  report  on  INRA,  makes it possiole  to  constru.ct  ,,, 
ordered scales,  each  one  representing  a  cluster of i terns  ·vied'"'  ' 
wed  :oeaningful  correlations  a'llong  them,  but  also  where  t.nc  ·c  •. 
i t.em,  i.e,  the  one  obtaining  the  small est  percentage of po•:" -L:  · 
al~ows one  to  predict  the  responses  to  ''easierr~  i te·rns  in";1u.<~;;< 
of  tc,e  scale.  For  exa'llple,  we  were  able  to  constrt,ct  a  scacc: 
th•3  attitudes of respondents  ·vho,  simultaneously  are •,vil.cHi!'  ·: 
.rary  personal  inconveniences  to  have  Europe  cci';-.Je  to  pass,  · 'l  c  , ,_ 
the  entry of foreigners  into their country,  who  favor  replac' ;• 
nal  currency with  a  european currency,  ·vho  consider  themselvec;  Q~  p 
involved or keep  informed about  politics, '.vho  feel.  in agree cc 
demonstrations,  and  •vho  do  not  agree with those who  claim  t;  ~~:. 
all  right 'vi th  the world  an.d  nothing ought  to  be  cl:ca.nged  r,o•  wko 
believe european unificatlon is impc.ssible  because  of la!lf':ua.·· 
I'he  :epecialist~  may  refer to  the INRA  technical  report  :  "L'uL,  ·'' 
peenr1e",  second quantitative stage.  He f.  c. 01. J _<2. 
A  ·.vorking  document  on the preliminary findin..,G  o1  this  stur:e  c 
·vas  published in February,  1970,  by  the Press  and  Infor,-nat'io· 
of the  Cormnission  of the  European  Com"!uni ties under tte tic.>· 
et  1 1 unification  de 1'  Europe"  (Doc.  17. 261/X/  69-F.  Hev), 
(=!  ~"he  samples  w·ere  distributed among  the  countries  as  follo"m 
Germany  (Institut fUr  Demoskopie  ) 
Belgium (International Research Associates) 
France  ( Institut franc;:s.is  d' opinion :puhlique) 
Italy (lstit""" per la Ricerche Statistiche 
e  l'.k.n<.lisi  dell 'Upiniona  Pubolico.) 
Luxe"!bcurg  (International  Research  Associ  c. teD) 
l:etherlands  (  I;ederland Insti  tuut  voor  de  Publieke 
Opinie) 
1'otal 
2J<l 
1298 
2046 
lC22 
J.r' 
1230 
8752 
The  technical  methods  of the  field researoh  and  data analys:  •. :: 
in  the  report  of the  International Research Associates whicl. 
overall  findings  :  "Les  dete=inants d' une  attitude favcn,:Jl·" 
tion poli  tique  de 1'  Zurope",  as well  ac  in the  annex  "L 'uni L  c 
peenne",  Ref,  C.Ol.l97. 
" 
" 
1'o  date,  only the  country  findings  have  been published,  bef:::· ·  c 
analysis,  in a  note issued  by  the general  effie  3  of the  PJ'ee3c: 
rnation  of the  Commission of the  European  Communi ties  (doc.  12  .. 
dated July  20,  1970)  and in an article published by  the  Britisl, 
Government  and  Opposition,  Vol.  6, Nr  4,  Fall 1971,  under  the  L  tL 
pean and  the unification of Europe". IV 
phase  to  the entire  population,  instead of limiting it.  to youngsters  as  initi~lly 
planned,  'N~>.s  taken in view of  the  f;_ndings  of the first  two  phas~;:;,  starting with 
th~ following  considerations  : 
1°  The  first  two  phases  provided sufficiently rich and  detailed informa-
tion that  certain conclusions could be  drawn  about  the youth  population, 
especially in that  tl1e  differences between young  people  and  adults  re-
garding  the  same  object,  are not  as  important  and  sharp as  expected. 
2°  In any  event,  verification of this absence  of substantial  differences 
required that  the  same  questions  be  asked of youngsters  ans  of adults. 
3°  The  choice  of samples  representing  the total  population from  the  age 
of 16  an  ,,.ales it possible to  treat  "age"  as  a  continuous varia  ole 
and  to  observe variations in opinion  and attitudes  as  a  function  of 
this variable. 
• 
•  • 
tach of the  three  phases yielded a  harvest  of information,  Some  hypothe-
ses formulated  in the first and  second  stagee were  verified in the third,  ans  some 
·.vere  not.  Others still remc.in  to  be  examined in future  research. 
In this  present  report,  -_.,e  have  tried to  present  t'te essential  findings 
of this  long research ·vi thout  delVing  too  much  into  technical  details or insisting 
too  much  on  the  hypotl:eses which were  rejedted in the  process.  Our objective was, 
and still is, to  improve  ;u.r kno·vledge  of attitudes  and attitude formation  of  the 
european public  tov•ard  european unification in order  to  upgrac1.e  jJI'blic  information 
policy, 
The  ent~re data set  as well  as all the  reports of the institutes con-
tracted are available  to  research scholars who  ~sh to  consult  them. 
Jacques-Rene  RABIER .I!.T?I'fUDBS  ,;rcNG  YuillWER  G&:IER.I!.l'IGNS 
I 
Hl.E  IN-DEPTH  IH'I'E?.VIEWS 
"Far  from  .fOI'ming·  first  or  8"'ren  ea.~'·ly  data,  the  feeling 
and  even  the  concept  of one's  o••m  nation appears  relatively late 
in a  normal  child ·vi thout its seeming  to  brir.,;;  about,  necessarily, 
a  sense  of patriotic ethnocentrism.  On  the  contrary,  to acquire 
1 
an  intellectual and affeoti  ve  a'Vareness  of his  o·m  country,  a  child 
has  to undertake  an  entire process  of "de-centrising"  (-.vi th  l'E'o<pect 
to his city,  his  canton,  etc  ••• )  and  of cocrdination (-vi th  perspec-
tives  other than his  o·m)  - a  process  •vhich  makes  him  come  tv under-
stand other coun"ories  and  points  of vi e·v  different  from  his  own". 
Jean  PI.b.GET  and  A. 'I.  'IIBIL  "Le  developpement  chez  1'  enfc.nt  de 
l'idee de  Patrie et des  relations  avec  l'etranger".  International 
Bulletin of Social  Sciences,  UNESCO  - .l!.utumn  1951,  Vol  III, n°  3. 
It's especially ·yi th  these  comments  of Jean Piaget in mind  that  the first 
phase  of the  survey included in-depth intervie•vs ·vi th young  people - boys  and girls 
aged 11  to  12 years,  alone;  side intervie··rs  \vi th youngsters  15  to  16 years  old and 
"Ti th young  adults,  aged 19  to  20. 
This 1vas  at  once  a  study  of  t:~':1e;ral  predispositions, ·vhich  ought  to unco-
ver the  fundamental  dimensions  of attitudes  to•vard  Europe  for  the  purpose  of quan-
tification in the later phases,  as well  as  of genetic  psychology,  which  should 
allo·.~  one  to  predict  to ·.vhat  extb.!.l  the young generations  might  respond  to or in 
the uniting of Europe,  while keeping in mind  t£"eir life cycle,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the historical conditioning of their own  generation,  on  the  other. 
The  main conclusions,  dra·.m  from  the mass  of information collected in 
the  course of the  216  in-depth intervie·vs  of young  people  in  the  three  categories 
samples  (11-12,  15  to  16  and 19  to  20 years old),  can  be  summarized as  follows  : 2 
1.  No  great resistance,  but little mohvation  toward  a  Europe  perceived  as  a 
Community  of manifest  destiny. 
a)  Among  young  people  behreen  11  and 12 years  of age  and  even  15  and  16 
years  old,  the  concept  of Europe  is vague.  It is characterized by  differences 
bet,JVeen  people  and  n~tions rather  than  by  comrnon  characteristics.  These  dif-
ferences  are principally defined  by geographical  properties,  but  the  distances 
are expressed in psychol"gical  terms  rather than in geometrical  terms,  especial-
ly in  the youngest  age group  :  one  country is seen mere  distant  from  another, 
even if it is more  proximate  on  the  map. 
Although  Europe  is viewed  as  a  group of countries very  different  one  from 
the other,  these countries are  perceived as  having  peace,  tranquility  and  ma-
terial welfare in  co~mon.  The  fear of war  remains  alive in the youngest  age 
group, 
Evident  signs  of an awareness  of a  co~mon european destiny or  even  of a 
feeling of european solidarity  are not  to  be  found  among  these youngsters. 
On  the  other hand,  feelings  of solidarity at  a  planetary level, at  the  level 
of all mankind,  seem  to exist in a  latent,  more  or less  embryonic  form. 
b)  A sort  of  european feeling along •.vi th  a  still vague  awareness  of the 
common  destiny  of the  peoples  of Europe  does  show up  among  youngsters  of 19  to 
20  year~ af age.  This  awareness is expressed by  a  sensitivity to  the  common 
history of european  count1·ies.  In this age grovl',  Ec~ape is spoken  of as  one 
entity,  even  at  the outset  of  the  interview when  the  respondent  did not yet 
knmv  that  the intervie'l concerned  european unification  • 
.AmOl't:"  the young  people •.vi th higher intellectual skills,  Europe  is vie·Ned 
as  being at  the origin of all  advanced civilizations for 'lhich  she  has  some 
kind of responsibility.  There is also  a  sort of regret  about  the  lessenir~ 
of Europe's  importance  in the world, 
In short,  there is no  great  resistance  among  young  people  to  the idea of 
european unification ;  on  the  contrary,  one  notices  a  latent  pro-european 
motivation in search of a  goal.  Thus  the question is  :  to 'Nhat  extent  can 
present  european  achievements  and efforts undertaken  for its uuification 
become  the goal  of this latent motivation  ? 3 
2.  Pro-ev.ro:pean  feelings  in search of  a  goo.L 
The  differences  observed  in  the  concepts  and  vit.  _,  u:C  Lurope  among  c::ie 
three  age  groups  studied are  partly  _explained  b;r  the  c'~'.:"f! c:ul ty of  the  forma-
tion of :pro--european fee1inr,s  in the mindc  cJ.'  you-r.z  1WO:p1e, 
~·his  difficl.l  ~~:l  ua.r·:  3..  ~.s  ,).:r_·-.._.o:d.ns  in  thr:  :~·no.l  ._:j_·:.'fc:.rer-~:OL  be·t'.·ree:~n  c·::.i:i 
1 :>~n. 
of ll ta 12  year::;  ...:f  •'·  ~~  ;wt]  tLc  Pl'f..Ce- dil'lf'  t;ener·;;..,:--j  nru::.o- 'l'.:_;e  o:Lild.ren  ·.vLc 
--:cere  11-12 ;rears  ole:  a';  be  ~ime of t•uc  firet  stage of  t.b.e  s·&udy  in 1968 
r1.iffer  from  the  prece·rling generations  by  t.:raits  which will  pr<>bably  remain 
as  ch.::d·aute:r-istics  of tneir generat::!.ono  !_;'or  us,  one  of these  character:~stioa 
!-·  oems  to  be  the  influet"l.ce  ol·  _ne'.Y  .:ot:tl:lb  o:l  soc:ial  coramunica-tion,  especially te-
le-:isi:):o::,  whj_ch  ~ s  co:1.tr:i.butine  to  ti1e  bi.rth  of'  a  i1\J':-J  culture  and  of  a  nei1T 
1~ind cf  civilize.tion~ 
~Iueh }-:!is  been  r-;;-:.,·~_(:.  hnd  .,i:J.C:i:l  :t•erna.in.s  ~0  be  ~:~aid  t·.b{!Ut  the  influence  of' 
television on  our societies.  But,  in limiting ourselves to  the  purpose  of 
this  study  and  to  the collected materials,  how  can  one  not  be struck by  the 
difference  bet•~reen the generation of young  lleople  w·ho  ·.vere  born between  t}:;e 
on a  of World  War  II and 1955,  on  the  C'1e  hand,  and  yoUl'l!;"  peopJ.e  born after 
1955,  on  the  other  ?  The  first most  assuredly  belongs  to  a  genere.tion of 
inventors  and users  of new·  anl  po-;verful  means  of communication,  but  their 
frame  of referenc•.  still goes  back  to  pre-war generations.  In contradistinc-
tion,  the generation born after 1955  became  aware  of the world in an  era 
which was  experiencing the massive  penetration of teleYision. 
This  study  allow·ed us  to ascertain that for children who  were  11  to  J.2 
years  old,  time  and  space were  experienced in  a  much  more  immediate,  compreo-
sed and.  direct way  than  during  the  preceding generations.  In addition,  the 
mass  of information absorbed has  increased tremendously. 
nal, 
These  ne·v  characteristics of perception give rise to 
almost  physical  phrticipation in the subject mhtter. 
a  stronger emotio-
In the  immediacy 
of their effects,  the child sees  and  almost  touches  violence,  conflicts and 
major world  problems.  Nevertheless,  tlle  volume  of messages  transT1i tteci  fo,-
ces  the subject  to  filter this  information. 
The  information which  penetrates  this filter and affects youngsters 
directly is that ·vhich makes  an  imroediate  or pressin;;  appeal  to their sen:>i-
tivi  ties.  Ho·.vever,  information about  Europe  transmitte<l  by  television has 
di.fficul ty getting through  this filter.  On  the  one  hand,  because  of its 
technical  character, it is not  ·.vi thin the  reach  of  the child.  On  the  othe1· 
Lmd, it lacks  the  emotional  content ·vhieh  characterizes information about 
other subjects of national  ans,  phrticularly,  international  politics. 
In comparing  the  d.evelopment  of attitudes  and  opinions  to  computer 
processing of data,  one  could state ti,at  data are  stored at the  age  of ll to 4 
12, ·vbereas  around  15  to  16  years  old,  the  search for  a  data processing 
program is under7ay.  Television  does  not  offer this  (data processing)program, 
and messages  sent  by  other agents  (family,  school,  press,  books,  ets  ••• ), 
chich  ought  to help the child to  interpret,  sort  out  and understand the  infor--
mation  perceived via television,  are  insufficient or inadequate,  or, moreover, 
cannot  become  attached to  emotional  quickstones without which this information 
is more  or less removed  from  the life and  interests of the child. 
Another finding is the  evidence  of a  feeling of uneasiness  that  15  to  16 
years old youngsters  have  in the  face  of the gro·ting  demands  of technological 
culture  on  the  individual.  They  feel  that their personal  freedom is oppressed 
or threatened by  the specialization of activities,  the subdivision of groups, 
an~lienation of the masses.  In this age group,  the  concept  of Europe  bas 
little attractiveness because  of its technical character, its lack of emotional 
appeal, its absence  of ideals or even its lack of simple  and  clearly stated 
goals. 
The  19  to  20 years  old youth are more  sensitive  to reality and  even to 
details.  They  have  entered a  phase  of fulfillment  and  feel  a  deep urge  for 
action.  To  take  the  image  of the  computer  once  again,  one  could say  th~t 
youngsters  of this  age  have  acquired a  data processing  program.  The  concept 
of a  united Europe  seems  more  attractive to  them.  It'~ a  choice  ·~itbin reach 
of concrete  fulfillment.  In addition,  the notion of a  united Europe is capable 
of appealing to feelings in the way  of an  overarching  program,  of an exiting 
adventure,  but  provided that  these youngsters  already have  the  necessary 
intellectual training.  Yet  there is no  doubt  that many  of the young  people  aged 
19  to  20  and  even adults  are still below this level of maturity  ;  their menta-
lity comes  closer to  that  of 11  to  12 year old children. 
This  second series of findings  show  that it is bigb  time  the  minds  of 
youngsters  born after 1955  ·.vere  mobilized in favor  of the uniting of Europe. 
In fact,  the differences  observed in tbe  conditions  of the  formation  of funda-
mental  attitudes  and  opinions  between this generation  and previous  generations 
might  result in a  "•eakening of pro-european feelings  to  the benefit  of other, 
yet unknown,  choices. 
In order that  policy  for  european unification arouse  an interest  among 
young  people  and bring about  their conscious participation,  the motives,  efforts 
and achievements  of the  authors  of this  policy should be  communicated  to  these 
young  people  (and to  the adults who  have not gone  beyond this mental  level)  in 
its simplest  form  and in ·.vays  that  appeal  more  to  their affective predisposi ti-
ons.  Indeed,  there is no  doubt  that the visible signs  of developing  european 
unification presently  are much  too  technical,  and the associated concepts,  too 
intellectual.  To  be understood,  these ideas call for  an intellectual level  and 
a  sensitivity very  rarely found  among  the public  in general,  including young 
people.  They  do  not  appeal  to  primary  emotions  and motivations  such as  the 
drive for  power,  the need for security,  the feeling  of being able  to  participa-
te in great historical  ach~r.vements, and  so  forth. 3.  The  general  views  of a  united Europe  hel,i by you gsters  clc  not  diffel' 
from  those  of  the greater mass  of adults:--· 
5 
The  general  vie~vs  of Euro_pe  we  ha,r(;  -~-1!-J\;Y  able  to  t1H:JE:""'V"E  "<'Hd:e  general-
ly latent  ;  the  v1e•vs  expresser!  by  t··;e  m.tbject  in the  course  ->f  t.te  ci.nter-
vie·7  d.id  not  place  his  emotivity at stake. 
This  VB-riety  of  v:ie'.vE>  is a1..so  fourlcl.  arncng  a.c:.J.l ts of ·the  c:cuntri-~G 
within the  ii.'uropean  Community.  A unJ t·:d  E~l:--ope  is consider·vl  h:{  some  c.s 
a  step toward  the union of people all •JVer  the world,  or  alt'O  BC'  the  ·:e-· 
velopment  of a  new  economic  and  military  po•.7er,  or still yet  <w.  c.  :; ·\nd 
of  promi:::teG.  luna.  ~.rllere  prosperi·ty  and  peace will  p:tevail.  .AJUO.l:tf'  the yol4:ngest 
children  the  pnncipal attractior, of european unl.Hcation is bar-ed  ClJ  peace 
and.  tranq_uih~y  ,  these motivations  ob•doJ.s};y  cor1'espond  to  a  funoa"•c.,,.h;. 
need for  s<>curi ty. 
There is al8o  a  G9l'c-ain  resista.:1oe  to  european unif.i.oation !w-ong  theee 
youngsters.  This  resistance stems  from  a  fear of dilution or disappoara::;ce 
of their cultures  and also  from  the fear that unification W•)Uld  all"  .. ,  ·.:r,c, 
largest  european countries to  pursue policies of domination  over the  othe1·s. 
This last fear is expressed mainly  by  yotmg  Dutch  and Belgia:cs,  but also  by 
yotmg  French,  Germans  and Italians. 
a)  In the youngest  age  group,  Europe  is geographically  defim·d  : 
all european  coWl tries, including 'Purkey,  are  seen as  part  of  Eul'0])<1. 
This  broad view - "the more,  tlle  better" - reveals  the  absence  of deep 
feelings  of unity. 
b)  For 15  to  16  year old yoUllgsters,  the  principal attraction of 
european unification lies with the solution of workd wide  1prohlems it 
'VOUld  make  possible,  prol,J ems  they have  just become  aware  of  :  the meeting 
of minds  bet·,acn people,  tLe  disappearance  of barriers •11hich  separate men 
and nations,  union  on  a  ·vorld wide  scale.  The  vie'.v of Europe  as  a  step 
toward "'orld unification i<J  rather frequent  in this age  group. 
c)  Among  young  peoplP  <cged  19  to  20,  we  find most  of the vi.e"''s  already 
observed in t'o'l  ~'oungest age grours.  Nevertheless,  the accent  shifts ttward 
a  more  concrete  and  more  practical  outlook.  Eu:·.·~,e  thus appears  as  an 
accomplishment  in which  one  ought  to colli  .  ."uorate.  It is an action-o:danted 
outlook,  It is in this  age  group  •.ve  find most  often the idea  uf'  Europe 
conceived as  a  ne·•1,  great ·.vorkd  po·.ver,  the  development  of '"hich w·ould  allo·v 
this part  of  the workd  to  catch u:p  ·.vi th the  other great  :r~.,ers,  ec_e3cially 
1vith  the United States.  It is possible  to  detect  a  latent '1ope  that one 
day  Europe would  be  capaale  of influencing the world with as  much  authority 
as in the  past,  but  this  time  in order to contribute to th3  solution of the 6 
great ··,orld  problems  of our  time. 
We  also notice  amont:;  these  19  to  20  years  old young  people  that  a  united 
Europe  is most  frequently  limited to  the  six countries  of the  Common  Market  and, 
at  the most,  to countries  of Western burope  • 
• 
• 
The  material gathered during  the first  phase  of research allowed  the  formu-
lation of a  certain number  of hypotheses which  might  be  sho•.m  as necessary,  and 
perhaps  sufficient, conditions  fJl·  the  explanation of  the  development  and  organi-
zation of attitudes  toward  european unification : 
a)  The  strength of attitudes to·vard  european unification. 
'Ve  have  found  amone  young  people  that  the view  of a  united Europe  about 
which  an attitude is formed  can  take  on  different  aspects,  of which  the main  ones 
are  as  follows  : 
A Europe  of sovereign nations,  built upon  agreement  between  independe:>t 
states  ; 
A  federal  Europe,  consistine of a  division of  powers  bet·veen  federal 
auohority  and national  ePthnrities  in poli+; cal,  economic,  etc.  spheres 
A unitary  ~trope, conceived in terms  of the model  of a  national unitary 
state,  a  view  that is to  be  found  sometimes  (especially  among  the youn-
gest)  as  a  rather utopic  form  of integration,  and at other  times  as  the 
extreme  degree  of the  above  mentioned federal  idea. 
The  analysis  of these  three views  led to  the  formulation  of the hypothesis 
that it was  more  a  matter of differences in the  degree,  hence  the strength,  of 
attitudes than in distinctly different  outlooks.  This  hypothesis, cvhich  •.vas  veri-
fied  throughout  the  follo·.'ling  p;oases  of the  study,  parmi tted the use  of a  sin,:le 
index  to  measure  pro-european attitudes,  an  index which ·vc.s  i!lferred  from  a  cluster 
of questions  and  served as  a  measure  of the  dependent  variable (1). 
b)  The  independent variables. 
Besides  the  dependent  variable,  ·~.rhich  ~easured pro-european  attitudes  in 
and  of the,·,1selves,  a  certain number  of independent  var :iables  was  hypothetically 
stated at  the  end  of the f'rst  phase  :  each of these variables is expected to 
influence,  directly or indirectly,  pro-european attitudes. 
(1)  See  pp.  25  to  30. I 
!-
These variables  are mentioned here  only in passing,  since,  in fact,  one  of  .. 
the  aims  of the  study was  to verify  ;Lese hypotheses 
1) Idealistic internationalism,  expressing  the ideal of universal frater-
nity and solidarity, 
2)  Political nationalism. 
3)  The  resis~ance to  technological  civilization and negative reaption to 
present  day  achievements  in  the  area of european unification. 
4)  ~1e desire for peace,  and  anxiety in the  face  of conflicts. 
5)  The  level  of information. 
6)  ·I'he  degree  to ·,vhich  european institutions are  "present" in the  publi.c' s 
percept·!lal  field. 
7)  Experience cvith different kinds  of centralized or decentralized  orgal'li-
zations  of socio-:political  systems. 
8)  Idep.t_:i,fica,tton with national subgroups, 
9)  Ethnocentrism,  i.e.  the propensity to  accept and  to  favor values, 
vievm  and ways  of life of the group to which  one  belongs  ;  .hich is 
. _____  an _?.tti tude w_l),ich  must  be  disti~~r_oJLR.olitical nationalism. 
10} .Age, 
11) Desire fer  emancipation. 
12) fttachment  to  language  and to cultural identity, 
13)  ~egreo .of ~np·7lc;I.:;:c.  .o~ ac:tual  !!UrOpean  ins  t,i...tu.ti.ans. 
14)  Need  to move  ··vi thin a  familiar universe. 
15)  Desire  to  overcome  a  feeling  of inferiority with respect  t~ great  powers. 
16)  Degree  of involvement in politics and public affairs, 
17)  Degree  of civic spirit at  the national level. 
These various hypotheses were  studied during the  second phase by  means  of a 
multivariate analysis  of 486  responses  collected in a  very  detailed questionnaire 
submitted to young  people of 15  to 16  and 19  to 20  years  of age. II 
·' 
·' 
ANALYSIS  OF  RESPONSES  TO  THE  PRETEST  QUESTIONNAIRE 
The  manipulation of these  responses  led to  the  discovery of 30  clusters 
in a  non-metric  space by :neans  of a  simple  correlo;::ion analysis bet1veen  responses 
to  each  :pair of questions  and to  8  clusters  or sco.J.es  in a  .'lletric  space 1:Jased  on 
cumulative  responses  to certain questions, 
For  the  :purposes  of the analysis, it would be interesting to  study the 
non-metric  as  well  as  the metric clusters.  Nonetheless,  in compatison to  the first 
kind,  the  ~Jcond has  the  twofold advantage  of constituting a  better measurement 
instrument,  on  the  one  hand,  and  of :providing  us the  assurance  that  a  single, 
latent variable  does  exist and determines  all the  responses  to  the questions making 
up the _cluster,  on the. ather hand. 
The  eight  clusters,  made  u:p  of responses  to questions  showing  a  statis-
tical  and. hierar.chiaaLordex...:.amang_:_them., --ilra.:.a.s nfol 1 0'7JL:__ _____ _ 
conservative nationalism, 
satisfjed conservatism, 
:positive  involvement  in the :political unificaUon of  Europe, 
utilitarian :pro-european a 'loti tudes, 
resistance  to  european unification, 
accepted or desired degree  of integration, 
strength of :pro-european feelings, 
cultural  resistance  of an  ethnocentric kind. 
We  are going  to  study  each one  of these  clusters in detail because, 
although  the  data gathered during this  :phase  of the  study were not  representative 
of the universe  studied,  the analysis  carried out  :proved very useful for  the 
:preparation of the final questionnaire -vhich was  later administered  to  re:presen-
tati  ve national  samples. 
1.  Conservative Nationalism (Scale I) 
This cluster made  of five questions,  expressed an  attachment  to 
established social  and :political order,  i.e.  to  a  certain form of conservatism 
·-vhich  represents  the  same  basic variable as nationalism. 
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The  vast majority  of you."!g  respondents  think that  the  principal  task. 
of a  government  is to maintain order in the  country.  AmotiL,  J'OUng  people  '1'ho  ex-
p:ress  this opinion,  close to  three quarters  believe it i.B  important  for their coun-
try  to  play  an important  role in world politics.  At  the bottom of the scale,  the 
most  discriminating question obtains  the  agreement  of those  who  think that  every·-
thing goes  vell  anyway  in the  present  state of affairs,  ar.d  tnat  there :is  no  rea-
son  for  a  change. 
!  Items  N  ~ 486  % 
' 
r-.::--Think that 
11the  Government  mast,  aboveall, 
i  maintain crder in the  country" . . . '  . •  . .  450  93 
- :3elieves it to  be  important  that his  country 
"plays  an  important  role iu •,vorld  politics" . •  .  330  68 
- Believes it i mporte.:r-t  for his  country  to 
i  256  53  I 
"ha"Tre  a  strong  army-"  . . . . . . . . . . •  . . . . 
- Takes  sides against  "students who  demonstrate" 
during  the  last y9ar in this  country  and in 
numerous  other countries . . •  •  . . . . . . . . .  195  39 
- Thinks  :  "everything is ·vell  ·vi th us  and  the 
•vay  things  are,  so ·vhy  change  ?"  . . . . . . . . .  I 65  34 
High  scores  on the scale measuring  conservative nationalism are  found 
in the  foll01ving  subgroups  : 
Young  people  aged 15  to  16  years, 
Young  Jeople ··ri th brothers  and sisters, 
Farmers'  or workingmen's  children. 
This cluster of attitudes is more  related to intellectual  background 
than to material ·.veal th.  In fact,  the  responses  hardly vary as  a  function  to 
the  income  of the household as  reported by  the  respondent.  To  the  contrary, 
•,ve  find  a  much  less nationalist attitude  among  students  than among  youngsters 
of'  the  came  age. 
Young  people ·vho  sho•v little or no  interest in politics are  more 
nationalist  than those •vho  express  a  stronger interest  :  this  finding  confirms 
the  importance  of the  h;ypothetioal  variables  related to level of information  ( 5) 
and  to  tl1e  ciegree  of involvement  in politics  and  public affairs  (16).  In fact, 
persons  ..  rho  claim that  they  never or rarely •vatch newsbroadcasts  on television 
as well  as  those  who  rarely or never  read the news  reports  about  politics in the 
I 
I 
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ne·vspapers  more  ;requently respond,  and  in a  meaningful  wey,  in the  direction 
of conservative nationalism. 
Young  J,-euv:i.e  who  did not  pursue their studies beyond  the  primary  school 
level also  obtain high  scores  (on this scale)  as  do  those ·vho  plan to  take  a  job 
as "l'orking  men  in the next  10 years. 
Since level  of  education,  exposure  to  mo.ss  media  and level  of kno·vledge 
are strongly relaced,  it is not  surprising that youngsters  who  have  not yet  heard 
of plans  for  european  political unification,  or who  cannot  name  the  member  coun-
tries of  the  common  'iarket,  respond more  freqc.'lntly  in the  ci.irection of conserva-
tive nationalism. 
Trust  in traditional  authorities  (parents,  teachers,  union leaders, 
r•Jligious  ..  ctthori ties,  cabinet  members,  legislators,  business  leaders)  usually 
go  along •vi th nationalist  feelings.  At  the  same  time,  an  inverse  relationsl;ip 
·vith trust in leaders  of students  movements  as well  as in student  demonstrators 
is observable. 
Finally,  subjects "rho  believe  that  a  g-ood  citizen loves his  o-:vn  country, 
is proud of it and  defends it against  foreigners,  show  a  higher degree  of nationa-
lism than those  ·vho  believe  a  good citizen is, above  all, he  ·.vho  stands  up against 
the  government  •.vhen  something displeases  him. 
In  sum-nary,  ·.-re  have  qualified as  "conservative nationalism"  those 
attitudes or clusters of attitudes ·.vhich  appear  typical  of the majority of young 
europeans.  This is a  m&jori ty -.vho  is slightly informed,  disinterested in poli ti-
cal life,  suspicious  of ne·v  ideas  and  probably,  as well,  of "intellectual elites", 
and  ·vho  stick cautiously  to  traditional values  and  authorities.  Perhaps it is 
•vhat  no•.vadeys  is called the  "silent  mo.jori ty". 
2.  SaGisfied Conservatism (Scale II) 
This cluster is mo.de  up  of 6  questions.  It expresses  the  at~itudes of 
those  who  are  afro.id of losing their material  -.vel fare  and  w·ho,  as  a  rerml t, are 
opposed  to  running  the risks  of  the venture in european unification.  It is the 
opposit~ of favorable  attitudes  toward  progress  and  protest. 
at the  bottom of this scale  -.ve  find  the notion  that unification is 
impossible because  of the diversity  of l&nguages,  a  notion  found  further  on 
in cultural  and  ethnocentric resistance  to  european unification  (Scale  VIII). 
This  finding is not  surprisinc if one  thinks  of the  importance  of the  motber-
tongue  in the  development  of a  sense of national identity and,  symbolically,  in the  image  one  has  of understanding among  men. 
Items  N = 486  %  I 
I 
+----------------------------~----+-----4 
'  Is not unhappy  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  431  89 
Has  nothi.ng,  in principle,  against  "foreign 
workers",  but  thinks  that  "there  a~·e  really 
too  many  of them in our  country"  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Believes  that "in a  united C,:urope  '.Ie  will  be 
forced  to  accept  decisions  taken  abr·or"d  arJY'~ElY" 
l''inds it important  to 
(or a  new  car) •••• 
be  able  to  afford a  car 
Thinks  that  "everything is well  w·i th 
the ·.vay  things are,  so ·.vhy  change  ?" 
us  and 
. . . . . 
Thinks  that  "european unification is impossible 
because  of different languages"  •  . . . . . . . 
264  54 
256  53 
246  51 
163  34 
82  17 
We  find high scores  on this scale  among  the  same  groups  as  in  the 
previous  scale.  However,  several  differences  show  that it is, indeed,  a  dis-
tinct dimension. 
For  example,  the difference  between  sexes is less  pronounced.  In 
addition,  satisfied conservatism seems  to vary according to  stated religion, 
11 
·vhich is not  the  case  for  the  previous  scale  :  the  persons who  indicated membership 
in the  protestant religion or who  say they  have  no  religion are more  frequently 
satisfied conservatives,  but  this relationship has  to  be  interpreted cautiously. 
J:t.  is interesting to notice,  on  the  other hand,  that  contrary  to  the  satisfied 
conservatives,  those who  might  be  considered as  progressivists or protesters 
coT:lB  most.  frequently  from  rich families. 
Another difference with  respect  to  conservative nationalism is that, 
although  satisfied conservatism crops up  as  frequently  among  youngsters who  intend 
to  become  ·vorkers, it also  appears  a'1ong  young  people 1vho  plan,  later on,  to  take 
jobs  as  heads  of businesses,  upper level  managers,  engineers,  shopkeepers  or tra-
desmen.  On  the other hand,  he  ·nho  plans  to  become  a  high  ranking civil servant 
or  to  pursue  a  professional  occupation is more  often inclined to  protest. 12 
Although  satisfied conservatism  seem  to generate less  resistance  to 
european unification than does  conservative nationalism, it certainly  does  not 
produce  a  favorable  attitude.  In fact,  it goes  along ·vi th  a  ·veak  interest in 
european  questions. 
Also  in contradistinction to satisfied conservatism it is not  related 
to  the  degree  of interest in politics  :  among  youngsters  involved or interested 
in politics, v•e  find  the  same  proportion of satisfied conservatives as  in the 
entire sample. 
The  two  variables we  just  analyzed represent  t·vo  important  aspects 
of the  "conservative-progressive"  dimension.  The  first  component  tends  to  cover 
the  "authoritarian"  aspect  and  the  second,  its "liberal"  aspect  in the  european 
sense  of  the word. 
~e may  thus  conclude  that  the  conservative attitude toward  politics 
presently alive  among  young  people  of the  EUropean  Community  is more  a  kind  of 
"petit-bourgeois"  outlook  than  a  kind  of idealism.  Traditional nationalist ideo-
logy is disappearing in circles of young intellectuals who  •will  probably  provide 
a  high  proportion of  tomorro·'r's  leaders.  On  the  other hand,  nationalism is still 
a  lively feeling among  those young  people  ·.vho  will  probably make  up  the  mass  publics. 
3.  Commitment  in favor  of the political unif'icatiot of furope  (Scde III) 
This  scale,  composed  of seven questions,  seems  to  be  the least  "simple" 
of the  eight hierarchical  scales  detected.  This is probably  the result  of several 
basic variables,  one  of •,vhich  is related to  a  strong ;pro-european attitude  ( pred.is-
position to  put  up with  passing personal  discomfort  to  have  furope  come  to  pass) 
and  a  progressive attitude (favorable  feelings  toward  protesting students  and.  an 
openness  to~rd foreign workers).  Thus  the  hypoti1esis  that nationalist  or satis-
fied conservatism is opposed  to  the  formation  of  pro-european attitudes is veri-
fied anew. Items 
- Does  not  agree  that  "european unification is 
impossible since we  speak  different  languages" 
- Does  not  agree '.'71th  the  statement  that  : 
"Everything is  •~rell  with us  and  the wa;y  things 
are'  so  why  change  ?n  •  •  •  . . . . . . . . . . 
- Is for "students '.vho  !.ave  demonstrated"  during 
the last year in his  own  and  numerous  other 
countries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
i 
- Considers himself as  politically involved in or  I 
keeps  informed of politic"l life without partici-
pating  personally ••••• e  ••••••••• 
- Favors  the  idea that  "his national  currency should 
be  replaced by  a  european  currency"  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
- Does  not  agree  •vi th the idea "as a  rule,  I 
nothing against  foreign workers,  but  there 
really too many  of them  in our country" •• 
have 
are 
•  •  • 
- Is "so  favorable  to  european unification"  that 
he is ready  "to accept,  temporarily,  discomforts, 
(as  for example,  having a  little less money)  so 
long as it comes  to  pass" •••••••••••• 
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N  ~ 486 
404  83 
330  68 
291  60 
55 
260  54 
222  46 
156  32 
Attitudes  on this dimension  occur more  frequently  and  are more  pronoun-
ced among  male youngsters whose  fathers  are not  laborers. 
They  also  show  up  among  catholic young  people  or among  those who  state 
that  they have  no  reli5ion,  but  this is difficult  to  interpret, 
Young  people who  come  from  wealthy families,  who  are  pursuing their 
studies in universities or in centers  of higher learning or who  keep  informed of 
poli tidal  evflntc  have relatively high  scores.  They  are all well-informed about 
european affairs ;  they  express  the hope  that  other european countries will  join 
the  six of the EEC,  including, in numerous  instances,  the  communist  countries 14 
they  prefer types  of unification l"hich  imply  a  high  degree  of integration to 
the  intergovernmental kind  ;  and,  they  have  less confidence  in established 
authorities  than in leaders  of  student  movements  and in young  protestors. 
•'ui<J  third scale thus  appears  to  express  a  general  outlook or a  set 
of attitudes in contrast  to  those  covered by  scales II and III.  This verifies 
once  again  the hypothesis that nationalism and  conservatism run counter to  the 
birth and  to  the  development  of pro-european attitudes. 
4.  Utilitarian Pro-European Attitude  (Scale  IV) 
pursued 
object. 
Scale  IV  shO'VS  that  a  relatively materialistic conception of the goals 
in european unification can also lead to  a  positive attitude toward this 
It turns  on  a  kind of traditional  outkook,  not  in the  least protest-
oriented,  and 1  undoubtedly,  very  similar to  the kind which gave breath to  the 
process  of  economic unification in Europe. 
Thie,  scale includes  five  items  of which the  "easiest" scale point 
is the  statement  that  the relative size of our states is no  longer adapted  to 
conditions of the  modern  •rrorld,  and the  most  difficult  point,  the  statement 
that  the  national  flag  ought  to  be  replaced by  a  european flag in important 
ceremonies. 
Items 
- Believes  that  "the relative size of our states 
is no  longer adapted  to  conditions  of  the modern 
'IVorld,  in our  da;ys,  we  ought  to  think bigger" ••• 
-Thinks that "in a  united Europe 1  ,,,e'll be  able 
to buy  things  cheaper"  •  . . . . . . . . . . 
- C<'nsiders  himself as  politically involved or 
keeps  infOo"c.ed  about  political life wi til  out 
. . . . 
participating personally  •  •  •  . . . . . . . . . . . 
- Would  change  residence if he  were  sure "to find 
in another  region of his  country'"'a more  interes-
ting life"  than the  one  he  can  expect  to  lead by 
staying at  home  •  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .•. 
N z  486 
381  78 
334 
265  55 
245  50 
- Favors  the  idea that  "the national  flag be  repla-
ced  by  a  european  flag in important  ceremonies" ••  159  33  I 
I We  find this atti  t".lC.e  again more  frequently  among  young  men  than 
amo:~g young girls, but  there is no  significant relationship  '.~i th family  cha-
racteristics.  On  the  other hand,  there is a  strong  relations~ip between a 
utilitarian pro-european attitude and  tho  fact  of keeping informed about  po-
litical ne•.vs. 
'I'he  relationship •vi th level of education is less strong than for 
the  former  scale,  but  the attitude generally goes  along with  an  excellent 
kno·vledge  of the  number  and names  of the  countries in the  common  Market.  It 
is likely that existing european  achievements  and institutions are accepted 
at  a  higher rate among  these adolescents  than among  those  ~hose pro-european 
attitude  dr~vs its inspiration from  a  progressive and  protest-oriented inter-
nation  ali  sm. 
The  utilitarian aspect  of the attitude measured is the faot  that  the 
scores  on  this scale are  the  only  ones .,hich sho'v  a  positive and linear corre-
lation ·.vi th the number  of languages  spoken  by  the  respondent  the acceptance 
of  the  Europ~ of the  common  Market is accompanied by  practical steps  to parti-
cipate in it. 
Organized youth,  i.e.  those  ~ho state they  have  paid membership  dues 
to  an  organization,  more  often manifest  this utilitarian pro-european attitude 
than  an idealistic one.  This is the youth •vho,  in ist political activities, 
accepts  the rules of the game  of our society ;  these  are youth  one  could call 
non-demonstrating progressivists or reformers.  For  example,  these young "uti-
litarian"  europeans  show  a  mixed kind of trust in established authority,  a 
great  trust in their generational  cohorts  and  in leaders  of students movements, 
but  none  in student  protestors. 
5.  Resistance  to European Unification (Scale V) 
For one  to act favorably  on  a  goal  or to  decide  in favor  of its 
attainment,  the goal  must  not  only be  attractive but  there  must  also be  no 
resistance  acting in the  opposite direction.  But  several  previous  studies 
have  sh0"'7l1  that most  pro-european attitudes held by  the  public at large can 
be  defined  as  the  absence  of resistance rather than  as  a  positive attraction 
for  the  plans  and initial accomplishments  of european unification. 
The  first  phase  of the  present  study  has  also brought  to light the 
importance  of certain typical kinds  of resistance,  for  example  the fear of cul-
tural levelling.  The  scale, "Those  i terns  are  indicated below,  includes  nearly 
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a  complete list of all  possible kinds  of resistance of the ilk included in the 
questionnaire,  •,vi th  the  sole  exception of those  expressing a  fear of cultural 
levelling.  The  last item in trLJ scale- the  predisposition to accept  temporary 
personal  discomforts  to  have  ElU"Oj,>e  come  to  pass  - is the  only  one  •.vhich  does 
not  express  any  resistance,  but  ·.vhich,  on  the  contrary,  measures  best  the  degree 
of favorable  commitment  to  a  united Europe. Lb 
In short,  Lis scale appears  to  us  to  measure  a  ~ertain kind  of accep-
tance  of auropean unification characterized by  the  absence  of  resistance, i.e., 
by  a  certain optimism,  an  open  mindedness  or,  in other  ~ords,  an  absence  of pre-
judice  regarding,  in particular,  ti;e  possible negative aspects  of european unifi-
cation, 
Items 
- Does  not  agree ·vi th  the idea that  "to attenpt  to 
draw closer together countries  so  different  from 
one  another -.vi thin a  United Europe,  runs  the  l'isk 
of provoking ne•·r  conflicts  and  ne-,r  wars".  . . . . 
- Does  not  agree  •.ri th  the  notiu:1  that  "a United Eu-
rope 1!light  appear as  a  threat  to  other countries 
and generate  ne•v  conflicts" ••• 
- Does  not  agree  that  "the  peoples  of l!.'urope  <..re  too 
self-centered to  clasp hands  in brotherhood" ••• , 
-Does not  agree  that  "in a  United  Europe,  we  ·.vould 
have  to  accept  decisions  taken abroad" ••• ,  ,  ,  , 
- Is  "so  favorable  to  european unification"  that  he 
is prepared "to  put up,  tempor,.rily,  --lith  personal 
discomforts  for it to  come  to  pass" •••• ,  •  ,  ,  I 
I 
N =  486 
361 
357 
257 
230 
156 
<(' 
;· 
74 
73 
53 
47 
32 
The  optimism meo.sured  by  this scale  seems  rather •.videspread  among 
youngsters whose  fathers  hold  positions  as  profescional man  or as  high civil 
servants,  It is •veak  among  youngsters  coming  from  families ·vho  are  independent 
farmers,  storekeepers  or tradesmen.  Catholics  also  seem  a  little -.nore  optimis-
tic  than the others, 
Resistance  to  united Europe  decreases  as  function of the level of 
education.  On  the  other hand,  the  deg~ee of resistance  (or non-resistance)  is 
only slightly related to  the  degree  of information about  the  common  Market, 
·~hich indicates that it is really a  matter of an  intervening variable  :  slight 
resistance  to  european unification is a  necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  condition 
for  the  development  of  a  strong attitude.  It results  in a  permissive attitude. 
(It is note·vorthy  that  for  those •vho  are very  favorably  predisposed  to,.,ard  Uni-
ted Europe,  the  image  of a  good  citizen is one  ·vho  knows  to  place  the  common 
interest  above his  mvn  and respects  the  liberty and  the  convictions  of others. ) 17 
6.  De;:;ree  of  ;~0cepted or Desired Integration  (Scale VI) 
The  fact  that different  degrees  of integration expressed by different 
questions  are located in one unidimensional  cluster confirms  the hypothesis sta-
ted above  that different vie·.vs  of United :C:Urope  - ranging from  a  simple intergo-
vernmental  agreement  to  complete integration of  a  unitary kind- are not qualita-
tively different,  but  rather degrees  of the  same  continuous variable.  (1) 
Items 
- Believes important  "that european countries 
should  join in  a  United  1Urope" •.••••••• 
- Thinks  that "a United Europe  is a  first step 
to,vard ·norld peace"  • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
- Is favorajle  to  the idea that  "national curren-
cy  be replaced by  a  european money"  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
- Is favorable  to  the notion that  "the National 
team  sent  to  the next  Olympic  Games  become  part 
and  parcel  of a  single european  team".  •  •  • 
- Is favorable  to  the idea that  "the national 
flag be  replaced by a  european  flag in important 
ceremonies''  •  •  •  •  • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
% 
442  91 
375  77 
260  54 
161  33 
159  33 
This is, indeed,  a  scale  that measures  the  accepted or desired degree 
of integration.  Only  the  second i tern  deals  ·vi th  the goals of a  United Europe 
(contribute to maintaining world peace)  ·vhereas  the  four  other i terns  deal with 
its content, its manifestations  and its symbols.  However,  the  seaond item is 
the ·.veakest  of the whole  cluster, i.e.  the  one  ·nhich  shows  the le&st  significant 
level  of statistical relationship to  the cluster.  To  us,  its presence recalls 
that  the strongest of all pro-european attitudes suggests  the image  of a  very 
integrated Europe,  one  like a  european nation in •nhich  the  pre-existing nations 
would  be  amalgamated. 
This  evidence confirms  the hypothesis whereby  the  images  of a  Europe 
that would unite only  the  nations  and states composing it in the most  ardent 
form  of cooperation are held mainly  by  persons  who  do  not  really have  a  favora-
ble attitude toward  european unification. 
(1)  See  page  6 18 
Corr.:;la  tions  b 3t'.veen  this variable  and  the various  characteristics 
of the  respondents  are  about  the  same  as  those  found in analyzing  the other 
pro-european  scales (III,  IV  and  V).  nonetheless,  all  these  correlations  are 
weaker. 
As  an  example,  a  favorable  attitude  toward  integration in its penul ti-
mate  form  of  development  implies great trust in the  leaders  of student  move~ents 
and  even in protesting students,  but  does  not  predict at all  to  the  amount  of 
trust  in established authorities. 
The  relative •.veakness  of correlations  between  scores  on  this  scale 
(VI)  and other characteristics of  tr1e  respondents is  probably  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  degTee  of integration is not  a  clear or '.villing  choice,  but  rather a 
vague  desire or ·vish  about  the  organization of  Europe  in the  future. 
7.  Intensity of pro-European  Feelings  (Scale VII) 
The  items in this  scale  express  a  certain impatience 'vi th  the  making 
of Europe.  As  in the  precedinc  scale,  there are  items  related to  the  politic10l 
organization of  a  United  Europe,  but  accompanied this  time  by  the  CJ.Uestion  whicJ:, 
··re  found  measures  best  the  degree  of com'Ili tment  to  ilirope,  namely  :  the  predispo-
sition to  put  up  ·vi th  temporary  persom.l  discomf:orts  to  have  Europe  come  to  p£cp:; 
(Scale III and  V).  'rhis  scale is quite distinct  fro:1  the  former  ne  because  of 
the  presence  of items  expressing  a  desire  for  concrete  policies  and  definite ac-
tjon  :  a  european  army,  a  european  currency,  a  european  government. 
Believes it important  "tho.t  european 
join together in a  United  Europe  "  • 
countries 
Thinks  that  "the govern:nent  sicould,  above all, 
contribute to  the  buildinG of  a  United  Europe" 
Is  favorable  to  "the principle of a  european 
army  -~hich ·vould unite  the  ar;oi es  of different 
countries  of 
1'lestern  .;urope"  including  the  in-
tervie·7ee' s  01.vn  countr<-J ••••...••.•. 
Is  favorable  to  the  idea "that  the  national  cur-
renc0•  be  replaced  by  a  european  ::ooney"  ••••• 
Is  favorable  to  tte notj.on  that  "  the  i.joverne1ent 
of  ""'urope  have  the richt  to  take  decisions  about 
certain important  issues,  decisions ·vhich 'vould 
takG  precedence  over t"ose of the national go-
vcrnment"  . . . . .  . . . . • 
Is  "so  favorable  to  the unification of Europe  " 
thc.t  he  is  ready  ''to  put  up,  tecnporarily,  ·ri th 
personal  discomforts  to  have it come  to  pass".  • 
N =  486 
442  91 
421 
318 
260  54 
245  50 
156  32 The  highest  scores  on  this scale are found  among  the  best  informed 
youth,  ·vi th all the  subsidiary characteristics it involve'  (family size,  head 
of household's  occupation,  level of education), 
Notice,  however,  that  responses  to  the items  making  up  this scale 
she·~ a  strong relationship .,'i th  responses  to  ti1e  question measuring the  degree 
of information about  the  existence of plans for  the  political unification of 
Europe.  This  demonstrates  that  this scale is measuring  an  active  pro-european 
attitude accompanied by  ideas  about  the political  contours  of a  United Europe, 
The  respondents  who  obtained a  high  score  on  this scale also more  often give 
right  answers to the question about  the  countries which  are members  of the  com-
mon  Market. 
8,  Cultural Resistance  of  the  ethnocentric  Type  (Scale VIII) 
The  variable measured by  this scale could have  been defined as  a 
kind of nationalism,  It represents,  however,  a  particularism of a  different 
kind,  for the  most  meaningful  items  included in the measure  of nationalism 
(scale I) are missing here.  Scale VIII  begins  and  ends  •vi th i terns  clearly 
focused  on  the  particular culture of a  people  :  to let all  peoples keep their 
distinctive birthmarks  and to believe that  european unification is impossible 
because  of  the diversity in languages.  One  also finds  an item typical  of sa-
tisfied conservatism  :  satisfaction  ·r~i th  the  present state of things. 
~vo of our latent variables  are clustered on  this scale  :  the  ethno-
centrism (or inability to identify •,vi th a  larger community)  and  attachment  to 
one's cultural identity (expressed as  the fear to lose this identity).  This 
may  be  due  to  the fact  that  those  two  variables are strongly related - and al-
so  to the impossibility of distinguishing one  from  the other with  the  question-
naire used. 
This  scale  expresses  a  deeply felt,  basic kind of resistance.  The 
interdependence  of the  items  in the  scale  does  not  spring from  logical  reaso-
ning  but  from  deep  feelings  in the  respondent,  It is a  deeply  rooted resistan-
ce  that  any  european informationmd training program  for youth must  take into 
account. 
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- -- ----------------,---,---~ 
Items 
Agrees  that "all  peoples  ought  to keep  their 
distinctive heritages"  •  . . . . 
Is not  "opposed,  in principle,  to 
"TOrkers,  "  but  thinks  that  "there 
too  many  of  them  in our country" 
foreign 
are  really 
. . . . . 
important  to  be  able  to  afford 
. . 
. . 
BElieves it 
a  car  (or a  ne·v  car)  .  .  . . . . . 
Agrees  that  "ti.e  peoples  of b'urope  are  too self 
centered to  join hands  in brotherhood" •••• 
Agrees  that the  state'llent  :  "all is "-Tell  '.vi th 
us  and  the  ,_va:y  things  are,  so  'Yhy  change  ?  "  •  • 
Agrees  that  "european unification is impossible 
since we  all  speak  different  languages" ••• , 
N =  486  I 
430  e8 
264  54 
240  49 
229  47 
165  34 
'  '  82  I  17 
J  I 
According  to  a  hypothesis  stated at  the  end  of  the  first  phase  of the 
study,  this re8istance  ought  to  be  found  more  among  the youngest  age  group.  It is, 
ho'vever,  not  confirmed.  It is nonetheless  possible that  this resistance, which is 
observable in all  age  groups,  is  expressed more  easily and more  spontaneously  by 
the youngest  cohorts. 
Like all resistance of  the  conservative-nationalist  type,  the  cultural 
and  ethnocentric resistance  increases in function  of the  number  of brothers  and 
sisters of the respondent.  High  scores  also  show  up  among  respondents  fro:n  farm-
mming  families,  •.vhich  suggests  that  the attaci1ment  to native soil is directly or 
indirectly related to  fears  of  the  effects of a  more  advanced  european integration. 
On  the other hand,  little resistance  of this kind is  found  ar.wng  responden Ls  from 
'veal  thy  fa:nili es. 
as  a  general  rule,  the  scores  on  scale VIII,  covary with  the  other 
characteristics of  the  respondents  just like  t11e  other variable 'Vhich  implied 
an  opposition to  european unification, 21 
The  second phase  of the  study was  a  transitional  phase in the  desl.gn 
of  the  final  questionnaire,  Most  of the questions cvhich  proved  to  form hierarchi-
cally  ordered clusters  for  a  heterogeneous  sample  of yc~:th 'Yere  adopted  in the 
questionnaire used in the  th:1rd  phase. 
None·Gheless,  the last phase  also dealt specifically wt th young  people  1 tl 
attitudes.  Fa::- this reason, it is pertinent  to verify  to what  extent  thG  hypothe-
ses  for'"·'llated at  the  end.  of the first  phase were  00l".firmed  or not. 
a)  Confirmed is the notion  that  the different definitions  of unification 
ra!J6inrr  fro"!  "l'Europe des  patries"  based  on  agreements  between sovereign states to 
a  Europe  of a  unita"';)'  type  are  projected on  to  a  single continuous variable within 
the  att:i tude  s;;rs+em  o~ .routho 
ll 1  The  importance  of ',he first  indep&ndent  variable ,.-hich we  defined 
in hypotLcni,:"l  terms  and  ceJ.led idealistic internationalism,  has  been  confirmed. 
This  wa.riable influences  the  development  oF}no  european  :fe'elingH. 
c)  The  second hypothetical variable,  political nationalism,  in·oerferes 
'Vi th  the  development  of truly european feelings.  This  political nationalism,  of 
an  authoritarian bent is effectively different  from  the  desire to keep one's cul-
tural  and linguistic identity and  fro.n  ethnocentricism proper,  i.e.  from  the ten-
dency  to  accept  awl  to  i'o.vor values,  vie'vs  and ·.veys  of life of one's  o·m  in-group. 
d)  On  the  other hand,  the  existence  and  the  importance  of the  third 
variable, i.e.  the  resistance to  technological  civilization and  the negative  raQction 
to  the  technical  and esoteric character of present  european realizations  and institu-
tions,  have not  been demonstrated. 
The  non-verification of  a  hypothesis,  which  seemed  to  be  backed up  by 
common  sense,  must  be  interpr·;ted cautiously.  It mey  well  be,  in fact,  that  the 
questions  asked had not  been ·.vell  sui  ted  to  the desired measure  1  or else that  the 
variables  related to  pro-european attitudes,  such  as  they were  measured  by  the 
questionnaire,  are far  removed  from  those 'Vhich  would have  par·mi tted the measure-
ment  of attitudes  toward  present  day  accomplishments  and institutions. 
e)  The  fo,n·th  variable, i.e.  the desire for  peace,  and anxiety in the 
face  of conflicts,  has  been  confirmed in so far as -i-ts-existence and its importance 
in the  development  of pro-european  feelings  are  concerned. 
f)  The  importance  of information level  (hypothetical variable 5)  has 
also  been  confirmed,  The  lo·.v  level  of a·vareness  of european  problems  and  the  rather 
negative attitudes  toward  european unification amant:·  young  people with little intel-
lectual  training,  support without necessarily confirming the bypothesis  that visible 22 
signs  of t:,e  present  european  Co::ununi ty  on  television are  too  rare  and  draw 
far  too little on  the  public  emotions  to  be  capable  of creating favorable  cur-
rents  of feeling  among  non-intellectuals. 
g)  The  sixth variable,  the  degree  of 
11presence"  of  european  j_nstitu-
tions  in the  public's field of perception,  has  not  been verified. 
h)  In order to  confirm  tLe  i::1portunce  of tl:e  seventi variable  (livi11{-; 
under centralized or decentralized socio-political  systems), it is necessary  to 
d_'LW  a  comparison between several  countries,  soT'lething  ti;e  sample  did not  allcc• 
at  this  sta;:e  of the  study. 
i.) 
(hypothetical 
The  impnrtance  of  the  identification ·_vi th  nat~·_cnal  sub-groups 
variable)  has  not  been  confirmed  (1 \. 
j)  The  existence  a1od  the  importance  of  the  ninth variable  ( ethnocen-
trisrn)  has  ~een partially confiriecl.  It has  also been  confir~ed  t~~,&t  this varia-
ble is different  fro111  nation&list  ones  anti  t;1at  it runs  counter to  pro-european 
feelin6L• 
k)  The  tenth hypothetical variable ·vas  age  :  pro-european  feelj n,n:s 
should occur more  frequently  ae1onc  young  people  (aged 15-16)  than  amonr:  older 
ones  (19-20 years  old).  .nt  this  point  of tLe  study,  this hypothesis  has  not 
been confirned.  On  the contrary,  the  average  scores  on  the scales  e1easurinG 
nationalism,  coi1servatism  and  ethnocentris;n  are  slic;h tly higher in tr  e  fi :est 
of the  t-yo  age  brackets.  Inversely,  the  averace  scores  on  the scales  ::1ea~;urint; 
pro-european attitudes  are very  slightly hicher in the  second  ago  oracket,  axcept 
for  scale VI  •.vhich  expresses  a  favorc.';_Jle  oriento.tion  toward symbols  of  a  United 
Europe  ( 2 ). 
l)  The  importance  of the  eleventh variable, i.e.  the desire  foreman-
cipation,  has  been confimed.  '.!ost  of  the  sets of question,;  related to  ,era-euro-
pean attitudes contain items  .. ,hich  express  a  desire  to  free  oneself  fro,CJ  the  very 
marked  coercion of traditional  authorities. 
(1) 
( 2) 
Tti<>  $~al\l 'it'll reappear in  the  third  phtcse  of  the  stu~ b"t  oJ;)e  ·7;ill  notice 
tat l  shlni· uence  en+bthe.1"0r'1at~on of  Pro-euraP\l~nda.t.  tudes  ls.th~ opposlte 
o  ·vha  ad  een  hvpo~  'jl.$lZ\'\1.  .Pro-eurege;;cn  a ttl.  J;U  es  ecrease  ln  c.nDc:.J:l 
0  the  degree  01·  ltienvl..i.lCa"tJ.On  1.7i th rcnn  rl  ty  natlODal  SUb-croups. 
'l'his  I;;)·olem  Ihls  b.aen  stui:i  <od  l. n  greater.  det~·  8. l  durinc·  ·~l;!e  thir~ Dhi>se,  (See 
I'a~es  oU  to  7  •  '~e  cacoe  to  t ·e  congll.l.Slan  at,  l!.  na  lOnalls  tcne1  e,;hnocen-
or'fc  feeJ.l.ng"S  re  J.ess  DO"'!e:;:;fu  ~('lQ11gd1b  to  - ,yearf?, 01  YOUJ:l.(:S  8<'S  than  a"'ong 
aO-li  teo'  l  t  O.Qe  not..  a  ~a  ur~  Ill-S  ecr  ~se  :t;1  a-r:;l  nal  valUes  lS  CC  r;I  a-
nlea by  a  reln~orc~meBf oi rna~=?  ln~ernaflonail$¥ ana  uro-euro~ean  rkee~l~gs. 
J"  ;nore  ~fi'~lD~d ana1ySlij  :;;  ou~d  bd  na  e  by  comp;;crll;l~morll  close1  orac  e ,e  age  o  s  1  -1  \l  rs, 11-1  e  rs  a  y  uest  onl  ou  pe  e  nd  aau  ts  ~~ ¥te  a.e  afull'y,  in or  e~ to  on¥rof  a~  mucE  as  o~sl~e a£f  ot~er varla-
b1es  except  age. m)  It w·as  not  possible to  distin;:;uish  the  attachment  to  lLnguagc 
and  cultural identity (the hel  vth hypothetical variable)  :from  ethnocentrism, 
n)  The  function  of  kno·.~ledge of y.re6·•mt.  eur·opean  institution<.: 
(thirteenth variable)  has  not  been isolated in its r,ure  state,  One  observe~., 
of course,  a  very  strong correlation  bet':"leen  pro-e-uropean atti  tudeG  .;;\,(;.C  ~~-}e 
amount  of kno·yledge  of present  european  institutions,  but,  for the  moment,  it 
is impossible  to  clearly distin,;uist  cause  fro'll  effect. 
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o)  '.Vhe  fourteent'l variable,  i.e.  the  urge  to  nove  "lithj.n  a  familiar 
en·riron"!ent,  has  been  pc.rtially confirmed,  Dne  observes  that  resistarce  to 
europe&n unification  increases  in the  degree to ·vhich  one  is less  inform8d  about 
other  peoples  and  other cultures.  Ignorance  of one's  neighbor  seemc  to  r.·o  along 
vith  a  ereater fear of the  possible  effec-'os  of unification. 
p)  Recardin.;  the  fifteent11 variable  ( uesire to  overcome  an  infer:'.ori  ty 
complex  tow·ard  the great  po•·rers),  •.ve  had  thout;lJt  that  the desire to have  a  politi-
cally united Europe  represent  a  third great  power- equal  to  the United States and 
to  the  URSS-,  would be  a  symptom,  This  is not  the case.  Positive responses  to 
this  i tern  are  only  \veakly  correlated ·.vi th  the most  sensitive indicators  of pro-
european atti  tc.·: Js.  It seems  that this infcriori  ty feeling leads instead to  a 
sublimetion of nationalist  feelings  into an  image  of  a  El:trope  ·nhich c,vould  have 
as its sole functior  the satisfaction of  poxer needs.  Persons  vrho  are motivated 
in this way  do  not  seem  opposed  to  european  unifi~ation, but  appear little incli-
ned  to  accept  or  to  participate actively in advanced  degrees  of integration. 
q)  The  degree  of involvement  in politics and  public affairs  (the 
sixteenth Vliriable)  has  been  confirmed  as  a  factor underpinning  pro-european 
attitur'·),  One  observes,  ho·.vever,  that  the  relationship is stronger 'Yith atti--
tudes  of the idealistic type  (scale III) rather than ·vi th utilitarian and realis-
tic attitudes  (scale JV), 
r)  It has  also been  sho·.m  that  civic  s:t;irit  (the seventeenth variable) 
bears  a  relationship to  pro-european attitudes,  Ho·.,ever,  this  positive relation-
ship is found  only when  civic spirit is defined as  a  feeling  of responsibility 
to•vard  society.  Defined in  a  traditional  •'lay  and  as  more  or less indicative of 
patriotism,  civic spirit bears  a  negative  relationship to  pro-european  feelings, 
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In short,  t·.~ro  ma.jor  conclu:.:>ions  can  be  ~ra·vn from  the  research, 
SIOecifico.lly  D.ealing  ·.vith youti,,  ·rhich  ·.vas  conducted.  d.urinc  the first  t•.vo 
phases. 
:.  - •'ile  different positive vimvs  about  a  United Europe,  as  well  as 
commit~ent in favor  of unification,  exist mainly  among  those  youth with the  most 
developed  intellect. 
This  probably  explains,  in part,  ·vhy  the scales having  to  do  with  these 
viens  and attitudes generally  form less coherent  clusters than  do  the  scales  con-
cerning national,  conservati1s  :-01d  ethnocentric attitudes.  In fact,  the  principle 
underlying  the coherence  of the first croup  tends  to  be  intellectual  and  rational, 
·~hereas that  of the  second groufC  is :nore  affective and  enotional. 
2.  -The qualitative changes  in the  views  and attitudes  among  the 
youngest  people  of the  new  generation do  not  seem  to  be  very  large.  In the groups 
·vith  the highest  intellectual  background,  one  observes  a  keener,  more  critical 
turn of mind  and  a  more  or less  marked  rejection of traditional authority,  but 
this is a  l'tinori ty  of youth.  On  the whole,  symptoms  of conservatism are mo"'e 
striking than  symptoms  of progressivism  and  protest. 
This last  comment,  based  on  data collected in 1968  and 1969,  should 
not let one  lose  from  sight that,  on  the  one  hand,  studies like this  one  OUbht 
to  be  repeated  periodically in order to  dra·.v  sounder conclusions  and  that,  on  the 
other hand,  the  phenomena  of  "social  resonance",  ·.7here by  innovating or disruptive 
minorities  can have  a  lasting or passing influence  out  of  proportion to  their 
numerical  size,  are still badly understood. 25 
Second Part 
THE  DETER'!Hli..NTS  OF  POSITIVE  .ic~''I'ITUDES  1'0W.ARD 
THE  POLITICaL  UNIFICaTION  OF  i!.'lG,Cn 
In order to interpret  tl1e  findings  of the  ti1ird phase  of this study, 
-,rhich  sought  to identify  t_le  determiaants  of positive attitudes  toward  the poli-
tice~ unification of burope, it •.vas  indispensable  to have  in hand  an  index  of 
pro-european attitudes.  Such  an index  had  to  fulfill  two  conditions  :  1) contain 
a  relatively high  number  of questions,  since  the accuracy  of placement  of a  respon-
dent  on  a  given  index  increases  as  a  functioil  of the  number  of question it contains; 
2)  be  made  up  of questions  'Yhich  are  statistically related. 
It made  sense  to  search for this  index  among  hierarchical  clusters or 
scales  detected by  a  multivariate  an~lysis during  the  second  phase  of  the data-
processing.  But  two  problems  arose  :  the first was  that  these scales had  been 
derived  from  findings  based on  a  sample  of youne  people  exclusively,  whereas  'Ve 
were  no··r  dealing with  a  population aged 16  and over  ;  the  second problem •.vas  that 
the questions used in  the  thirc'c  pLase  ·.vere  not  exactly  the  same  as  those  used in 
the  second  phase.  Therefore,  the  findings  of the t"ird phase  ·~ere  submitted to  the 
name  type  of multi  variate analysis  as  was  done  in the  previous  phase  ;  this  ad the 
additional  advantage  of allo·,;ing comparisons  bet·.~een the variables  determining the 
pro-european attitudes of young  people  as well  as  those  determining the attitudes 
of the  entire  popul~tion. 
The  findings  of this  e1ul ti  variate analysis will  be  studied late:!'  ( 1). 
It suffices  to  indicate here  that  no  contradiction was  found  bet•.veen  the scales 
detected during  the  second phase  and  tllose  '7hich '"ere  dra-m  from  the  findings  of 
the  third.  phase. 
The  problem  remains  in the  choice  of a  single scale  of sufficient 
cenerality as  to  constitute  an  index  of  pro-european attitudes valid for all 
intervie•yees.  "'be  final  choice settled on  a  set of questions '.7hich  not  only 
composed  a  hierarchically ordered scale,  but  also  included items  that  frequently 
appeared in most  of the scales  measuri1:,s  pro-european attitudes, no  matter what 
the  type. 
'I'he  index  of pro-european attitudes  tcl;:es  on  tl1e  follo·ting  form 
(see  table I) 
(1)  See  chapter II,  pages  122  to  148  and document  INRJ,.  C.  01.197, 
appendices  to  the  report  on  "L'unification  europeenne"  (third quantitative 
phase). 26 
Table  l 
COMPOSH'ION  OF  TEE  Il!Dl:lX  OF  PRO-i:.UROPEdl  J.TTITUDES 
Ite'I\S 
- Is very  of fairly  favorable  to  european 
unification .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
- Is favorable  to  tl:e  evolution of  tlce  common 
:.!arket  to·vard  a  political grouping in the 
forr:1  of a  U.S.  of Europe  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  .  •  . . 
- .ngrees  that  above  the  government  (of his  o·•rn 
country)  there be  a  european  ,:;overnment  res-
ponsible  for  common  policies  in the  areas  of 
foreign affaire,  defense  and  economy •••••• 
- Is favorable  to  the  proposal  that  the  currency 
(of his country)  be  replaced  by  a  european  cur-
rency  .  •  •  .  .  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  ·  •  •  •  ·  ·  •  ·  • 
- Is ·vholly  or fairly predisposed to  accept 
certain personal  sacrifices,  financially  for 
example,  to  see  Europe  come  to  pass •.• 
- Would  be  terribly sorr-J  to hear  to-morro·v 
that  the  common  ':!arket  is being  disbanded 
. . . 
. . . 
ll  =  8750 
6377 
6094 
4869 
44:Jj 
3000 
2510 
73 
70 
~l 
34 
29 Scores  on  this scale were  attirbuted to  each  respondent  in the follo-
a)  Subjects  •!rho  systematically responde(l  by  "don't kno'V"  to  each 
question  or who  gave  no  answer were  sorted out  from  the others, 
since it was  not  possible  to  assign  any :'leasure  of attitude inten-
sity to  them  (1). 
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b)  The  score of each  subject was  simply  fixed  by  adding up  the  num-
ber of questions  the  subject  ans•Nered  pcsi tively according to the  sca-
le ;  we,  thus,  obtained scores varying between 0  (no  posiUve  response) 
to +6  (responses  to  each of the six questions in the seale), 
c)  Given  the  lw.rge  number  of per:;ons  who  obtained the  score  of  "0", 
we  tried to distinguish in this group the  "indifferents",  "undecideds", 
and  the "hostiles"  :  persons who  'vere.  "indifferent''  to  the  easiest ques-
tion in the  scale ("are you favorable  to  european unification")  were as-
signed to  this group  ;  those who  ans,vered  "don't know"  or who  did not 
answer this question were  classified as  "undecideds"  ;  finally,  those 
who  answered  "rather unfavorable"  or "very unfavorable"  were  attributed 
a  score of -1, which made  it possible to  extend the  scale  by  one  point, 
The  index  thus  constructed,  we  still had  to  veri~ its hierarchical 
and metrical  properties  and  to use it in  the analysis  of the entire data set (2), 
The  distribution of scores  on  this pro-european index  is given for  each 
country  and  for the whole  of the  Community  in table  2  : 
( 1)  In fact,  this group is rather small  and  is barely perceptible •Ni th the 
exception of the Italian sample. 
( 2)  To  veri~ the unidimensional  character of  the  index,  see  the  tec"!mical 
report  of INRA,  doc,  c.  01-J 97. I  I  EEC  Scores 
i  I  Total 
l  I  (=) 
'  %  i 
I 
+  6  12 
+  5  15 
I 
! 
A  27 
+  4  19 
+  3  17 
B  36 
+  2  13 
+  1  11 
c  24 
Indifferent  4 
Undecided  5 
- 1  3 
No  response  1 
I 
D  13 
I 
I 
Total  100 
'  Avo rage  score  3,11 
N  8749 
Table  2 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  TliE  PRO-EtJROPE.AN 
INDEX  BY  COUNTRY  (x) 
(Interviewees  aged  16  anci  o} der) 
' 
• Germany  Belgium  France  Italy 
i 
% 
C'  ,o  I 
,~ 
I'  ~~ 
18  10  I  8  11  '  I 
17  12  12  17 
35  22  20  28 
17  19  18  23 
13  15  19  19 
30  34  37  42 
12  14  16  11 
9  13  14  8 
21  27  30  19 
6  7  3  2 
5  8  5  4 
3  2  4  3  - - 1  2 
14  17  13  11 
100  100  100  100 
3.30  2,80  2,79  3·27 
2019  1298  2046  1822 
28 
I  I 
Llllrembourg I  Netherla.ndtl 
I 
%  I  %  !  . 
8  12  ' 
18  19 
! 
! 
26  31 
; 
I 
I 
19  l7 
22  19 
41  36 
I 
1 
~ 
16  13 
9  10  I 
25  23 
4  3 
2  3 
2  4  - -
8  10 
100  100 
3,19  3,24 
335  1229 (x)  The  results are presented with  4  sub-t~tals which  reflect the  strength 
of the attitude  (as  measured  by  the index)  at  these scale points  :  very 
favorable  (A),  favorable  (B),  fairly favorable  (c),  indifferent, hesi-
tant  or negative  (D). 
(=) The  results in the column  ""uropean  Community"  correspond  to  the  total 
results for  each  country weighted  by  the  percentage of the  population 
aged  16 years  and  older in each  of  the countries,  namely 
Germany  46.232.000  ou  33,238 % 
Belgiu;u  7.132.000  ou  5,128  d' 
I" 
France  37.139.000  ou  26,701  % 
Italie  39.294.000  ou  28,250 % 
Luxembourg  254.000  ou  0,183 % 
Pays-Bas  :  9. 041.000  ou  6,500 % 
Total  139.092.000  ou  99.990 % 
This means  ~i>at  these  percentages  are the best  possible estimations 
of the  percentage  one  should obtain in  inter~lewing a  representative  sam-
ple  of the total  population of the Community. 
29 30 
In the whole  communi~y,  roore  than  one  person  out  u:..·  :iuJ.:..'  (27  ,,,  can 
be  considered as  very  favorable  to  europea.n  unifica-tion.  T~e truly  inC.=._f_ier.Jnt, 
undecided and hostile  person::;  bo.rel~~  represent  :nore  than  one  out  of ten  (13 j;), 
Hidway  between  these  two  polar extremes,  60  'f.  of the  population  seems  to drift 
from  a  point  of unawarenes&  or disinterest  (rather than hostility)  to  one  of 
commitment.  (See  graphic  1) 
.tiS  one  can  see,  when  the countries  are  ranked  b:r  their mean  scores, 
Germans  come  in first  place ·vi th  a  score  of 3,30,  the  Italians "Ti th  3,27,  and 
the  Dutch  '!Ti th  3,24,  followed  closely by  the Luxembourgers  ·.vi th  3,19, yet  far 
ahead  of  the Belgians 'vi th  2 ,eo  and  the  French "lith  2,  79. 
No-v,  if the hir;hest  scores  (  +  6  and  +  5  )  on  the  index  i:·Etead  of 
the  mean  scores are  taken into account,  nearly  the  same  rank-order is  found  but 
the  differences  bet•  .  .-een  the  countries are  coore  accentuated  :  Germany  and Holland 
first  (35  and  31%  respectively), Italy (28  ).,),  Luxembourg  (26 ;;),  Eele;ium  (22  %) 
and  France  (20  ~). 
More  detailed results •.till  be  presented in these  t•1o  chapters 
I  Summary  resnl ts  by country. 
!I  Characteristic"  -f  f~.vorable commit:,>ent  to 
european unifi  :~~tion. 31 
Graph  1 
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I 
Strl!l.WlY  F'INDINGS  EY  COUNTRY 
Most  of the findings  of international  survey  research are presented 
by  country,  and  the  analyses  are  often limited to  comparisons  between countries. 
The  journalist and his  reader,  indeed the specialist,  easily come  to  believe  that 
people  in one  country  think and  behave  in a  particular way  and that  people  in ano-
ther country  think  and  act in other ways.  This is merely  on  indication of what 
·.ve  might  call  comparative national  ethnocentrism,  i.e,  an outlook  on  the world 
whereqy  membership in a  national group is for  each  and  every  one,  the  single best 
discriminatory criterion in the  formation  and  the  expression of his attitudes and 
behavior,  In other words,  we  presume  that,  from  a  social-psychological  point  of 
view,  a  person is German,  Belgian,  French,  •••  before  being a  man  or woman,  young 
or old,  rich or poor,  or educated or not, 
In the next  chapter,  we  shall  see  tow unscientific this method is. 
National  membership has  to  be  treated as  a  variable among  others.  It ·vill  even 
be  shown  that this  va~iable is a  relatively weak  predictor of attitudes  toward 
european unification in contrast  ~th others like socio-occupational  status,  edu-
cation level  and  even  sex. 
Nonetheless,  in this chapter,  we  have  adhered  to  the traditional 
country  by  country presentation, not  for  the  sake  of  op~ortunism nor from  a 
desire  to  avoid running counter  to  conventional  practice,  but in order to  take 
into account  the  fact  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  data were  collected on  the basis 
of national  ~epresentative samples  and  that,  on  the other hand,  the socio-politi-
cal,  socio-economic  and  socio-cultural  systems  constituting our nation-states are 
still -or seem  to be- very  different  from  one  another,  even within the  european 
Community. 
lll'e  will  examine,  successively  the follo•ving variables  : 
1.- Demographic  and cultural differences  among  countries. 
2.- Political, union  and religious  participation. 
3.- Exposure  to mass  media,  level  of knowledge  and  contacts 
•'Ti th foreign countries. 
4.- .Uti  tudes  tmvard  european unification, 
5.- General  attitude  to·vard life (satisfaction or dissatis-
faction,  optimism  or  pessi~ism). 
6.- Aims  and objectives attributed to  the  socio-political system. 
7.- Degree  of trust in certain foreign peoples. 1  - DE:\!OGRJ..PHIC  .AND  CULTURAL  DIFFERENCES  A'~ONG COUNTRIES 
a)  Sex  :  In each of the six countries of the  european  Community,  •vomen 
are  more  numerous  than men,  although the  difference is slight. 
b)  Age  :  Persons  of 55  years of age  and older represent,  on  the  average, 
almost  one-third of the  population studied in all six countries.  The  percentage 
of persons 1vho  1vere  65  and  older,  at ar.  a:;e  one  can regard as  marking the  end of 
active  employment  in life, is relatively high in the  Belgian and French  samples 
(18  %) , 1vhereas it is not  so  high in the Halian (10 %)  and Dutch  (9 %)  samples. 
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o)  Occupation  :  .Among  inhabitants  of  the  countrj.es of the  European  Community 
aged 16  and older,  only 8% are  employed in agriculture.  Three-fourths  of them 
are farmers,  and one-fourth are hired farm helpers,  the majority of which  reside 
in Italy.  In Belgium and in Italy,  only  a  small  proportion of the active  popula-
tion is employed in agriculture  :  2  to  3%  •  On  the  other hand,  in the  samples 
of these  two  countries,  there is a  relatively high proportion of shopkeepers  and 
artisans  :  i.e., 10  to  11  %,  compared  to  an average of 7 %•  in the  European  Com-
munity. 
d)  Education level  :  In Germany,  and to a  lesser extent  in France,  a  high 
proportion of respondents  did not  go  past  the  primary level.  In the countries 
·.vhere  this  proportion is lmver,  the  percentage of persons  having gone  to univer-
sity is not  very high either,  except in Belgium;  particularly in these countries, 
there is a  larger proportion of persons who  have  attended courses  in technical  or 
vocational  schools.  The  proportion of persons who  completed higher education is 
10  to  12 %  in Belgium,  in France  and in Italy, in contrast  to  only  4 %  in Germany. 
(See  table  3) 34 
Primary  School 
Secondary 
School 
Technical  or 
Vocational 
Scho:>l 
Higher 
Education 
Other 
Don 1 t  know  or 
not  ascertain 
Total 
N 
1 
Table  3 
E~UCATION LEVEL  IN  THE  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  EEC 
(respondents  aged 16  and older) 
EEC  Germany  Belgium  France  Italy  fLux em bourg 
%  %  %  -%  %  % 
53  67  46  56  52  44 
24  23  21  16  29  22 
13  6  21  16  7  21 
6  4  10  10  12  4 
1  0  1  - - 6 
0  0  1  - - 1 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
6752  2021  1296  2046  1622  335 
Netherlands 
% 
35 
35 
19 
7 
3 
1 
100 
1230 35 
2  - POLITICAL,  U1ITON  AND  RELIGIOUS  PARTICIPATION 
A.  POLITICAL  P.t..R1'ICIPATION 
Three  questions  or groups  of questions  made  it possible to  study atti-
tudes  tmvard politics  and  the  party identification of the  intervie-vees,  the rela-
tion wrJ :Jh  may  exist  bet,~reen party identification and  attitudes toward  european 
unification~ and finally  the  transm:'..sdr,n  of party identification  from  one  gene-
ration to  the  other. 
a)  Attitudes  to'ITard  politics  and  party identification 
"Do  you,  yourself,  participate in political activities 
or do  you  follow politics with  some  interest without parti-
cipating actively,  or don't  politics interest you especial-
ly or not  at all  ?n 
"Is there  a  political  party you  feel  closer to  (than others)  ?rr 
"Do  you feel  strongly attached to  this party or only  a  little?" 
Very  few  respondents  indicated that  they were  participating in political 
activities  :  4% as  an  average  for  the  entire  Community,  without  large differences 
from  one  country  to  another. 
The  great majority of respondents  divide into  three groups  of about 
equal  size  : 
36  %  indicate that  they  follow· with interest politics without  partici-
pating actively  ( 47  %  in Holland  and  17  %  only  ill  :Jelgium)  ; 
31% indicate that politics does  not interest  them  more  than anything 
else 
27%  say  they  are not interested at all in politics  (54%  in Belgium). 36 
In Holland  and in France,  follo·ved by Luxembourg,  Germany  and Italy, 
the citizens more  frequently  feel  involved in politics.  Belgium comes  in last, 
Walf  behind the  others  (1).  (See  table  4) 
Table  4 
PARTICIPATION  IN  POLITICAL  LIFE 
(Respondents  aged 16  and  older) 
EEC  G  B  F 
%  %  %  % 
Participate in political activities  4  3  3  4 
Are  interested in politics without 
participating actively  36  36  17  42 
Are  not  especially interested in 
politics  31  43  23  26 
Arb  not interested at all in poli-
tics  27  16  54  27 
Don't know  or don' t  answer  2  2  3  l 
Total  100  100  100  100 
N  8752  2021  1298  2046 
I  L  N 
%  %  % 
5  2  3 
33  41  47 
22  34  25 
34  20  23 
5  3  2 
100  100  100 
1822  335  1230 
In order to make  these  differences between countries  stand out better, 
it is possible to calculate an  "index  of participation in political life",  by 
attributing a  coefficient of 3  to  the  response  "personally participates",  2  to 
"is interested without  participating person.,lly",  and  1  to "is not  especially 
interestsd",  and then dividing  the total by  100  Hence,  the  following  classi-
fication is obtained  : 
Index  of participation in political life 
(maximum  3,00) 
Netherlands  1,28 
Germany  1,24 
Luxembourg  1,22 
France  1,22 
Italy  l ,03 
Belgium  o,66 
(l)  As  ""e  1vill  see further on p.  53,  the Netherlands  also is the most  exposed 
to  mass  media,  whereas  Belgium is the least  exposed. 37 
In regard to  party identification, in Gem.any  and,  to  a  lesser degree, 
in Italy a.nd  the  Netherlands,  there is a  high  propo1·tion of :Cntervie·vees  who  sa:y 
they  f'eel  identified •.7i th  a  roli tied party, ·.Yhereas  in Fra:we  and  especially in 
Ilel.:;ium,  these  propo:dions  are  much  less. 
Ho•.vever  in Germany,  where  almost  t·y;:,  thirC.s  of the  population  (64 %) 
ident  If'y  'Vith  a  political  party,  tiH;  strencth  of attachm•mt  to this party is 
less ·.vid.espread  than in  tLe  other countries  a::·'1  is only  present  among  less  tha-'1 
one  quarter of the citizens .,,ho  are party-idencifiers.  In Beleium,  on  the  con.-
trary  1  ·vhere  only  19  ~:  of  the respondents  identify ·.vi th  a  political party'  almost 
half of  them  say  they  are  st;ronc;ly  attached  to  this  party.  Thus,  even  the distri-
bution of political  involvemer.t  appears  to differ fr:o,'l  one  country to  another (l ). 
(See  tables 5  and 6) 
b)  The  relation between  party  icJ.entifj ~a.tion  and attitudes  toward  europea.n 
unification 
"Do  you lena·::  whether  the  representatives  of the  party  (named 
by  the  respondent3)  are  favorable  or not  to  european unifica-
tion  ·
11 
"If this party  took  a  position contrary to your oplnlons  about 
european unification,  do  you  think you  vmuld  most  certainly, 
probably,  probably not  vote  for another party  ?n 
Among  the respondents  who  expressed  a  preference  for  a  political  party 
desicnated by  name,  almost  one  out  of three are unaware  of the attitude of the 
party's representatives  to,vard  european unification  The  vast majcri ty of the 
others  think  the  party has  a  favorable  position. 
The  percentage  of party-identifiers who  are unaware  of the  position 
of their party's representatives  tm~ard Europe  is considerably  lower in Germany 
and  Luxembourg.  In Belgium,  on  the contrary, it reaches  46  %. 
These  findings  confirm  the  hypothesis  alreedy  stated at  the  end  of the 
previous  phases  of the  study,  namely  that  the attitude of most  political parties 
toward  european unification is not  very salient to  the  public.  l~creover,  every-
thing seems  to indicate that  party  preference has  hardly been influenced  by  the 
positions  on  EurQpe  attributed to  the  parties  ;  since the  public is, in large mea-
sure,  favorable  to  european unification, it attributes  similar positions  to  party 
leaders. 
( 1) It wPuld  betinteresti~f tofsearch  fer  tt~ causes  cf  t~ese differences.  It 
wmbe due  o  the nu1,  r  o  actlvll  fo~l leal paples ln a  glven ccuntij,  In  ue  an.v,  nearlYdall  vo  ers are spli  e  ;genfon  two  farties  ;_  ln.J:!e  lum1  2  r  1e~ a  ~  ha~ ly eno  h  to  ac  ou  r  al  o  the  e  ct ra  ~  •  ~n _  an  e  ~~r»e  ~arlifles are  nece~ary, ana  aJlmos~ . our in tlie  Ne  ~er~an~s to  accoun~ for  5tl  'JO  or t  e  voters. I 
I 
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Table  5 
PARTY  IDEIITIF'ICATION  AlrD  STRENGTH 
OF  PARTY  IDENTIFICATION 
(respondents  aged 16 years  and  older) 
I 
EEC  G  B  F  I 
%  %  %  %  % 
Feel identified with a  political 
party,  of whom  :  56  64  39  44  60 
- are strongly attached to this 
party  17  15  18  15  22 
- are weakly  attached to this 
party  38  49  20  29  36 
- do  not  respond  1  0  l  0  2 
Do  not  feel  especially close  to 
34  a  political party 
21  52  50  30 
Do  not know  or do  not  respond  10  15  9  6  10 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
N  8752  2021  1298  2046  1822 
Table  6 
STRENGTH  OF  PARTY  IDENTIFICATION 
(based on  those  ·vho  indicate a  party  preference) 
~----
B  F  I 
I 
EEC  ,  G 
'  I 
%  %  %  %  % 
-are otrongly identified with 
this party  31  23  45- 33  37 
- Are  only '"eakly identifies 
·d  th this  party  67  76  52  65  60 
- Do  not know  or  do  not  respond  2  1  3  2  3 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
N  4661  1284  i  512  909  1096 
L  N 
%  % 
49  57 
22  22 
26  34 
1  1 
35  37 
16  6 
100  100 
335  1230 
L  N 
%  % 
44  38 
54  60 
2  2 
100  100 
163  697 This ·.veak  relationship bet·veen  po.rty  preferentoe  a.nd  attitudes  toward 
Europe  is also  confirmed  by  the fact  that  only  one  person  out  of five  (19  %) 
state that  they  would  definitely  c:hange  political  party  if'  theiJ·  prefered party 
adopted  a  position  to·vard  european unification contrc.ry  to  thwLr  own.  In Italy, 
one  finds  the highest  percentage of persons  w:,c  '.VDuld  d&fj,.j ':.&ly  vote  for  anoth•o:c 
party  ( 27  %)  and  in Germany,  the  lo·vest  , 14  \~ ). 
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No  matter how  '.vea:-c  the  influence  oi'  th8  party's  political  program  c'<}'ptlars 
to be  on  the  european attitudes  of tl,eir part',sans, it p1cbably is not  negligi·:,::e. 
In  Germany,  for  example,  thBre  is,  a..t  once,  a  v0ry  hig-.t,  iJ!'OI•ortion  of persons  who 
are very  favorable  to  the idea of  eu·;-opsan '1nification,  two  large political partiHs 
'"hose  pro-europelj.tl  orientation is knmvr,,  a  hc.ch  percentage of people  \Vho  think  the 
policy of these  parties is favorable  to  J;'urvpe,  and,  at  the  sam<c  time,  a  strong re-
luctance  a<.lvllg  oi  tizens ·vho  sey  ·vhat  they ·vould  de  if their party aclopted.  a  position 
c•mtrary  to  their personal  opinions  on  .Scn·ope.  This  reluctance may  mean  that  the 
hypothesis  of a  deep  disagreement  bet•.;een  ti,e  p·o-european attitudes of the inter-
vi<>·•~es is not  very likelo'  a.s  well  a.s  underline  the  t'aci;  that  a  party's  program  on 
Europe  is not  a  decisive  facto1·  in pari:,·  choice.  (See  tc.bl es  7  and 8) 
Table  7 
AWAREUESS  OF  THE  POSITIOli  OF  PREFERED  POLITIC.iiL 
(based  on  persons  ··tho  e~.::p:ressed  a  part;y  preference) 
EEC  G  B  i  F  I  1  N 
' 
,.•! 
i  ' 
,. 
~  '  "' 
c7  ,.  ,.  '  ,,  ,,  ,, 
Thiruc  that  the leaders  of their  i  I 
preferred party are  1  I 
I 
- very  favorable  27  34  19  21  9  34  15  - rather favorable  38  43  30  42  27  36  47  - rather unfavorable  3  2  4  4  4  1  4 
- very unfavorable  1  0  1  2  2  - 1 
Do  not  know  or do  not  respond  31  21  46  31  38  29  33  ! 
Total  100  100  100 
I 
100  100  100  100 
N  1523  1589  898  !  1497  ' 1240  242  1057 
I  I  I  I  1  i 40 
Table  8 
ATTA.CHMEN'.(  TO  PREFERED  POLITICAL  PARTY  .I.S  A FUNCTION  OF  ITS 
POSITION  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  OPINIONS  OF  THE  RESPONDENT 
REGARDING  EUROP~ UNIFICATION 
(based on  persons who  expressed a  party  preference) 
" 
EEC  G  B  F  I 
C! 
t"  9'o  %  %  % 
Would  vote for another party in 
case of disagreement  concerning 
Europe  : 
- definitely  19  14  1"6  17  27 
- probably  25  37  16  18  21 
- probably not  22  28  18  20  16 
- certainly not  16  10  24  26  12 
Do  not  respond or do  not know  18  ll  26  19  24 
1 
% 
23 
20 
15 
29 
13 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
N  6523  1589  898  1497  1240  242 
N 
% 
22 
24 
20 
18 
16 
100 
1057 c)  Transmission  of party identification from  one generation to  another 
"Do  you know  1vhether your parents  had  a  preference 
for any  political party  ?u 
"Was  it a  political  party of the' same  tendency  as  the  on0 
41 
for ·vhich you  ·7ould vote  now,  or '"as it of another tandency?n 
"What  •.vas  the political tendency  of your parents  ?" 
It  seemed  interesting to  ask  these questions  to  attempt  to  bring light 
to  this rather poorly knmvn  problem  of  the  transmission  of party identification. 
In fact,  the results are not  very  meaningful  because  of the  number  cf confounding 
variables  and of the  lo·.v  proportion  of  persons  in the  total  sample  who  express, at 
one  and  the  saMe  time,  a  party preference,  know whether  their pareni;s  had  one  and 
can  coc~pare their parents  1 preference ''ri th their  own.  (The  tendency is  even  less 
meaningful,  since,  in additic·n•  the  respondent's  preference has  to differ from  the 
preference  he  attributes  to his  parents. ) 
Taking  thAse  reservations  into account,  •rre  observe  that  tc.e  majority of 
the  respondents in Germany  (60 %)  state that  the  party  preference  of their parents 
is unkno··m  ;  this is probably  due  to  the fact  that  the  present  political  regime is 
relatively recent  and  that  many  still hesitate  to indicate their parents'preference 
under  the  previous  regime,  even if they kno·v it,  In Italy,  on  the  other hand,  there 
is  a  high  percentage  of people ·vho  are  a·•;are  of their parents' party preference al-
though  this countr3"  Las  experienced  the  same  political  discontinuities  as  Germany. 
'l.'•ro  factors  probably  influence  the  answer to  this question  :  on  the  one  hand,  the 
historical  continuity of the political  regime  and,  on  the other,  the  predisposition 
to  discuss  politics and  to let one's  preference  be  known,  The  high  percentage of 
people in Belgium  and  the Netherlands  ·vho  claim to  know  their parents  1 party prefe-
rence  is probably attributable  to  the first  factor,  ·vhereas  the  high  percentage 
observed in Italy may  be  due  to  the  second, 
With all of the  countries  of the  EEC  taken  as  a  ·.vhole,  the  ratio of 
persons  ·vho  express  a  political  preference  to  those  who  kno·.v  their parents  had 
another  preference is  a'l~ut  one  to  three,  This  proportion is higher in France 
and,  most  of all, in Holland  (See  table  9) 42 
Table  9 
PARTY  IDEI!TIFIC.Ii.TION: 
COMF.I!.RISON  OF  SELF  WITH  PARENTS 
(based  on  persons ·vho  expressed a  party  preference) 
EZC  G  B  F  I  L  N 
r.  c'  ;O 
<'  iJ  %  %  '}\  % 
Kno•v  their parents  had  a  preference 
for  a  political party  51  40  61  54  58  53  65 
whose:  - tendency was  the  same  as 
theirs  34  26  42  35  40  39  40 
- tendency was  different  16  12  18  18  16  I 2  25 
- don't know  or don't 
respond  1  2  1  1  2  2  -
J)o  not  know  49  60  39  46  42  47  35 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
N  6531  1588  598  1503  1241  244  1057 
• 43 
B.  Ln\ICN  'L!Z:IBERSHIP 
.r.1.S  .,,i th political partici:patior:.., it see:ned  interesting to collect  data 
on  the  affiliation of  employees  •ri th  unions  ( o.n~  or.  tbG.iJc  feelings  to·varr,  thes·3 
union  organizations  of ·7hich  tc.Gy  arc  not  me,,1berc:),  on  the  streneth  of'  their iden-
tification ·vi th  these  orcb.nizations  and  on  \.J:..,:;~_.J'  &·'.rareness  of union  positions to-
·.,ard  euroyec.n unification. 
a)  Union  memberGhip  and  tL.e  c:tT·JLC:~:..- Df  attach:nent  to unions 
"Do  you bel  on~.:  ~o  a  union?" 
"Even  thoug-h  :rou  aren't  a  CJI?mber·,  clo  you  nonetheless  feel 
fairly close to  a  uni.on _;H 
"Do  you  feel  8tron1;ly  VE>C'J'  dose to this union,  only  fairly 
close or not  at all  clos~ 
As  '"e  already know,  t;,e  rate  of unionization varies  a  lot  from  country 
to  country.  On  the  basis  of the data,  tlrere  ma,y  be  on  the  average  ·,vi thin the 
.tmropean  Comrnunity,  about  one  out  of  three  employees  'Tho  are union  members,  58% 
in Belgium  and  only  31  %  in Germany. 
In each  country,  there  are,  to  a  t_;rec..ter  or lesser degree,  f;egments  of 
the  salaried 71'0rking  population ··rJ,o,  ··i tbout  necesoarily being union  members,  iden-
tify ·vitl1  a  union.  This  segrnent  is  proportionately smaller in  a  country like Jlel-
giuCI  ·vhere  the  rate of union 1leCibership is ver-:1  high,  yet is scarcely greater in 
Germany  •vhere  this rate is less.  In  l<'rance,  ··rhere  the  rate is equal  to  the  mean 
rate ·vi thin the  European  CoMmunity,  there is  c.  proportionately great-er number  of' 
union identifiers than in the  other countries. 
The  concentration of union strength,  i.e.  the ratio of the  number  of 
organizations  to  that  of union  roembers  or identifiers,  also differs  considGrably 
f'ro·n  country  to  country.  The  six  countries  could  be  ranked  on  an  index  of  concen-
tration  of'  union  strength calculated on  the  b~sis of  the  number  of'  organizations 
required  to attain a  rate  of 50 i'  of union  "Tiembers  or identifiers in each  country, 
as  foll01vs  :  ( 1) 
(1)  The  formula used is ,hl r•rhere (_ f'  is the  coum  of  ~cores obtained by  union 
organizations  beginnJ.~ll·rri  th  the  lc.r;sest  requi:'ed  to  attain 50 % of the  total 
nnmher  of union 11e:nbers  or 'r'entifiers.  For  example,  in Germany,  ·.vhere  the 
DGB  obtained 70 %  of' all  scorGs,  the  index  is equal  to  70  =  1,  40  ;  in France, 
it is equal  to  38  +  16  =  o,  54.  lx50 
2  X  50 44 
GERMANY 
BELGIUM 
FRANCE 
Germany  1,40 
Belgium  0,85 
Italy  o,n 
Luxembourg  0,68 
Holland  0,62 
France  0,54 
Table  10 
UNION  ~lBERSHIP OR  IDENTIFICATION  BY  COUNTRY 
(based  on  salaried ·vorkers  ·vho  are union members  or identifiers) 
D G B  (socialist leaning).  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  70 
D A 0  (white collar ·11orkers ).  •  21 
others  •  •  •  •  5 
do  not  respond  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4 
CSC/ACV  (catholic unions) •• 
FGTB/ABVV  (socialist unions)  • 
CGSLB/ACLVB  (liberal unions). 
others . . . . .  • 
do  not  respond .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  • 
CGT  (communist  leaning) •••• 
CFDT  (former catholic union)  • 
• 
Total  100 
(N)  (419) 
•  •  • 
•  • 
Total 
(N) 
•  • 
• 
47 
38 
6 
4 
5 
100 
( 324) 
38 
16 
CFTC  (catholic union  leaning). 
CGT-Force  ouvriere  (socialist  leanir~)  • 
5 
11 
others . . . .  •  •  •  •  19 
do  not  respond  •  • . . . . . . . . . . .  •  8 
i.'ota.l  100 
(N)  (406) ITAlY 
LUXEMBOURG 
NETHERLANDS 
CGIL  (communist  and  socialist leaning) ••••• 42 
CISL  (christian democratic leaning) •••••• 35 
U I  L  (socialist leaning)  •  •  •  •  •  •  5 
CISM.AL  (neo-facist leaning)  •  •  •  •  1 
Others  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  9 
Do  not  respond  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  8 
Total 
(N) 
L .A  V  (socialist leaning)  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
L  c c B  (christian unions). . •  •  •  • 
FE P  (white collar workers).  •  •  •  . 
FNCTTFEL  (public services)  •  •  •  •  • 
SYPROLUX  (  christian railways union)  •  •  • 
Others . . . .  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Do  not  respond  •  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
N V V 
C N V 
NKV 
Others 
Total 
(N) 
•  •  •  (soci~list leaning) 
(protest  ants)  •  •  •  •  • 
(catholics)  ••• 
•  •  • 
•  •  •  •  •  • 
•  •  •  . .  . . . . .  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
• 
Do  not  respond  •  • . . . . . . . . . . •  •  • 
Total 
(N) 
100 
( 317) 
37 
31 
15 
5 
2 
10 
100 
(63) 
45 
17 
18 
9 
11 
100 
( 225) 
45 
Generally  speaking,  the  strength of identification ·rl  th a  union is 
rather weak  in all  the countries  :  lees  than  one  employee  out  of three who  are 
union members  or identifiers claim to  feel  strongly identified with their union (1). 
(See  ta les 11  and 12) 
(1)  Undoubtedly,  the  explanation  to  this  phenomenon  has  to be  sought  in the history 
of the unions  and  of the 1vorkers 1movement  rather than in the  present structure 
of the union  movement. 46 
Table ll 
ATTITUDES  TOWARD  UNIONS 
MEMBERSHIP,  LIKING  AND  IDENTIFICATION 
(based on  s~laried workers) 
EEC  G  B 
%  '  %  % 
Are  union members  34  31  56 
IdentifY with a  union  16  ll  12 
Total  50  42  70 
who  are  : 
- strong union identifiers  15  10  24 
- weak  union identifiers  27  25  33 
- non-identifiers  6  5  9 
- do  not know  or do  not  respond  2  2  4 
Are  neither members  nor identi-
fiers of a  union  50  56  30 
F 
% 
34 
23 
57 
17 
33 
5 
2 
43 
Total  100  100  100  100 
N  3292  1000  459  706 
I  L  N 
%  %  % 
35  43  40 
16  10  19 
51  53  59 
16  17  17 
26  22  31 
I 
6  4  9 
l  10  2 
49  47  41 
100  100  100 
615  122  366 47 
Table 12 
STRENGTH  OF  UNION  IDENT'IFIC.I\1'ION 
(based  on workers  •vho  are members  of identifiers) 
EEC  ,,  ... 
~-
~~  % 
Strong identifiers  29  I 
25 
'\Teak  identifiers  55  59 
Non-identifiers  12  11 
Do  not kno•v  or do  not  respond  4  5 
Total  100  100 
N  1754  419 
--n=t 
'  j 
=·-~--~ - -· >  ~;  ... ~~  p  ~  p  ' 
34  30  1  >1  ·  .·  f  -s  I  ·'  .  ;:;j  '  "' . 
I 
47  58  51  42  53 
13  9  15  7  15 
' 
I  -, 
I 
6  3  3 
100  100  100 
324  406  317 
18  4 
-
100  100 
' 
63  1 225 
I 
~ 
-j 
'· 
b)  The  awareness  of the union's positions  toward  european unification 
In all of the countries  of the  European  Community,  almost  one  ur1ion  mam-
ber employee  out of  t•.vo  does  not  know •:vhether his union is favorable  or ur:favorable 
to·vard  european unification.  This  proportion is even higher than the  one  ·.ve  obser-
ved for political parties  ( 1 ).  This  difference  bet·veen  the  position attri  but"<l  t.o 
a  party  or a  union,  respectively, is observable in all  countries.  'loremrer,  in }'ran-
ee  and  in Italy,  an unfavorable orientation toward  Europe is more  frequent:ly attri-
buted  to  a  union rather than  to  a  party. 
From  these  data,  one  may  conclude  that  the union influence  on  e~:ployee" 
atti  tudec  to,vard  european unification is, to  present,  practically inexistant,  except 
perhaps  in France  and in Italy •vhere  four union members  or identifiers  out  of ten 
claim  to  be  affiliated to  extreme left-wing organizations  and where,  respectively, 
9  and  12  '{{  of these  employees  attribute an unfavorable  position  toward  "'u:rope  to 
their union leaders  (See  table 13). 
(1)  See  table 7 48 
Think 
are  : 
Do  not 
Table 13 
AW.IJ!ENESS  OF  ONE'S  OWN  UNION  TOWARD 
EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
(based  on  vrorkers  l'l'ho  are identifiers) 
EEC  G 
%  % 
that  the union leaders 
-very favorable  14  16 
- rather favorablJ  34  45 
- rather unfavorable  4  1 
- very unfavorable  2  -
knmv  or do  not  respond  46  38 
Total  100  100 
N  1754  419 
C,  CHURCH  !ID!BERSHIP  AND  ATTENDANCE 
B  F  I  L  N  ,  ,  %  %  % 
21  9  16  24  12 
25  32  20  33  41 
1  6  8  - 1 
- 3  4  - -
53  50  52  43  46 
100  100  100  100  100 
324  4o6  317  63  225 
Questions  concerning church membership and attendance were  asked,  as 
in any  socio-political  survey,  in  order to try to evaluate the  effect of this 
variable  on  attitudes at the heart  of this study,  namely  attitudes  toward  euro-
pean unification,  We  will return to  this point later,  For the moment,  we  would 
simply like to  point  out  that  only 9 '!>  of the respondents in all six  countries 
indicate no  religion as  a  response,  but that this percentage rises  as  high as 
15 %  in Belgium and  32  '!>  in the Netherlands, 
As  one  could have  expected,  the largest majority of the  people living 
in Belgium,  France,  Italy ar Luxembourg  who  indicate a  religious preference belong 
to the catholic religion,  In Germany  and in the Netherlands,  more  than half the 
population of church members  are protestants,  but  the  catholics are barely in a 
minority, Amo~ persons  who  are church members,  the  proportion of those who 
practice regularly, i.e.  those who  attend services at least once  a  week,  is 
t·.vice  as  high in Belgium,  Italy,  and  the Netherlands  (more  than 6  out  of 10) 
as  in Germany  and in France.  (See  tables 14 and 15). 
Church  membership  : 
- catholic 
- protestant 
- other 
Church  attendance  1 
- go  to  ohurch at 
once  a  week 
Table 14 
CHURCH  ~EMBERSHIP AND  ATTENDANCE 
(Respondents  aged 16  and  older) 
EEC  a  B  F 
%  %  %  % 
91  96.  85  89 
69  43  83  84 
20  52  1  3 
2  1  1  2 
least 
37  29  51  23 
- occasionally during 
the year  37  46  20  40 
- never  17  21  14  26 
Belong  to no  church  9  4  15  11 
Total  100  100  100  100 
I  L 
%  % 
91  99 
90  98 
1  1 
0  -
56  52 
30  30 
5  17 
9  1 
100  100 
N 
% 
68 
31 
35 
2 
42 
18 
8 
32 
100 
N  8752  2021  1298  12046  1822  335  1230 
49 50 
Table  15 
CHURCH  :m~BERSHIP AND  i>TTENDANCE 
(based  on  persons  '.vho  indicate a  church  preference) 
I  ,,  I'  ,, 
I 
'  ., 
[  I  ' 
I  Church  membership  : 
I  - catholic religion  76  45  I 
98  95  99  98  46  ' 
I  I 
- protestant religion  23  54  I  1  3  1  1  51  ' 
! 
I 
1  - other religion  l  1  1  2  '  0  1  3 
I  '  j 
5J 
1 
Church  attendance  : 
I 
- at  least  once  a  1veek  41 
I  30  60  26  61  I  62  I 
I  - occasionally during 
the year  40  48  23  45  33  30  26 
- never  19  22  17  29  6  17  12 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
I 
332 ! 
•  N  7681  1941  1095  1813,1667  833  ' 
!  1 3  - EXPOSURS  TO  ~SS :JJ>niA,  DEGREE  OF  KNOWLBDGE  Al!D  CON'r.nCTS  'HTH 
FORBIGN  COUNTRHS 
J..,  EXPOSUR~ TO  ;,t~,.SS  'IEDIA 
In  the  'Thole  of  the  countries  of  the European  Connnuni ty  almost 
seven  persons  out  of  ten claim to watch  newsbroadcasts  on  television 
every  day  ( 48  )~)  or several  times  a  ··•eek  ( 20 %  ).  Only l3 %  never watch 
these  programs. 
Radio  comes  in second  as  a  source  of information  :  six  persons  out 
of ten  say  they listen to  the  ne·vs  every  day  ( 45  %)  or several  times  a 
week  (16 1:)  ;  17 %  never listen to  radio news  broadcasts. 
51 
The  press takes  third place  :  four  persons  out  of ten  read  ne·vs  about 
current  events  in  the  ne·vspapers  every  day  ( 27  %)  or several  times  a  ·veek 
(14 %•);  29  r:  never  read them.  (See  table 16). 52 
"'atch  ne·vs  broadcasts 
- every  dey 
- several  times 
- at least  once 
- less often 
- never 
Listen to  the radio .  . 
- every  dey 
- several  times 
- at least  once 
- more  rarely 
- never 
'l'able  16 
EXPOSURE  '1'0  MASS  :.!EIIIA 
(Respondents  aged 16  and older) 
EEC  G I 
B 
%  % '  %  i 
on  television  :  l 
48  60  41 
a  week  20  19  20 
a  •,veek  11  8  13 
6  7  11 
13  6  15 
'l'otal  100  100  100 
45  50  30 
a  week  16  15  15 
a  week  11  9  10 
11  12  1~ 
17  14  27 
Total  100  100  100 
F 
% 
46 
16 
11 
8 
19 
100 
48 
15 
10 
9 
18 
100 
Read  ne,vs  about  current  events  : 
- every  dey  27  34  19  25 
- several  times  a  week  14  16  11  13 
- at least once  a  'veek  13  12  9  15 
- less often  17  21  19  14 
- never  29  17  42  33 
'l'otal  100  100  100  100 
N  8752  2021  1298  !2046 
I  1  N 
%  %  % 
36  37  57 
24  21  24 
16  11  7 
9  8  4 
15  23  8 
100  100  100 
36  46  52 
20  16  13 
15  7  6 
11  16  12 
18  15  17 
100  100  100 
19  42  38 
15  12  17 
13  9  12 
14  18  18 
39  19  15 
100  100  100 
1822  335  1230 '  I 
I 
'  I 
I 
I 
53 
'l'he  degree  of  exposure  to  rta8s  media  can  be  calculated  by  attributing 
a  coefficient  of 4  to  persons ':'tho  say  they kesp informed "every  day",  3  to  those 
"rho  ans••rer  "several  times  a  •.veek",  the coefficient  2  for  the  response  "once  a  week"' 
1  to  the  response  "less often",  and 0  to  the  "never"  and  then dividing this total 
by  100  • 
(See  table 17) 
Germany 
'I'elevision  3,20 
Radio  2,75 
Nec~spapers  2t29 
Total  8,24 
Order  2 
Table  17 
DEGREE  OF  EXPOSURE  TO  :laSS  MEDIA 
(ma.xirrn.Ln  :  4100  x  3  =  12 100) 
:  Belgium  I  France  Italy  ; 
i 
2,61  2,72  2,57 
2,66  2.45  2,05 
1,46  1,83  1,61 
6,12  7·21  6,63 
6  4  5 
Luxembourg  Netherlands 
2,41  3,18 
2,62 
I 
I  2,71 
'  2,40  I  2,45  I 
7t43  8>34 
3  1 
•'lli<~  o-ble  shows  that  the  Dutch public keeps  highly  informed,  follo•·red 
lJy  tlle  Gemano.  The  Netherlands not  only has  the highest  total score,  but  also 
the  highest  score  for ne·vspapers  ;  television and  radio  take  second place  in con-
trast ·yi th other countries. 
In Germany,  television and  radio  come  in first in comparison ·yith other 
countries'  although the  German  public  ranks  onlu third insofar as  ne•~tspaper rea-
ding is concerned. 
The  Italians  and  especially the Belgians  have  the  lowest  scores. 
B.  AMOUN'l'  OF  KNOWLEDGE 
The  amount  of kno·nledge  was  measured  by  two  questions,  one  asking  a·bout 
the  name  of government  leaders  of their country at  :o\e  time  of the  survey  (Prime 
:hnister or Foreign Minister)  and  a  second  asking the  number  and the  exact  name 
of the  rtember  countries  of  the  common  Market. 
Throughout  the entire Community,  nine  persons  out  of ten correctly gave I 
i 
54 
the  name  of the Prime Minister in their c1vn  country  and  a  little over six out  of 
ten gave  the right  name  of the Foreign Minister, 
On  the  other hand,  sll.ghtly less thac"  cne  person out  of four  ( 36  %)  gave  the  exact 
~embership of the  common  Market,  (See  tables 18  and 19) 
Table  18 
KNOWLEDGE  OF  GOVEilll'.!ENT  LEJillERS 
(Respondents  aged  16  years  and older) 
EEC  G  B  F 
% I 
%  %  of, 
I 
Pri  '"e  '.Unister  :  I 
- right  answer  90  98  77  84 
- •ITong  answer  3  l  3  4 
- do  not kno·.v  or do 
not  respond  7  l  2  12 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Foreign Minister 
- right  answer  64  84  48  34 
- wrong  ans'.ver  7  4  3  15 
- do  not  know  or do 
not  answer  29  12  49  31 
Total  100  100  100  100 
N  6390  2021  1298  2046 
( x )  There •vas  no  government  in Italy at  the  time  of 
I  L  N 
%  I  %  % 
I 
I 
I 
(x)  91  88 
1  3 
8  9 
100  100 
(x)  73  96 
8  0 
19  4 
100  100 
335  1230 
the  survey. r----
i 
l 
I 
c 
I 
orrectly named 
ncorrectly  named 
Total 
N 
•rable  19 
( Hespondents  aged 16 
bEG  G 
/" 
'  ' 
'  I 
I  36  39  I  34 
i 
'  64  '  I 
61  66 
I  100  l 100  100 
I 
!  8752  !2021  1298  i 
55 
i'  I  ;'-
' 
I' 
I 
I 
'  63  31  35  '  49  '  I 
69  65  37  51 
100  ~10d  100  100 
2046  '1822  335  • 123o  I 
I  j 
' 
It is interesting to  observe  that  the  rank  order of countries  bJ'l  tloe 
pc,rcentace  elf  people ·.vho  kno·v  the  name  vf both political leaders  corresporuls  ra-
ther ·vell  to that  obtained by  "the  U.egree  of  exposure  to  mass  media.  In  the  Neth3r-
lancls,  ho-rever,  the na'Tle  of the  Prime :!inister of the  time  was  less ·vell  kno"ffi  than 
t.1&t  of  the  r~loreicn ·anister,  ·~r.  Luns. 
'rhe  relationship bet·veen  the  l:no·vlecJee  of the  number  and  the  names  of  the 
'_ler..bvy.  states  of  the  co·'"1T:1on  :.!arX:_ct  io  eq_uL.l1y  strikin;.::;-,  although  there  are  soT"1G 
exee:ption.G.  In Luxentbourt?'  t:-1e  LG~berchip of the  co  .. r'lon ·.!arket is best  kno-~.rn,  al-
thouch  tl:lis  country  ro.n.l.::s  only  thir(~ in ist degree  of  exposure  to  Mass  "'1edia.  ;  this 
ma;y·  be  explained by  the  fuct  that  in the  five  other countries,  LuxeCJbourg  is least 
often recognized as  a  '1eC~bor of  tllc  comnon ·rarket,  a  fact  tJ,at its own  inhabitants 
are likuly to  ignore.  In France,  -·,e  find  the  smallest  percent<.ge  of persons  -,.ho 
kno·17  the  :""lo'Tlbership  of  t:ue  com·;1on  ~-~arket,  ·vhereas  this  country  ranks  fou:t:>th  in its 
exposure  to  maso  media;  it is possible  that  in  sor:1e  countries  (:na.inly  the  "big 
ones")  the  degree  of  exposure  to  nass  media is greater than the quantity of infor-
:-:-J.ation  about  the  Europcw~j_  C:omr:1uni ty  contained in messages  transmitted  b:i  these 
"Jedia,  or else that  tl1ese  '_1GSS<.J.G8S  are  add.res;::;ed  more  to national  problern_s  and  pre-
canted  to  the  public  in  a  national  setting (1). 
(1)  It is notu·rorthy  that  infornation e.bout  the  comnon  ~,!arket,  publisi.ed in the 
ne7spapers,  the  radio  or television are more  often related to  meetinGs  of the 
.:.Guropean  Co:n~I'Juni ty  and are  presented  to  the  public,  the  jL~-..trnalists  and  n8'.vs 
a(~·encies  of  a  civen country  by  representi;l,tives  to  the  EEC  in a  natj_onal  con-
-text  to  tl-:.e  extent  of  Gi  vinp;  the  hit::h&st  esteem  and  most  prentigious  role  to 
the  govern~ent in question. I 
I 
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Finally, if the  degree  of kno'lledge  of the  countries in the  common 
',{arket  is coCJpared  separately ·vi th  the  scores  for  each  infor11ation source,  one 
observes  that  thG  relationship is best  for  the  press  and ·verst  for television  ; 
indeed it is better for  the  press  than  for  the  tot~l score  for all three  media 
taken together. 
This  evidence  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  t"e  press  provides  bettAr 
information  than  the  radio  or television,  since it is likely that  persons  who  are 
already 1vell  informed,  perhaps  because  they  already acquired an interest in poli-
tics,  tend to  read political  commentary  in the ne·vspapers  mol'J  frequently  than 
those ·vho  are less interested.  It is well  known  that  radio  and television act 
much  more  often to  sentisitize persons  to issues  than  to  inform them. 
In comparing  this rank  orderine of countries •ti th that  obtained for 
participation in political life (table 4),  one  obsGrves  that it is exactly  the 
same  as  that  obtained for degree  of  exposure  to  the  three information  sources  1 
the Netherlands  lead,  followed  by  Germany,  Luxembourg,  France,  Italy and  Belgium. 
Once  again,  the relationshir is best  for  ti1e  ordering by  newspaper reading,  and 
worst  for television (1).  (See  table  20). 
! 
! 
Total 
N.  <Dj 
Germ.  ® 
Lux.  Q) 
Fr.  4 
It.  5 
Bel.  6 
Table  20 
RANK-ORDSR  OF  THE  SIX  BY  DEGREE  OF  EXPOSURE  TO  :.!ASS  'iEDIJ., 
DEGREE  OF  KNUWL.O:DGE  Ji.HD  PARI'ICIP.Ii.TION  IN  POLITICJ.L  LIFE 
Degree  of exposure  Degree  of knowledge  Participation 
..  - in 
Press !  Radio '  TV  Prime  Foreign  EEC  political 
I  .-!inister  lli.nister membershi,  life 
G)  ®  ®  (j)  Q)  ®  1 
Q)  <Y  Q)  (f)  ®  Q)  2 
®  4  6  ®  Q)  (D  3 
4  Q)  Q)  i 
4  5  6  4 
5  5  5  I  - - 4  5 
I 
6  6  I  4  I  5  4  5  6 
'  L__  i  i 
(1)  Of  course,  this  comparison  1)·Jt'Veen  countries  probably  does  nothing  110re 
than  translate differences  in social  structure (age,  education,  occupation, 
residence  eto. ).  A  socio-psycholot;ical  analysis ·vould  require  an  examination 
of the correlations  among  the  different variables  for  each  respondent.  This 
examination remains  to  be  done. 
I 57 
C,  CONT.hCTS  VI'l'H  FOH..O:IGN  COUNTHISS 
Sojourns  abroad,  too,  m&y  be  considered as  ar1  important  source  of infor-
·~ation as  ·7ell  as  a  significant variable in pro-european atti  tucle  formation, 
Nonetheless,  the  probability of going  on  sojourns  abroad - be it t'or  only  a  da,y' s 
duration,  as  tl;e  question asked - depends  on  nwnerous  factors  such  as  the  siz">  of 
the  country  and  the  averuge  purchasing  po·ver of its population,  It is net  surpri-
sing  tbat  proportionately  more  Luxembourgers  go  on  sojourns  abroad  than  do  'f'erd dents 
in the  other  countrie~.  TJ, , .•  are  follo·•ed  by  +,he  ll\ctoh,  and  even  though  th8  Bel-
(;'ians  live in  a  "small"  country,  geographically speaking,  they  obtc.in  a  lo·'ler  score 
than  the  Germans.  The  Franch  and  the Italians travel  far less often .than  the  others. 
(See  table  21 ), 
An  "index  of familiarity ·,vi th foreign countries",  calculated as  the  ave-
rage  nu~ber of countries visited by  each  respondent,  makes  it possible  to  rar~ the 
countries  as  follows  : 
Index  of Familiarity  with Foreign Countries 
Luxembourg  4,03 
Netherlands  3·27 
Germany  2,90 
Belgium  2,76 
France  2 ,oe 
Italy  1,15 58 
Table  21 
CONT.i>.CTS  ·'fiTH  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES 
(Resfondents  aged  16  and  older)  ,-
EEC  G I  B  F  '  l  ! 
%  "'  i 
d!  %  i'-' 
' 
,, 
I 
i 
; 
spent  at least  one  Have  dey  I  in  :  I 
I 
- no  foreign  country  32  20 I 
18  32 
- 1  foreign  country  18  15  I  17  I  23 
- 2  foreign  countries  14  16 I  16 l  13 
'  - 3  "  "  11  15  I  14  10 
- 4  "  "  8  11  14  7 
- 5  "  " 
r  7  7  4  .) 
' 
- 6  "  " 
I  4  5  5  4 
- 7  "  "  3  4  3  2 
- 8  "  "  2  2  2  2 
- 9  "  "  and  more  3  5  4  3 
Do  not  know  or do  not 
respond  0  - - -
Total  ;  100  100  100  100 
j 
N  '  8752  2021  1298  2046 
'  I 
I  1  N 
%  %  % 
54  1  14 
18  13  14 
12  12  16 
6  17  15 
3  15  11 
3  12  8 
2  10  8 
1  7  5 
0  4  3 
1  6  5 
- 3  1 
100  100  100 
1822  335  1230 59 
'~he  notable  charac-~eristic of  thic  muvey is that it is not  1i•oi ted to  collec-
tj.n{t  more  or less  vague  opinions  about  general  and  supc:ri.''ir:i.al  aspects  cf european 
uni.fication  in ·vhich  the  respondents  feel  ''lOre  or  ,:~s  inv·.:;lved..  The  survey  tried 
to  ai.n  higher  b:,- colleu~ing more  data,  such  a.s  1 
attitudes  to-.7ard  the political  unification of Europe, 
identification ·.-ri th national  sy;nbols, 
desired geographical  definition of  the  common  l.!arket, 
desired degree  of integration for  a  United Europe, 
imag-e  of the United States  of  Europe  1  expectations  cmd  fears 
"valuation of the  effects of the  common  Market, 
degree  of support  for  european unif1cation, 
J...  POLITICAL  Ul'II:F'IC.Il.1'ION  OF  ZUROPE 
Four q_uestionc  make  it possi-uie  co  ia.entify,  at first glance 1  general 
attitudes  toward political unification  :  the  evolution  of the  common  'Jarket  into 
a  political grouping  in the  for'll  of the United States  of Europe,  the election of 
a  european  parlia;nent  by  direct  popular  suffr~e, the  formation  of a  european go-
vernment,  and  the  election of a  President of the United States of Europe  belonging 
to  a  country  other than one's  o•vn.  J~  fifth q_uestion  allows us  to measure  general 
co;n:nitment  to  european unification. 
1°  ".hre  you  for  or against  the  evolution of  the  common  :.!arket 
in  a  political  form  like the United States  of  Europe?" 
In all  the  countries  of the  Com~unity, seven  per3ons  out  of ten  and 
almost  nine  out  of  ten ·vho  expressed  a  ( positive or negative)  opinion  are  11 for" 
this  statement. 
The  highest  percentace of positive responses  ·7ere  observed  in J"uxembourg 
and Italy.  In regard to Luxembourc,  the  results  are  rather surprisinG'  and ·vill be 
discussed further  (1)  ;  in f'act,  ··re  already kno·.7  that this country is positioned 
af'ter Germany,  Netherlands  and Italy in  terms  of hich values  obtained  on  the  index 
(1)  See  paces  90  and  91 60 
of pro-european attitudes (1). 
The  lo·1ver  percentages  in :Belgium and  in France  ail:'e  not  surprising  : 
these  t•.vo  countries  had the  lo·.vest  scores in the  two highest categories of the 
index.  Both have  t:i.le  lc..rgest  nu:nber of non-responses( '!don  1 t  know or do  not res-
pond"). 
On  the other hand,  the  percentage obtained in the Netherlands  seems 
rather small,  at first,  compared to Luxembourg  and Italy (See  table 22). 
If the non-responses  are eliminated,  thereby  taking into account  only 
positive and  neg~tive responses,  one  observes  that,ranked immediately after Luxem-
bourg  and It-.ly,  Ger:lany  and  Belgium are  practically equal, barely ahead of the 
netherlands  and  France. 
One  r:Jcy  thus  conclude  tlH;  .. t  the najori  ty of the  europeans with an  opinion 
and  80  ~~  of the  respondents  have  one  - are favorably  predisposed toward the evoluti-
on  of the  common  ·rarket  to·.vard  a  political grouping in the  form of the United States 
of Europe  (See  table  23). 
An  exanination of the results for younc  people  of 16  to  20 years of age, 
on  tl:.e  one  h~nd,  and  persons  aced  21  and older,  on  the other,  shows  that youth more 
frequently  have  an  opinion  as ·vell  as  a  more  favorable  one  than  do  older, cohorts, 
but  the  difference is sicnificant  only in Luxembourg  and Belgium  (See  table 24). 
(1)  'rhis  difference  ctresses the value  of working w;i th a  •vell-constructed index 
ancl_  not  -:i th  se1c~r.:te  q_uestions  to  ·rhich  identical responses  might  have diffe-
rent  [TieaninG·s  und  levels  of intensity.  The  question alalyzed here  is included 
in our index,  thow:;h it is one  of the  "eaGiest" questions. Table  22 
3VOLUi'IOII  OF  THJ::  CO  c!Ull  !  •  ..IiJ:~T  'rO''I>JlD  i>.  FCJLI'l'IC.nL  GRUUFING 
(Respondents  aged  l~ :roars  e,-.  l  older) 
- ------------,.--or---r---,---.-----.-- ------r··-. ---- -~ 
For 
Lo  nnt  kno--;  or  do  not 
re8pond 
Total 
N 
'----------·----- -. -
KSC  G  B  F  I  L  ~,I.,··;  II  ;.._ ___ ,  ~~-;-·--~---:=--··-r~~·.-:  -r-·-· ~-..  •--('1 ___  ;!  ___  . -+--o.--1 
i ;,  :, I ,62  :, ;,  ;, i  75  I 
I  10  i  10 I 10  I  l3  6  51  14  I 
I  !  I  I  I  I 
L_ _
2 ~ j _=_rj__~- ~~  ~-l-8+-l_r_1--1 
l 100  ~  l~~rlo:.L~-~0  100  100:  100 
'  875212021  11296  '2046  1822  335'  1230 
Table  23 
EVOLUTION  OF  TllE  CO:,f!ON  'L.RKET  TO'!Ii>.PJ)  i>.  POLITICAL  GROUPING 
HI  ~'HE  FOR!  Of<'  THE  UNI'rED  ST.o.TED  OF  EUROPE 
(all respon<lents  ·•ho  express  an  opinion) 
---·----- -- r~-----
l  I  EEC  I  G  '  B  N 
' 
I 
I 
-~--r- -;;,--
"' 
c  rJI  '·  rf'  rf!_  %  ,, 
I"  /l)  \  jO  )  /;  ,, 
! 
68  67  '  86  I  83  93  94  84 
il.t2,'ainst  12  13  14  17  7  6  16 
---- __ "'  ___ 
I  __ _ 
Total  100  100  100  1100  100  100  100 
61 62 
l 
Tabl"  24 
ilL  ;oT!ON  ·'"".m::i!:'T  TOW,,im  .A  POLITICaL  GROUPING 
.Liifir~~·_';_;n ,J'-~';  ir;  ;_,,:::rcer:tc.ces  Oet·veen  responses  of young  people  aged 
lf  to  2~-~  L  .. ~:·,l  ::~osc  of  the  arl.ul t  respondents 
i 
EEC  I  I  '  G  B  F  I  1  N  I 
~--- ---- i 
---·  -~ 
l'
1
0T  +  4  - 2  i  +  16  +  4  +  1  +  19  +  4  '  ! 
i 
.Ac·ains t  +  2  +  1  '  - 1  +  4  +  2  - 5  - 1 
! 
Do  not  l<.:nc·  c:  ~:~o  r:c>t  ;  i 
rer;pond.  - 6  +  1  - 15  - 8  - 3  - 14  - 3 
i  l  ' 
I  .  I 
- ·-·----~·  ~ ··-- -· 
If  onl;,~  tLo~oe  r)or::;ons  ·'Lo  expressed  an  opinion  (positive or negative) 
are  taken into  c::..ccodE::,  t:~~e  d_i  f~-·erence£,  disappear almost  completely,  except  f"or 
Luxe'Tlbourc. 
"i.:;:-8  :rou  for  or  at~;c.ins t  election of  a  european Parliament 
by  di:cect  popular  suffrage,  i.e.  a  parliament  elected by 
&ll  ci  ti~o;enG  of the  meT"lber  countries  ?n 
'l'his  quc·ction  cr;  i:Clportant.  In fact,  it is included in most  of the 
scales  'T!ea:::.urinc  tLe  v-a.riou<t.  aspects  of  pro-european attitudes  ;  it also  forms 
part  of  tLe  cenerc._}_  inclex~ 
,,J.cnoct  •c·v~  tl,:r·:s  of tLe  intervie·•rees  respond  positively (64 %)  with 
the Italians  G.nr.l  tl"e  L:.Lxe:.bourgert;  cominc in first,  followeC::.  by the  Germans,  the 
Dutch  and  the  Fronch,  and  finally  by  the  Bel,=ians  in last place. 
Bet·:e8n  2C  to  3'!%  of the  respondents  expressed no  opinion  (See  table 25). 
Cor:!""'elation  e.na1yses  sho-'V  th&.t  persons  \Vho  desire maximum  integration of 
to-day's nctions  i.r,  t::Ce  -"'urcpe  of  tomorro·v  are all favorable  to  the election of a 
h'uropean Parlia:oent  1J;:r  rcL·ect  popular  suffrage  • 
.tl.  l\Osi  "tl  ~,rc~  re~;pon.:ou  to  this question tends  to  go  along '."lith  the  follo,rlng 
attitudes 63 
"Jould  rec;ret  the  eventual  disband,~ent of  the  common  '!.arket, 
expects  that  in a  Cnited States of Europe,  the underprivileged ·vould 
have  coore  opportunity  to  get  ahead, 
expects  a  hie;her  standard of livine in  tLe  llni ted States  of Burope, 
does  not  consider,  however,  the  fie;ht  ag1.inst  inflation to  be  an  impor-
to_nt  objective, 
but  considers  an  improvement  in the citizens'participation in government 
decisions  as  an  import~nt objective, 
is stronc;ly  identified c•li th  a  political  party, 
"Tould  certo_inly  OT  pTobably vote  foT  another political  party,  ·vere  the 
leaders  of  hLJ  party  to  t>cke  a  different  position on  euTopean  unifica-
tion, 
considers  aid  to  underdeveloped  countries  as  a  top  priority objective, 
humanization  of  our  society is also  considered  as  an  objective  ;"'Tl th  top 
priority, 
as ·vell  as  the  protection of  the  freedom  of  speech, 
tends  to  be  favoTably  predisposed  tm•1ard  student  demonstrations, 
lacks nationo.list  feelincs. 
Finally,  ··re  notice  that  a  fo.vorable  attc tude  to·vard  a  european  parliament 
is  found  Triore  frequently  a·:wnc;  people  ·.vho  visited several  (at  least  four)  fo:rej.gn 
countries. 
Therefore,  a  response  favorable  to  a  european  parliament  elected by di-
rect  popular  suffrac;e  seems  to  be  tied to  t·.7o  deep  feelinc;s,  ·vhich  are,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  desire to  see  Europe  integrated ar.  far  as  possi1,le  and,  on  the  other hand, 
the  desire  for  as  direct  a  democracy  as  possible.  Furthermore,  these  factors  are 
not  independent.  Thus,  the ilypocheois,  stated at  tho  end  of the  second  phase  of the 
research,  is CGnfirmed,  n<emely  that  the  desire  for  rre-nocr~>tization  i~ [:Onorally 
acco"Jpanied  by  truly  pro-eur)pean  fee lines,  ·vhereas  -nore  authoritarian attitudes 
rrenerally  go  toeether •vi th more  or lese  hidden  anti-european  feelings. 
'7e  observe ih table  25  that it is, once  agaiu,  ill  Belcium where  one  finds 
the hiches  t  percenta;;e  of  persons  "Tho  refuse  to  com"li t  the"lsel ves,  vherea~ this per-
centc.ge is  lo·ver in Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands. 
Taking into consideration only  those  pe"2ons  ·vho  have  expresued  an  u..-i-
J.L.i.Ullj  the  percentage  of positivo  reG1 JOnDos  iu  hi;_-;l1or  in  Itc-.ly  (90 ;:.),  in  l:u..x.e·:1~)ourg 
(66  jC)  and  Germany  (85 %).  In Prc.nce  (79  ;;)  c.nd  es£ecially  tJ,e  Natherlands  (74 ;:), 64 
the  percent~:  e~  ~Lr·  J.a·7er.  (See  table  26). 
At  "-_,-~,  'cmce,  the  Dutch  findings  are  surprising  ;  in fact,  the  score 
of this  count:-;:  uo1  e  pro-european  index  ranked it first after Germany.  This 
seems  to  inc\'_cOJlt.,  ·"' t:,e  Dutch  public,  no  matter hmv  pro-european it may  be,  is 
nonetheless  v·:n:~,r  d~t'":;.ched  to  itt.:  national  insti  ~utions and is somewhat  apprehensive 
about  the  effectl:  of ni,-hly  ,:eveloped integration.  The  differences  between youth 
(16  - 20  yeao-c:  Df  o.;c;e 1  and  ti.e  rest  of the  population also holds  so:1e  surprises  : 
iu':1  c.n·:l  Gernany  t:1e  young  people  are  11ore  favorable  to 
a  european  parliament  than  the  other respondents,  the 
in  ti1e  opposite direction in the Netherlands  ; 
J.n  .'.iLl..  eouc•~:;:-ies,  except  in  Germarzy,  the  percent,.;.t:,e  of the  opponents 
c;c  t,c-?  enro"'ean  P&rlia·nent  is slightly higher for young  people,  espe-
~-=~ver:  .. L  e1:.  '""n-responses  are  eliminated,  one  observ~"'"",  that  this  opposi-
ti  or- is relatively stront:er  ae1on;;  youtlo,  notably in Luxembourg.  (See 
It  2.-.:  ·':a•·::  that  ve  nay  sug(:;est  the hypothesis  that  the  C~ain reason  for 
these  diffe:··-:;r:cr_,,  ,  '.  c~1  :~Lun:;  .J"'JUDG  people  in several  countries  to  be  less favo-
rable  to  a  :...:uTo:t>J-a.L  ?a:.nlia-:wnt  tl1an  tneir elders,  does  not  ste;;t  from  a  desire  for 
''complete  intel~-:r<-..-:ior.
11 ,  but  ratl1er  fro·n  the  desire for  "democratization".  Despite 
appearances,  ·:.;  ·::tL-_o  ~.  ;:..z:;k  oursolve.:.  the  question "1l1ether  the ne·.v  generation is as 
keen  about  cie·wc''&c0  c.c:r'  it:;  development  throuc:h  elections  and too,  perhaps,  about 
the  char&ctcri;.:; ';:i.e  fr~;ed_o:1S  uf  this  de~11ocracy as  tl-·e  preceding £enerations  ( l  ). 
( 1)  Eere  ··re  are  c_,E1~:,~  sLi  ~:tint·  ov  .:;r  this  probl e:rt  of  fundamental  importance  ·7hich 
~eri  ts  further  .jeto.ilod  ccJpu.rative  analysis  of  t!1e  phenomena  of dissatisfac-
tion  and  ~/=·ot<'~;-:;  ·:iLOn.-·  ;{outl~  in  po3t-inG.ustrial  societies. For 
Do  not kno·";"  or  f~ o 
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It :1.::;  due  tu  t:.t>J  f&.ct  ·;·.l:.a:t  t!:.e  ~;-ev·:u.r.;r..  qu.-::;stion  t'Al/.L·~-~-'  _;-\'  ···v<"l"_-·:f,-.. l  t;·,t"O  ldA.a:  .  .J, 
·.v:harca:::;  thi  o  C':-;,;,:  was  m~~-·.::E1  1 -:_·.:-ee;.~--;e  .. 
Luxembourcol'~'::  ;110:!,"0  f:c'2--'.).~.l8l:t:.y  ;:_~_:;.;:;::::-don  O]:i..t-)0~~-: ..  ~:.,;.1)~'1  ~  1':'1.:."·.7.'~ 1  ~ •• .,~t:'i  \:-·-~-'  ·th:':_rtl  c~~  reJ.  .. 'POlJ.G 
intervie·,ved  u~r~r 4U  ~~  of  tbose  -_~,i:lc  express.  f'-":""  or,j·aic-r:  (J · 
relatively  hiV~1,  cmoo  \'!f!.  t.;J..ke  ir.to  e..cGount  t!'e  :fr.:.et 
on  the  ovor!..l1  index_:  u<'  pro-1?-":-l!'opea:n  a~; ti  t.ud.es  ( 2)  .. 
in .:-aet 
As  foJ..  ..  the younp,  people,  they  are  slj.,,~·htly  n:'}7'0  :t'a."t?:J~:h:ll.e  than  t!"H~  :rest 
of the  population  in  each  countr,v..  One  n.J.so  JV:/ti,,es  a  sJ.i:;;-:;"!".l_~':~  (~Be~t~~:~  r:roportion 
of t.i.nfavorabl e  o:tini\'":nr;  amOl'l.f;  their elderg  ir:  L1IT€'71'b0Ur,s;,  ]:\'.::J  snd  =:.  t&.1:{.  7f 
non-responses  are  eliminated.,  t~·t~::':  largest  pa:;:-t  o:~  dif:f'cr:::(r:c•-'1.-_;  '!)·::-"'::·7tth.'H:i:  ~,:-Gu_t}·  s.t:.d. 
aC.ul ts ·.vt.ich  ?le  hr.d  Et.ressed  in the  previous  (~UBP,-J;ior.  ·o;:'"cl-fi~  ;:_-.1}_,_.:::.s  t!:".dR  apr,flars  to 
confirM  the  hyi,oth-~sir.  'l'Jf:  Et} pllla:tt•d  regardJ.r.~ a  ce;.tE);,  :;;·.~  ~  .~.  ~-~;~e  f'?Y  a  eEn·t.ain 
i nrJ.ifference  of  ycui~g people  tc·varf~  de~,ocrac;:·  :::J,~- 1  J. t  :i  r:;  J.;r.<-J.:;t  ~ 
(See  to.bJ.n  30)., 
in  cu-r  ;:-;r·  .. u.rrt.ries  ... 
(l) In order to  explain  th:i.r.  T&1a.tivil  di.sa,::;:rne'l!ent  among  ti:e  licl'tch,  one  might 
refer to  tbe  hypctb.esJ s  expre~,sed prevJ.ousl.y 
of a  highly inteerated Eul"'ope  (See  pc.,rs~  64) 
(2)  See  table  2 
' I 
'  I 
' 
'  I 
I 
I 
-
Table  28 
(Hespondents  UL'ed  16  and  older) 
EEC I 
I 
I 
I  I 
I  ~=l 
G  B  F 
I 
I  L  i 
I  I  (  (  %  c- "'  '  I 
I•  ,.  1'-'  ,, 
I 
/' 
I 
56  67  49  For  58  I 
52  53  47 
' 
Against  I  23  23  19  28  16  36  37 
i 
Do  not  know  or  do  not  I 
respond  !  19  21  29  19  17  17  14 
j 
' 
..•  ----
.  - . ·------ --~- ----
Total 
I  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  I 
I  --------
N  i  8752  2021  1298  2046  1822  335  1230 _j 
'  ____ L_  ..  ·-- . -- --· -------- l  ..  - __ _._  -~--
Table  29 
(based  on  persons  -.-,.ho  expressed  an  opinion) 
- -------
EEC  I  G  I  B  F  I  L  N 
"'- I  ,,  ol  " 
cl  'j1  "  /0: 
I 
,,- ,,  ,,  ,,  ,, 
For  72  71  73  65  81  57  57 
AGainst  28  29- 27  35  19  43  43 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
I  -----.  -------
Table  30 
FOR'U:riON  OF  A  ;;uRGPu.l!  GOVSllN-!ENT 
Percentage  d!.  fferencG~ in responses  of  the younc  people 
-- aged  16  - 2C'  yc;ar-~  e'1d  adults 
---------------
For 
.t~;ainst 
Do  not  kno·v  or  do  not 
respond 
EEC 
+  4 
+  2 
- 6 
G 
+  8 
- 6 
- 2 
--
I 
----
B 
i 
i +  4 
I +  6 
! 
-10 
. -
F  I  1  N  I 
+  6  + 1'  +  3  +  3 
+  1  +  6  +  9  - 3 
- 7  - 7  -12  0 
----·  __ __. 68 
4°  "In  the  case  of the  election  of  a  President  of  the United  States 
of Europe  by  universal  suffrace, ·vould you  vote  or not  for  a  can-
didate of another nationality,  provided  that his  personality and 
his  program  agreed better  •ri th your  idt.as  rather those  of cwdi-
da  tes  of your  O"ffi  nationality  'l'u 
rrhis  question  obviously  belongs  to  tlle  some  group  as  the  t·.vo  previous  ones. 
At  first clance,  this question measures  rather accurately  a  favorable attitude to 
european  intecration.  In fact,  the  respondent  is not  asked  to give his  opinion  on 
the  l)rinciple  of  a  p?ef'iclential  olGction  by  popular vote,  but  to  give  so·te·'hat  of 
an  idea  of the  extent  to  ·.vl1icJ.1  Lc  ·:roulU.  bG  till  inc  to  C.o  u.way  --nth his  nL.tional  und 
even  perhaps  his natioLalist feelincs.  The  rankine;  of  couat:ries  by  the  percentage 
of persons  ·vho  agree  with this  state'!lent  corresponds  more  or less, in fact, -d  tr.  the 
average  scores  on  the  pro-european scale  as  given  above  in Table  2 1  though  France 
ranks  highel  ( l  1• 
(See  tablec  31  and  32). 
In all  the  countries,  younc  people  respond more  favorably  than  adults, 
i.e.  for  the  election for  a  foreicn  president.  Of  the  four questions  related to 
european political unification presently under  examination,  this question  reveals 
the  sharpest  differenc,o  ·uct  ..  reen  youn, sters  and  adults,  It reinforces  the hypotte-
sis •.vhich  proposed  that  the  :roungster~'  turn of mind is better characterized  by 
the ·.veakenir;g  of no.cionalist  feelinc;s  than  by  the  strengthening of definitely  pro-
european feelings. 
(See  table  33) 
(1) It is ·vorth·vhile  to  SGress  that  ';his  question,  as  all  the  others  too,  is not 
as  good'- neasure  of pro-european attitudes  as  the  scores  in the overall  index. 
In fact,  each question  contains  ele"lents  ·vhich  bear  no  direct  relation  to  pro-
european attitudes.  In this instance,  for  example,  a  feeling  of national  pride 
is set in opposition  to  the  personality  and  political  program of  the  president 
of the United States of Europe,  ·vithout civing  any  details about  this  program 
or his  personality.  It is then  possible  to  believe  that  some  responder.ts  •.vho 
are  ideolocically involved  but  not  necessarily  favorable  to  the unification  of 
Europe  ·.vould  prefer to vote  for  a  foreign  leader of  the  same  party rather than 
for  a  compatriot  ·yho  might  be  a  political  opponent.  The  presence  of this ques-
tion in  most  pro-europe= scales  only  sho·vs  that  a  goodly  a'llount  of  the  varian-
ce  in responses  to  this quection "lay  be  attributed to  pro-european attitudes. I 
I 
t 
'  l 
I 
! 
I 
: 
'  ' 
'l'able  31 
VOTE  FOR  .h.  PnESIL.E:NT  CF  •;:·nt:  UNI'.i'ED  ST>•TES  OF  'TIJROPE  0~'  A!JOTHER 
H.b.1'10N£LIJ'Y 
(Respondents  aged 16  and  older) 
EEC  G  B  F  I  L  1![ 
"' 
o··  %  %  c'  %  %  ,,  /"  I' 
For  66  70  54  63  64  68  71 
Ji.lcainst  19  14  23  23  22  19  19 
Do  not  kno-.7  or do  not 
respond 
For 
.tl.gt..inst 
For 
Against 
15  16  23  14  14  13  10 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
N  8752  2021  1298  2046  1822 1 335  1230 
Table  32 
VO'rE  FOH  .11.  Pil.ESIDEN1'  OF  TH.>  UNITED  S'l'~.TES  OF  EUHCPE  OF  .~<}lUTHER 
HA'riON.bLITY 
(Based  on  respondents  '.Vho  expressed an  opinion) 
-
EEC  !  G  B  F  I  L  N 
,,  "'- dl  %  "  %  %  I'  I"  I'  I~ 
I 
78  83  70 l  73  74  78  79 
22  17  30  27  26  22  21 
'l'otal  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
T&.ble  33 
Percentage differences  in responses  of young  people  ~;ed 16  to 
2C  and adults 
EEC  G  B  !  ]'  I  I L  N  I  ' 
+  12  +  10  +  14  i  +10  +16  1 +16  + 
6  6 
I  - 7  - - I  - 7  -
1 
2 
Do  not kno'l  or  do  not  respond - 5  - 4  - 8  -
"  ;  3  I 
-141-11 
- 4  - 7  +  1 
-
I 
I 70 
The  difference  bet·veen 3'0"C1G'  people  and  adults is the ·.veakest  in the 
Netherlands "rhich,  at first,  see::1s  surprising,  since it is one  of the  t'Vo  coun-
tries which  sho···ed  the  highest  percentac;e  of positive responses  to  the  quec;tion 
and  is  a  country kno'm  for its  11progressi  ve"  tendencies. 
The  sat'le  observation is also  true for tl:e  three  preceding questions  : 
the  sum  of  the  (positive or negative)  differences  between  the  responses  of youth 
and  those  of adults  for  the  four questions  on  european  political unification is 
only  18  in Holland,  in  contrast  to  36  in France,  42  in Germany,  47  in Italy,  63 
in Belgium  and  76  in Luxenbourg.  This  pheno'llenon  can  be  explained  by  the  fact 
that young  people give  "for"  or  "againot"  responses  nor0  "'rE.quently  than adults 
and  by  the  fact  that  the adults  "cautiousness"  carkedly  varies  fro"l  country  to 
country,  much  "lOre  so  than youth.  In  the  d.egree  to ·•,hich  tc.e  percentage  of  adell ts 
.. rho  all stain on  this question is ·veak,  as  is the  case in the  Netherl<mds,  the  diffe-
rences  bet·veen young  people  and  adults  decrease. 
Generally speaking,  one  "light  i'llagine  that  the  observed differences  in 
responses  to  these  four questions  about  euro;Jean  political unification bet••reen 
young  people  and adults  can be  explained,  in larce part,  by  the  influence  of ace 
rather than generation,  i,e,  by  the  fact  that  one  io  born  on  a  given date  instead 
of another. 
'rables  34  and  35  sumr:1arize  these  several  explanations  of the  four 
questions  on  political unification. 
Table  34 
INDEX  OF  IliVOLVKL!:NT  Ill  i,1JHOP£.,,n  POLI'riCil  Ul!IFICATION 
AMONG  YOUNG  P '"OPLB  ( 16  to  20  ;years  old)  AND  .A:!ONG  ADULTS 
(21  years  of age  and  more)  (x) 
(:!aximum  =  100) 
.. 
EEC  G  B  F'  I  !  1  N 
Adults  79,0  79,0  70,5  78,8  82,8  82,5  86,5 
Young  people  84,8  82,5  82,8  84,0  87·5  92,0  86,3 
Difference  I  +5,8  +3,5  +12 .3  +5,2  +4•7  =9·5  -0,2 
I  i  -
(x)  The  Index  of Involve'1ent  is calculated here  by  E::.Vcraging  the  total 
number  of positive  and  nec~tive responsec  to  Gach  of  the  four questions, 
It is the cdrror-i'llage  of  the  "non-response"  index. '~ 
I 
PERCENTAGE  DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  y~r"r<;S~'i·(;(::;  ·  ..  •.C--20  y.n,.·;;  old) 
------~·---·-,·------·-,..··--·------
..,.  ·-·---'!'-·-. 
l 
G  r  '~ 
Creation of the 'Jni ted 
St• ·Lea  of Europ0  ·- l  "'  ;:>  )·  3  3  - 2  +  6  •· 
,., 
\ 
Election of ..  europer.r 
Parliam•mt  '  ~  2  - '  I 
j  ~:,  c  -- ~  J 
Acceptance of a  eu·rcpe~ 
government  0  c  4 
\  2 
I 
'  '•  .\ 
I, 
:  ..  - •· 
-Vote in favor of  a  foreign 
candidate  +  o  +ll  +  9  +17  !  +13  +  2 
l  ,  \. 
"  ·--------'--·----- .:.  '·---~-' ,_  ..  _..'.,  ....  _,  ___ , -------------
"Would you  say you  arot  v••ry  favorable,  rather favoral:>le, 
indifferent  1  rath<n unfavorable  or  VJOij'  anf'iiV'Orable tc-
european unification  ?" 
Responses  to this question are largely vary  favon.ble 1  but  the  t'!"Ue  value 
of these  responses is rather poor,  because  of the very  gom•ral  ohar&ot&r  of  the 
question which gives  no  information about  the kind of united Europa  involved.  It 
is an "easy" question which naturally appears  in all scales measurine- )W()-european 
attitudes. 
'lore  than  one  third of the respondents  ( 34 %)  aey  they  &rfl'  vex7  favorable 
to  european unification and  40%  are rather favon.ble 1  whi"h  means  that  throughout 
all of the six  countries  of  the  Community,  three  persons  out  of'  four  are  inclined 
to  accept  - if not  support  - unification, 
As  predicted,  in Luxembourg,  Italy iilld  Germany,  the  percentage  c.r  v.,ry 
favorable  responses is the highest.  Ho·nver,  what  ie not  e:x:p1a.ined  at  E.r.at  glance 
is 'lfby  in the Netherlands this  percentage :is  rel&tively  lei"f  an~  :>.f  th&  s;;ma  'll:agnitu-
de  as  that in Belgium.  In the Netherla.nds,  one  li.lsc  o!Jserveo  a  xdativ,.I;;r high  per-
centage of unfavorable  responses  :  10 %  compared  to  8  <f.,  Jn  E'.rMoe. 72 
Would  it be  thkt in Holland there is an aotive minorit,y group whioh is 
opposed  to  european unification ?  In the absence of  ~act answers  to this question, 
we  have  to propose  the hypothesis that  some  unadmitted,  nationalist (or ethnocentric) 
feelings exist in this country,  or else that  there is disagreement about  the w~ 
european unification has  been undertaken so far.  This  second hypothesis,  however, 
appears  to us as  the least likely since,  as we  shall see later, it is in Holland 
where  one  observes  the highest  percentage of persona  who  would  feel  "very sorry" if 
the common  Market  were  disbanded.  (See table 36) 
Table  36 
GENEIW.  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
(Respondents  aged 16  and  older) 
Very  favorable 
Rather favorable 
Indifferent 
Rather unfavorable 
Very  unfavorable 
Do  not know  or do  not 
respond 
Total 
N 
: 
I 
i 
' 
' 
I 
' 
'  I 
' 
I 
I 
' 
EECI  G 
34  39 
40  37 
11  13 
4  4 
2  1 
' 
9  6 
-----
100  100 
8752  2021 
I 
B  F 
--T 
I  . 
"' 
I 
' 
40  i  '  31  !  24  I 
!  I  !  35  :  46  I  38! 
I 
16;  11  '  7! 
31 
I 
6  I  4  I  I  2 I  2  1. 
I 
I  13  11 i  10! 
i  ' 
i 100  100  I 
100 
' 
'1298  I 2046  !1822 
{  r  I 
L 
"' 
'  ' 
52; 
24  I 
i 
14  I 
I 
21 
i 
2 i 
i 
I 
61 
100 
335 
·,  ------
N 
30  I 
I 
44  I 
i  11 
I  7 
3  I 
5 
i  100 
---! 
1230 
---- ! 73 
One  question makes it possibla tc  measur'*  •·  •7JJ:''""i natel~  ~.r  t.~t titude whioh 
one may  think runs  in the opposite direohon of  pr(•·--•u.:rc·,;  at ;i  tt;oi~s  :.  the atrength 
of'  at  taoL.ment  to  oerta::i:a  aymbo.:. ~  ~ i- ·_·.,:~ 1  -r.t nF·  f:  /:.,  ··-"' t·) ,_,.:r;..a:1 .  "  ~_·  ..  >t  r  -'.  '·  -'j <'tttion  :  ~mr-
renoy,  olympia  teL~, flag. 
f''·.uropean  --j~mmuni  ty  come  out  ir~:  t  Iii.-...-.  ""  c:-,f  t:  ,··c-:<?'liL'i  :.n.:-.:,··:..  ~n:;y::  .,,f'h~T>&.t-.!i  o!'~J;;·  23 %  a.:r>a 
opposed  to  :i.t.  Apart  .from  JJU),_,..i-_.!"·:v~ug2  w:  t.,;:·.,  ,.;~  ~-"ttl"'J  .,  -'  '"h  l;iiH"·~"lP1t.ae·'$  cf'  1'4''ftp1e  ir· 
favor.-1.t.ble  -to  a  eu.x-·,r·-r_,,4£,,e..!'i.  ~11r:re11cy  ( 6  ~:  ·:./  _:  :!  ~:,.  .:·~~ 1 U.~::--~  1..;:.__  I<#  •  \'i.~ 1 ll  t.-1  ~·- -"~  .: .Urly  ~1Jwil 'tl"  .. n 
the various  oountrier~..  ?l.le  spec.~  -~':-1  :~:il.c1~  {·~- ).,.ux4::,oc;.,·!'C  . J··,·  i')ii:;_:..,(;.~  :;r *·  ;)-\_l!j  ~~(x:pla1  ..  ;;l.t)d  ':;,;y 
the :fact  that h•r  <Ju..<·-.r-snc~.r  1s  GJ<>~t.s:~'·'  L>~_._,;~;:;.  tc  .;:.";,  __  !tJm~,o  .. 
On  the other hand,  rather stronr.  d.if.f<lr•mc:ou.;  iu  tall  <n;~<ttar of  ft<rrw ng euro-
pean  olympia  teams  among  countries are  obst,I">!;;ol.·1',  .F..  littl" il'O!!!!  ·~hJ<n  one  fou.rth 
(27 :') of the  european  public ia favorabie  to itt ,•ir<&rO<&li  41%  &re  OJ>poaed.  The  ra... 
tio of partiaMS to  opponents is the  higJ•~•st  5.n  1uxe·~h<>.a-g .fo.r  c·~~.sc::.ui  whioh  ar&  u.-
sy to und11rstand1  but  surprisingly enough,  this  COJ.U;~ry  l.s  f'ollo'lfed  l>y  Fr~mo11,  Jlno-
ther surpriae is that this ratio i&  the loweat in Germazlj  and  tu:pooially  tn  tbt~ N-
therlands,  the  oount:cy"  whioh,  as  we  know,  ranks first in the  iH:orer•  ;:,f  the  prc>--<~U.X"o­
pean attitude index. 
The  percentage of fa.vorabl!il  attitudes toward  a  eurn:;:,,M,  :flag is, fer all 
respondents,  the aame  for the Olympia  tesm,  namely  :,:)  'f,..  On  the  oth.,;r  hand,  "the 
percentage of opponent  a  reaohea  52 f.,.  They  ars fotrnri,  fiN.<~  uf  %1.)  l r  .tn  po,.anne  (61  ~), 
but also in Italy, Luxembourg  and  the Netherlands  (~!'(  %).  In t:t.h lii.st  oonntry,  on-
ly 19 %  support it.  One  oan  atato that  tLO!!  kind of nationalism  &ymbolJ.ud  b;r  the 
flag is weaker in Germany  and  Belgium,  and atronger in France  and  th~ N~therl&nJ.s. 
'!'hie  evidence supports  the hypothesis,  stated at the  o 't,\let  of this stud,y,  that na.-
tion&lism ans  pro-european attitudes  do  not lie on  +; •··  :..;,erne  di!ll&naion,  but  repre-
sent  two  distinct  dimensions, 
In psychclogio&l  terns,  the motivations  tard.ing  to  create a  des',re  fo"' 
ouropean unification are not  the  same  as  the motivations  re1atec. to nati.onal  prld.n. 
Nationalist motivations,  when potent,  clearly ar"  o:ppo .. ed tv  p·z:·-•Hropea.n !Dotivations1 74 
but both oan oo-exiat and create tension or friction.  In the case of the Nether-
land&,  it aeems  that the hypothesis  formulated above  can be refined :  in thia coun-
try,  there are strong motivations supporting european unification held u,r  the majo-
rity of the population, yet there are alao very strong, latent and less easily de-
tected,  national feelings which might  become  visible as  european unification takea 
form. 
This ia a  phenomenon  often observed in studies of motivations.  In these 
studies Which  almost  alw~s have  a  utilitarian, generally commercial  objective,  one 
oan  distinguish the attraction generated by  an object  from  the resistance impeding 
acquisition of the motivation.  Thus  a  motivation which makes  an object attractive 
is considered as different  from  one  which deflects a  possible bQrer  aw~ from  this 
objeot. 
From  this point of view,  a  favorable attitude  toward european unification 
~  be  considered similar to its acquisition.  There are four conceivable attitude 
profiles  : 
strong attraction,  weak  resistance, 
strong attraction,  strong resistanos 
- weak  attraction, weak  resistance 
- weak  attraction, strong resistance. 
The  Dutoh  public,  which is well-informed and politically mobilized,  tenda 
to reflect  the aeoond profile, Wherus  the Belgian public tends  toward the third. 
(See table  37 ). Table  37 
ATTAC!NENT  TO  THREE  NATIONAL  SYXll)LS  1 
CURRENCY  ,  THE  OLYMPIC  TEAM  .AND  THE  FLAG 
(Respondents  aged 16  and older) 
European  CurranQT 
Favorable 
Opposed 
IDdifferent 
Do  not know  or do  DOt 
respond 
Total 
Ratio Fav.  I  Opp, 
European  Olympic  Team 
Favorabil.e 
Opposed 
Indifferent 
Do  not know  or do  not 
respond 
Total 
Ratio :rav.  I  Opp, 
51 
23 
18 
27  I 
43 
22 
52 
26 
14 
25 
51 
18 
49 
23 
21 
26 
36  ! 
27 
F ,_  I·-+--L~  __  N] 
~  ~I  ~  "'  I 
I 
I 
51 
23 
18 
34 
36 
22 
51 
21 
24 
41 
25 
63 
13 
19 
53 
20 
21 
47 
23 
27 
20 
54 
23 
I 
I 
i 
\ 
I 
I 
8  6  11  I  8  10  6  i  3  I 
'  ... --·-··. ,.. ....  .  ..  ··1----- f  ... ~ 
1  100  .  100  1oo i 100  1oo  1 100  ~  1oo  I 
~-o~6~-o,-49-:-~~7;J~~94~-o,5·9G,65:  0,3~ 
·----+-- -;--·------ ··-j 
I  :  I 
European Flag 
Favorable 
Opposed 
Indifferent 
27 
52 
15 
!  '  ! 
35 
41 
18 
26 
48 
20 
22  24 
61  57 
11  '  11 
26 
57 
12 
19 
57 
21 
Do  not know  or do  not 
respond  6  6  6  6  '  8  5  3 
'  .  !  ·-r--r-------7  ···--: 
Total  100  . 100  1  100  1100  i  100  100  ! 100 .  i 
Ratio Fav.  I  Cpp, 
1 
0,52
1  0,85~-~;5-4--~--;;6~~~2-~,46;1 0,33  ! 
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C.  DESIRED  GEOGRAPHICAL  DI1ENSIONS  OF  THE  CO~N  XARKET 
Two  questions were  asked on  this subject  :  one  concerning Great Britain's 
joining the  common  Market  and  the other about  different countries whioh  the  publio 
would like or not  to see  join the  common  Karket. 
1°  "Are you for or against  Great Britain's entry 
i11t0  the  common  Market  'in 
In February  and Maroh  1970,  almost  seven respondents  out of ten througheut 
the oountriss of the  european Community  and nine out  of ten among  those who  expressed 
an opinion wars favorable  to Great Britain's entry into the  common  Market.  The  hi-
ghest  percentage is in the Netherlands  and the lowest  in Franoe,  though  the gap is 
muoh  smaller if only those  respondents who  express  an opinion are  taken into acoount, 
(See tables 38  and  39). 
If we  taka into aocount  again only  the  people  expressing an opinion and 
compare  the data in tabla  39  with those in table 23,  we  notice that  the  percentage 
of persons  favorable to Great Britain's entry into the  oommon  MArket  in Belgium and 
in Holland  exceeds  that of those who  support  the political development  of the  common 
llarket  toward the United States of Europe.  This  tendency  also exists in Garmany. 
In Franos  and in Italy,  on  the other hand,  an  opposite  tendency is observable. 
Although  the differences are very small,  they  seem significant.  One  might 
propose  the hypothesis that differences in attitudes toward Great Britain and the 
British  pl~s a  mora  important role than european views  themselves,  A positive res-
ponse  to the question about  Great  Britain's entry appears  related to a  relatively 
high degree of interest in politios.(l) 
(1)  See  chapter II, pages  143  to 145. Taltle  38 
ATTITUDE  TOWARD  GREAT  BRITAIN'S  ENTRY  mro  THE 
CODON  MARKET 
(Reapondenta  aged 16  and older) 
i Por 
I 
: .Againat 
Do  not know  or do  not 
respond 
Tot&l 
N 
Table  39 
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ATTITUDE  TOWARD  GREAT  BRITAIN'S  mro  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
(Reapondents who  express an  opinion) 
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2°  "Among  the following countries, whioh  do  not  belong to 
the  oommon  ~arket, are there any you would like to see 
joill it 1  Whioh  one  ?u  (Choice indicated on  a  list) 
For all of the interviewees,  Switzerland and Denmark  are most  frequently 
chosen  on  the list of six countries  proposed  (63 and 59 %  respectively).  These  are 
two  countries in Western  Europe,  small in size and considered as  democracies.  The 
peroentage  of votes favorable  to Spain is considerably lower  (39 %),  although higher 
than the  percentages  obtainea by  the  three countries in eastern Europe  indicated on 
the list 1  Eastern Germany  (25 %),  Poland  (23 %)  and  the Soviet Union  (18 %). 
There  are  some  rather marked  differences  between the attitudes of the res-
pondents in the countries of the Community.  On  the average,  Belgians  and  Luxembour-
gers indicate less than two  countries, which  seems  to  show  that  the public at large 
does  not  feel  very  favorable  to enlarging the  common  Market,  at least insofar as  the 
present notion is concerned.  At  the other extreme,  we  find  the Germans  and  the 
Frenoh,  followed b,r  the Dutch,  who  appear more  open-minded.  The  rank-order of the 
countries is very different  from  the one  we  found  concerning the entry of Great  Bri-
tain into the  common  Market  1  both kinds of expansion,  in fact,  scarcely have  any-
thing in common.  In one  case, it is a  matter of expressing one's opinion on  a  defi-
nite, forthcoming issue1  and in the other case,  to express oneself on  the eventual, 
but  rather improbable membership  of countries as different  as  Spain,  Switzerland and 
the  Soviet Union. 
(See table 40). 
The  degree of familiarity or  proximity of one  country to another seems 
to influeace considerably  the choice of the other possible, future  partners in the 
common  llarket.  Thus 1  we  observe that almost  eight out  of ten Dutchmen  and almost 
as many  Germans  express the wish to see Denmark  enter the  common  Market.  On  the 
other hand,  only four Italians out of ten,  express  themselves  in the same  direction. 
The  differences between what  one  mlcy"  call the  popular!  ty ratings  are far 
less marked  for Switzerland, which is probably  due  to its rather central  location in 
Europe,  to its great notoriety  and  to its particularly favorable  image.  (1) 
(1)  We  shall see further that,  of the aix countries cited,  the  Swiss  obtain the 
highest  percentage of trust accorded in each of the six countries of the  EEC. 
See  pp.  118 -121. 79 
The  percentage of respondents  recommending  the entry of Spain into the 
common  Market  ie lower in Luxembours,  the Netherlands  and  Belgium  than in Italy, 
Germany  and,  moat  of all, France.  Indeed,  in France we  &leo  find the higheet  pro-
portion of people who  desire the entry of ao-oalled european popular demooraoiee 
into the common  l(arket  1  approwimately  one  Frenchman  out of four and  &'ltl!n  28  '%> 
when  it oom88  to Poland.  In ll'estern Ge:rmany,  almoet  30  %  of the respondents woulll 
like to see the German  Democratic Republic  join it, but  only 16 %  Wish  to see  the 
Soviet Union  join. 
Observe that in Luxembourg  and Holland  ,  the countries leaning toward 
communism  obtain percentages as  small  as in Belgium,  though other countries have 
been  chosen much  more  often. 
The  choice of countries in eastern Europe  as desirable partners in the 
common  Market  probably  depends  upon  several factors,  one  of which is, without  a 
doubt,  the  degree of familiarity with it(Eastern Germ~ in ll'est  Germany  and Poland 
in France)  and another, which is the size of the party and  of the communist  electo-
rate in the country where  the respondents are interviewed (France  and Italy).  In 
each country of the  european Community,  it is interesting to  compare  the total votes 
rece1.ved by  the three western countries,  on the  one  hand,  and bu  the three  l!tastern 
countries,  on  the other.  The  more  hospitable the public of each country is toward 
western rather than towerd eastern countries,  the higher the ratio.  The  three Bene-
lux countries have  a  higher value on  the index of relative western orientation than 
the  three large countries  ;  after the Benelux, ll'estern Germany  is the least oriented 
toward the East  ;  ita orientation still is largely influenced by  its relatione with 
Eastern Germany. 
Index of relative western orientation 
Luxembourg  3·58 
Netherlands  3>54 
Belgium  3,09 
Germany  2,68 
Italy  2,29 
France  2,07 eo 
Table 40 
COUliTIUES  ONE  WOULD  LIKE  TO  SEE  ENTER  THE  CO!l!ION  MARKET 
(Respondents  aged 16  and  older) 
r--·---
I 
i 
Den~~~&rk 
Spain 
Eastern Germaa;r 
Poland 
U.  S.  s. R. 
Switzerland 
None  of theae countries 
Do  not know  or do  not  answer 
Total  of Western countries 
Total of Eastern countries 
Total  of above-mentioned 
countries 
G  B  F 
59  76  46  52  43  54  78 
39  42  30  45  33  25  29 
25  29  16  26  22  13  16 
23  24  15  28  19  15  18 
18  16  12  23  18  '  12  16 
63  67  57  62  59  64  70 
~  ,; "  ~  ! ::J  ,: I ,: : ,: : ,!j 
161  .  l~~~~~~-~-35_j_l4i~7~J 
l-6~t.  69 
1 --~~  11  59  I  4o  ~ 
!  221  i 254  116 I  236  l  194  183  221  J 
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D.  DEGREE  OF  INTEGRATION  DESIRED  FOR  UNITED  EUROPE 
Theorioall71  one  can diatinguieh three w~s of organizing relations bet-
ween  states and  peoples within a  Europe whioh  is politioallT united or in the  pro-
ceas  of uniting  1  intergovernmental  cooperation ;  the setting up of a  "supranatio-
nal" government  of a  confederal or federal kind ;  the  establishment of a  unHary eu-
ropean  state. 
The  question aaked makes  it possible to  jedge the public's views  of these 
three formulae. 
Contrar.y  to what  one  might  have  feared,  the percentage of non-responeee is 
not very high for a  relatively complicated question like this one  :  depending  on  the 
country,  one  to two  pereons  out of ten have no  opinion, with a  minimum  for Holland 
(8 '!>)  and a  maximum  for Belgium  (20  ~). 
!lore  than one  third of the people expressing an  opinion chose the solution 
advocating a  european  government  in charge of the most  important matters, with  each 
country keeping ite national government  to handle particular problems. 
The  proportion of respondent&  who  prefer that  eaoh national  government 
retain its sovereignty,  by  reducing cooperation to intergovernmental meetings  for 
decisions on  common  policy, is about  the same  in the different countries  1  less  than 
two  persons  out of ten. 
Finally, the advocates  of full integration impl7ing the substitution of 
national governments  by  a  european govel'll!llent  are even more  of a  minority  1  in Fr&ll-
ce  and Luxembourg,  they are the least numerous,  and the most  numerous  in the Nether-
1 ands  and  Gel"lll&llY. 
Responses  to thie questioa are of the greatest importance  1  the,r  show  that 
citizens in the countries of the Community  are much  more  involved than ie sometime& 
expected and that public support  for  european unification reflects a  "more  suprana-
tional"  w~ of organizing relations among  the statea, govel'll!llentll  and  peoples  than 
is presently practised within the  european  Community. 
(See  tables 41  and 42). 82 
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Table  41 
DEGREE  OF  INTEGRATION  DESIRED  FOR  UNITED  BUROPE 
(Respondents  aged 16  and  older) 
!  EEC  :=t ;J;' ;T: r:  ;  I  '1> 
l 
There is no  government  at  I  I 
the european level, but the  !  I 
government&  of eaoh oountr,y  ' 
meet  regularly to decide 
upon  common  policy.  16  16  14  18  13  19 i  18 
There is a  european govern-
ment  responsible for the 
moat  important matters, but 
each oountr,r retains ita 
own  government  responsible 
for ita own  problema.  56  52  51  62  57  63  .  58 
There  is a  european govern-
ment  responsible for all  I 
'  matters and the member  ooua-/ 
tries no  longer have  a  nati-. 
' 
0:&1&1  government.  I  11  15  91  7  10  5  13 
I 
None  of these  formula  4  4  61 
I  3  4  1  3 
I 
Do  t  kn  d  t  110  ow  or  o no  i  '  i 
respond  I  13 
I 
I 3 I  20  i  10  16 i  12  i  ! 
100!  Total  100  :  100  100  100 i- 100 i  10  I 
' 
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0 Table  42 
DEGREE  OF  IBTEGRATIO!T  DESIBED  FOR  UNITED  EUROPE 
(Respondent•  who  e%press  a  preference) 
The  governmenta  of each 
count:1:7  meet  regur1arly 
::s.  One  european government 
handles  the moat  impor-
tant mattera 
c.  One  european government 
handles  &11  matters 
Total 
: 
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E.  IJIAGE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  EUROPE  1  HOPES  .AND  FEARS 
What  we  just observed supports all previous  surveys  in that the vast majo-
ri  ty of "Earopeana"  are 1n favor of the uni tiDg of Europe  and  even support  a  orne  kind 
of supranational organization of a  united Europe.  Oae  criticism, however,  ia often 
made  of surveys like thia one  1  do  the  respondent& know  what it is all about  ?  Do 
they feel  concerned or involded ?  What  image  do  thy have  of a  un1 ted Earope  t  and 
exactly what do  they  expect  ? 
At  first, one  poasible  reaponae ia that  the percentage of "don't know" 
or "don't answer"  1a not very high  1  thi& ia already  one  indication of an awareness 
of oonoern and involvement.  In the instance of the  four questions,  for  example,  con-
cerning  the  evolution of the  common  Market  toward a  form  of the United States of Eu-
rope,  the election of the Earopean Parliament  by direct universal election,  the set-
ting up of a  european government  above  the national governments  and voting for  a 
"foreign"  candidate to the office of president of the United States of Earope,  the 
mean  percentage of  persons not  expressing an  opinion waa  nearly  20  ~ for all of the 
ColllliiWlity  ooUJltries  (28  ~ in Belgium  and 14 ~ in the Netherlands).  For the question 
concerning one'a general attitude toward  european unification,  the non-response  rate 
was  about  9  ~ (13  ~in Belgium and 5  ~ in the Netherlands). 
Yet it is &till possible to object  that  even the  respondents  expressing 
themaelves  (be it positively or negatively)  have  a  vague,  unreal notion of european 
unification,  a  notion reflecting,  perhapa,  an ideal  detached  from  reality. 
To  respond to these objections, we  asked the  followiDg question which  con-
sists of presenting to  the respondents  a  certain number  of opinions,  twelve  exactly, 
to which  they should respond by  indicating the extent  of their agreement  or disagree-
ment  1  "strongly agrees"  t  "agrees"  t  "disagrees"  t  and  "strongly disagrees"  as well  as 
non-reaponse.  (1) 
One  first finding is that  the majority of the respondents  (more  than eight 
out of ten)  reaffirm& his national  pride  1  the persentage is 82  ~ throughout all the 
countries in the  COIIIIIJUni ty  (92  ~ in Luxembourg  and 71  '1>  in Gel'lll&ey ). 
Conservatives - namely  thoae who  are reluctant  to see  any  change  in the 
present  aituation,  those who  fear oertain negative  effect&  of europsan integration 
(loss of national calture and identity,  increase in the  oost of living,  and unem-
ployment),  and  also  those who  believe european unification is impoasible because of 
the diversity of its languages •  represent  two  to three  peraons  out of ten. 
(1)  See  complete results in annex  (table 1). 65 
Luxembourgers  appear to be  the most  conservative,  followed b,r  the  ~elgians and the 
Dutoh.  The  Italians are the most  open  to  change. 
A\out  one  person out of two  express resigned or ethnooentrio kinds of opi-
nions whiob are verr oloae to conservatism  1  55~ agree  that  "one can't ohange  any-
thing about  the fact  that the strong alwa;rs  rille over the weak"and 46  ~ agree  that 
there are too  many  foreigners in their country. 
When  it oomee  to pro-european attitudes, which  represent  a  olear majorit7t 
these  seem  to be organized around five major images  or motivations  1 
- Europe,  u  a  third power  between Amerioa  and the U.S.S.R.  1  67  ~ of the 
respondents  agree  (69  to 64  ~ ia Gel'la&nF,  ~elgium, Ital;r and Prance, 
57  ~ ill the Netherlands,  and  46  ~ in Luxembourg)  1 
-Europe as  a  means  for european scientists to oatoh up with the Ameri-
cana  1  62  ~ of the respondents agree  1 
- Europe  aa  a  means  to improve  the level of the most  underprivileged 
groups  1  61  ~ of the respondents agree 1 
- Europe  as  a  first step toward world government  which would  eliminate 
war  (66  to 54  ~ in Germany,  ~elgium, Ital;r and  Franoe,  47  ~ in the lfe-
therlands,  and  40  ~ in Luxembourg)  1 
- Europe  ae  a  means  of improving the standard of living for all  1  59  ~ 
of the respondents agree  (71  ~ ill Ital;r)  • 
• 
•  • 86 
In order to facilitate the reading of the results and to underline the 
differences among  itema  and countries,  the distribution of the  percentage  obtained 
is summarized in the follo'fing table.  The  responses  "strongly agrees"  or "strongly 
disagrees" were given a  ooeffioient of 2  1  the responses  "agrees" or "disagrees", 
a  coefficient of 1  1  the difference between the total  of positive and negative res-
ponses were  then divided by  the percentage of the respondents who  expressed an  opi-
nion (1). 
(See table 43). 
(1)  Example,  for the entire european  Community  and for the first item 
("I am  proud to be  Gel'lll&nt  or Belgian etc.")  1 
- strongly agrees  55  'f.  multiplied by  2  e.-J.s 110 
- agrees  27  'f.  "  27 
- disagree  8  'f.  n  8 
- strongly disagrees  5 'f.  multiplied by  2  equals  10 
- Do  not know  or do  not  respond  5 'f. 
(11o  +  27)  - (8 +  10) 
The  index is obtained as  follows  1  (lOO  _  5)  •  1,25 Table  43 
DU.GE  OF  THE  UlliTED  ST.ATBS  OF  EUROPE 
FEARS  .AND  EXPECTATIONS  ( 1 } 
.-------------------.-l-EB-0~-G ·-.---,------·-r---.-----, 
!  F  I  ·  L  I 
~ 
I  am  proud to be  (from this or 
that  country) 
L--4------·--------r--------~ 
I 
!  1,25. 0,82  1,55  1•49. lt42  1,71: 1,48 
The  United States of Europe  should 
become  a  third power,  equal  to  the 
USA  and  the Ug:!R  i Ot98  0,97  1,24  0,94. 1,00  0,51  0,55 
Within  the United States of Europe, i 
I 
european scientists would  be able  · 
to oatoh up with the Americans  0,81 · 0,81:  0,63  0,83  0,84.  0,63  0,53 
Within the United States of Europe 
the most  underprivileged groups  of 
the  population would have better 
chances  to improve their status 
In the United States of Europe, 
the standard of living would pro-
bably  be  higher 
The  United States of Europe would 
represent  a  first step toward worldi 
government  which would  eliminate 
war 
One  cannot  ch~U~ge  the fact  that thei 
strong will alwa,ys  rule over the 
weak 
In principle,  I  have notb&ng 
against  foreign workers,  but  there 
0 ,81 . 0,68'  0.91 .  0,69 • 1 ,oo '  0 ,62  0,  7 3 
o,64:  o,89!  o,88  o,44  o,62  o,o5  0,20 
0,32 ~  0,52:  0,72  0,54,  0,13'  0,97  0,32 
are really too  many  in our country  0,05  0,29  0,85  0,52i-1,14:  0,29  0,24 
In the  present state of affairs, 
1  all is well with us,  so why  ohange?!-0,55 -0,12 
I  . 
Within the Uaited States of Europe  I 
the various peoples would run the 
risk of losing their culture and 
their identity 
I.a  the United States of Europe, 
the cost of living would be hi-
gher,  along With a  greater riak 
,  of unemplqyment 
European unification is impossible 
since we  speak different languages 
i 
' 
o,o3 -o,64 -1,07  0,34 -o,33 
0,06 
(l)For the method  oftoaloulati~tlithe SUmmtfY  coefficient corresponding to  each  item  ana oounlry,  see  he note  on  e  preoe~ng page. 
The  i hmx aretranked here  i~,g~ending order of the mean  values  obtained by  the  countr1es or  he  european C  'Cy. 88 
In all the countries  except  Germany,  the  item which  obtains  the highest 
score is a  nationalist item,refleoting a  feeling opposed  to  a  favorable  attitude 
toward european unification.  This  item belongs  to  the  same  group as  the  on~ which 
expresses  pessimism about  european unification because  of the language  differences 
and the  one  expressing the feeling  that  there are  too  many  foreigners  in the ooun-
tr,r.  In Germany,  two  more  items  expressing a  favorable attitude  toward  european 
unification obtain a  larger number  of votes  :  they involve  the wish  to see  Europe 
become  a  third power  equal  to  the United States and  the  Soviet Union,  and  the  per-
ception  of United Europe  as  a  first  step toward world government  which would  elimi-
nate war. 
The  perception of United Europe  as  a  third world  power  ranks  second in 
popularity  ~ong the  public  throughout  the countries in the  European  Community. 
However,  this image is far lees  I>Qpular  in Luxembourg  and the Netherlands  than in 
the other countries.  A perception which is more  or leea tied to the idea of a  third 
power  would mean  that, in the United States of Europe,  europeans scientists would be 
able to catch up with the Americans.  This  ppinion &leo  obtains  a  large number  of po-
sitive votes in all the countries.  In Belgium,  ho•.vever,  ,.-e  observe at  the  same  time 
the largest percentage of advocates  of the third power  and  a  relatively small  percen-
tage  of persons who  believe that  european scientists could catch up with the Ameri-
cans  ;  this difference is due  to  the high  percentage of "non-responses"  to  this last 
question. 
The  notion that  european unification could mean  a  first step toward  a 
greater world unity and  toward universal  peace also obtains  strong support,  mostly 
in Germany,  and surprisingly  enough,  in Belgium.  The  French  public is a  little more 
soeptio&l  about it ;  the  Dutch  and  Luxembourg  public,  even more  so  (1). 
The  feeling that  the domination of the weak  by  the strong is a  sort of 
unchangeable  law is related to  a  fairly negative attitude toward  european unificati-
on.  In all the  small  oouatries,  nonetheless,  the  proportion of positive responses 
is higher than that  of the  negative  ones,  especially in Luxembourg  and  Belgium  ;  the 
(1)  The  results obtaine4 by means  of this item have  to be  interpreted cautiously. 
The  objective of the question was  to  measure  the  presence  and  the intensity of 
a  certain notion of a  united Europe  viewed  as  a  workd  po,.-er  qualitatively diffe-
rent  from  the other  powers  and  as  a  power  whose  strength would,  at first, not 
be  economic,  military or political, but  rather moral.  It is uncertain •'fhether 
this item accurately measures  this  notion.  In fact,  in this instance we  find 
that it shows  no  negative correlation with  the  item referring to Europe  as  a 
third world  power,  Moreover,  this item ie only very indirectly related to  those 
it&ma  which measure,  more  surely,  favorable attitudes  toward  european unificati-
on. 89 
Italian publio responds more  positively to this statement. 
The  last item whsrs  the proportion of posit:'.ve  responses is higher than 
the negative responses is the  one  which  expresses  reservations about  foreign wor-
kers.  This item definitely measures  a  conservative attitude.  It is normal  that 
Italy is an  exception,  since Italy has  a  negligil:,;_e;  ntL"''"'r  of foreign "'orkerR  and 
is a  country of emigrants.  We  observe  that  BelgiQ~ h~e the highest  score  on  thi~ 
item,  with  France taking second place. 
The  statement which  most  clearly measures  this conservative attitude,  \s the 
i tern stating that  there is no  reason to  change  tne ?l'tteent  state of affsire.  The 
highest  positive  soores  on  this item are  observed in Luxembourg  and  Eelgium.  On 
the other hand,  quite clearly in France  and Italy, the  n~s have it 1  these instan-
ces undoubtedly ought  to  be  seen as  stemming  from  a  correlation with the existence 
of a  powerfUl  communist  movement  in these  two  countries rather than ae  a  d~reot ax-
preasioh,  at least in Italy, of dissatisfaction with the  present  or of pnsimililm 
about  ~he future (1). 
The  fear that  europel<l!  unification might  result  :!.n  the loss of cultural iden-
tity does  not  represen,t  a  wide  spread objection among  the  c~untries of the European 
Community.  Everywhere  the score on  this item is negative,  ~th the  exception of 
Holland where,  once  again, we  find a  kind of nationalism and latent ethnocentrism 
mentioned above  (2). 
The  belief that  the unification of Europe  runs  the risk of increasing the cost 
of living and unemployment  is not  ~despread.  The  proportion of those who  agree is 
a  little higher in the  ]enelux  countries than in the  "largo"  countries.  In Italy, 
this  proportion is particularly low;  this is confirmation of the  Italiw:.&'v;;>timism 
regarding  the  positive effects of european unification on  their standard o:f  living. 
Agreement with the belief that  european unification is impossible beoauae  of 
the diversity of languages  spoken qy  the  european peoples is not  only  a  recog~ition 
of a  difficult  problem,  but also a  symtom  of unfavorable attitudes  toward unifica-
tion.  However,  of all the items in this series, this  one is the least  approve~ 
That  agreGment  with this i tern  is slightly higher in France  and Eelgium is understan-
dable, yet  the rather high figure in Holland confirms  onoe  again the hypothesis, 
presented above,  regarding ethnocentric  tendencies in this country  • 
(1)  See  pages  99  and 100 
(2)  See  pages  64  and  66. 
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The  data in table 43  make  it possible to see  somewhat  more  clearly the 
structure of the public's attitudes in each of the six countries, at least in  th~ 
form  of hypotheses. 
- The  German  public differs  from  the other countries in the  lower  av"'"a,ges 
on items  axpressing reservations  about  european unification.  On  the other haHd,  this 
positive motivation seems  to  be  characterized less by  economic  aspects (better oppor-
tunity for  the underprivileged,  improvement  of the  standard of living)  th&.IJ.  07  po 1i-
tioal aspects. 
-The Belgian  public  seems  to  be  as  attracted by  the positive  effn,t-·:  t>i 
unification as  the German  public,  but with greater reservation.  A large  se:--m<mt  of 
the public responds  conservatively.  Belgians  appear  to  be  particularly s<wel :_:  •e 
to the effects of unification on  the standard of living,  Nevertheless,  note  th,,t 
these tendencies were  based on  those  respondents who  expressed an  opinion.  ln''""d' 
the  proportion of persons who  express  no  opinion is highest  in Belgium,  'fh"': s  -;  -
along with France,  the  lowest  of all the countries  of the European  Commun3 -,- :_  1 '. 
The  findings  axamined here  allow us  to  conclude  that this  low  average  mus~  ue  ~' · ~i-­
butable to  the indifference of the greater part  of the  Belgian public  and  '""'  ti,e  "'-~ '.s-
tance of conservative reflexes in the other part rather than to the  lack  o,·  attractj  ---
on to the idea of european  unification itself. 
- The  French  public is less conservative than  the Belgian,  Res.istance  tc 
unification also is less, but  here we  also  find a  smaller proportion of  p<orsona  wL 
are  sensitive to  the  factors which  ma;y  make  european unification attractive.  <cLc 
axoeption oonoerns  the  poesi  bili  ty that,  thanks  to unification, Europe  can  c",,,,_,  •,he 
technological  gap with the United States. 
- The  Italian public also is not  characterized by  strong resistlillce  -,u 
notions  concerning unification,  In regard to its attractiveness, this public  seems 
particularly sensitive  to  promises  of improvement  in prosperity and  the standard  o.:-
livine within the  context  of the  european  Community's  development  • 
- The  Luxembourg  public is an  exception,  It is relatively consern:·•  __ , v-
and,  moreover, it seems  slightly less sensitive  to  the motives  for unifioatic.E  ,~-·~-­
sented in the list. 
(1)  See table 2. 91 
This  ia  a  poor explanation of its rLthor higt  ::or!'  :·;o  ';l;~  <"vE>r-tC.l  index  (1),  but 
the particular position of Luxembourg within the  ::umrouni ty has  to  be  taken into con-
aideration.  The  latent nationalism  atHi  particularimcw  of tl<e  Luxembourgers  cannot 
be  of the  same  nature  as  those in the  other countri  r,  ~rem at  the  :level  of the 
mass  public,  the Luxembourg  people must  be  ror.:ce  a~,·R~'''  of  ·~···eir  dependent  position 
than  other  eurcpem;  peoples.  TheJ'  are  accustomed.,  ,;·c, •  ·•'UH1'(Le,  to  ·the  frequent use 
of several  currenal.es  ;  indeed,  currency  can  h•·  <co~ tl~ ;,ered  ae  one  of'  the principal 
symbols  of  n~;tional  sovec·•eie·at.;v.  T}JUB  an  ""-''·  .  ;llJ hyJ<'<UtAHJ.s  iP  that for the Lu-
xembourg  people,  tbe  charJgss  er..1·opean  unification will  bring about  do  not  seem par-
'·  .<''~larly imporh.flt.  If this  h;1  ~ottesis ·•ere  ve1·ifiad, lt would  mea.n  that attitudes 
which  run against  tbe formatj en  <'f  pro-european attit;ulies in other  :~ountries  I natio-
nalism,  social  or political conservatism)  do  not generate  any  real  resistam:e in Lu-
xembourg. 
- Lastly,  in  a  fir$  C.  look at  the Dutch  ;mbli. ::-,  we  notice  tcd&t  the percen-
tage of personn  vmo  res1•ond.  j"'  c:onsid.erably  hj.gher tnan  :Ln  the other countries. 
Thla  means  that  the  segment  of  tlH'>  Dutch  populat..i.on  co;  .  ..:·esponding  to  those groupe 
'"llo  abatain :fro1n  J'esponding  '~~  other cot:<•'l.ries  has  a  stror,ger  influeno·~ on  the dia-
tribution of responses  'than  c•ther c:ountries.  't''nia  aegment  of the  DtH·Jl:.  population 
is probably  :responsi  b:t e  for  the :f"'' t  thu  ',  \Ve  no-~ice  &  more  important  part1cularia-
tic reflex in  the  Dutch  P''';·Hc.  tbfm  amGng  most  of the other countries.  In the Ne-
therlands,  a  non-negligible  part  of  the  population  sho·ws  awareness  o:f  national  iden-
tity which is  prob~bly rnoN>  sooio-oul tural in character ·thart of the nationalist ty-
pe, yet  which  runs  the risk of engendering strong reactions, if the cultural  and 
perhaps  moral  identity of the  Dutch  people  aeemed threatened.  As  indicated above, 
it is a  latent feeling,  since to :9resent,  no  real.  nor ev.,ntual  threat has  been felt 
by  that  segment  of  the  population which  would  be  res.poneive  to it.  ( 2) 
(1)  See  table  2 
(2)  The  analysis of nationalism,  or more  precisely,  of fealing·e  of m;.ticnal  identi-
ty  among  the  small  countries of the  EEC  has  not yet  been carried  cut. 92 
F,  ESTIMATED  EFFECTS  OF  THE  COMMON  MARKET  AND  DEGREE  OF  ATTACHMENT 
TO  THE  CODON  MARKET 
Two  questions made  it possible to measure  the attitudes toward the 
common  Market  :  one  had to do  with estimating the effects of the  common  Market 
on  the respondents'standard of living,  the other with evaluating the degree of 
attachment  to the common  Market. 
1°  "Do  you  think that, up to now,  the common  Market  has  had 
a  ver,r  favorable,  rather favorable,  rather unfavorable 'or 
ver,r unfavorable effect upon your standard of 1:! ving  ?'• 
Responaes  to this question do  not  often appear in the scales measuring 
favorable attitudes toward european unification.  One  reason is, undoubtedly,  the 
fact that 40  ~ of the  european public is unable  to respond to this question.  In 
Belgium  and France,  almost half the respondents  do  not  express an  opinion.  We  oan 
thus think that persons  who  give the  cautious  response of "rather favorable  effects" 
are not ver,r sure of their response. 
Therefore,  although the vast majority of the respondents is favorable  to 
european unification and even,  has,  as we  have  aeen,  a  rather precise  image  of the 
forms  unification ought  to take andof the objectives it might  attain,  the  effects 
of the common  Market  on  the standard of living are scarcely perceived. 
These  findings  might  mean  that  the effects of the  common  ~~et are 
really weak  at the level of the  "man  in th• street" or else,  evan though  non n.-
gligible in effect,  they are hardly  perceived.  The  first interpretation is scar-
cely plausible, if what .is known  about  increased exchanges  between the countries 
in the  common  Market  is taken into account, yet  from  our point of view,  what  is 
important is less  the  objective situation than the image  that is perceived.  In 
fact,  by  eliminating non-responses,  one  observes that the favorable  effects are 
predominant.  The  non-responses are undoubtedly given by  respondents who  are not 
sufficiently informed or elsa badly integrated into a  society whose  contrai.nts  and 
injustices are perceived in a  undifferie•tiated w~.  One  also  observes  that in 
the three countries where  the index  of exposure  to  mass  media is the highest  (Hol-
land,  Germlll!T  and Luxembourg),  non-response ie the least frequent. 
(See tables 44  and 45). Table  44 
BSTDLATED  EFFECTS  OF  'l'RE  COIO(()JI  IU.RXET  ON  'l'RE 
ST.AlfiW!D  OF  LIVIJIG 
(Respondents  aged  16  .-n.d  older) 
Very  favorable  effeote 
Rather favorable  effects 
Rather unfavorable effects 
V•  unfavor ble effe ts  ry  a  0 
i 
Do  not know  or do  not res- j 
pond  i 
Total  I 
I 
'  i 
EEC 
5 
37 
14 
4 
40 
100 
6 
43 
11 
4 
36 
100 
i 
'  ' 
i 
6 
36 
8 
2 
48 
! 100 
: 
I 
2 
30 
4 
36 
6 
42 
5 
45 
18  12  13  22  1 
4  4  2  5  1 
1  ,  ~,j  46  44 
. 
100  100 
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Table 45 
ESTDlU'ED  EFFECTS  OF  'l'RE  COKilON  !UJli{ET  ON  'l'RE 
ST.AlfiW!D  OF  LIVING 
(baaed on  respondents expresaing an opinion) 
.---------------.----··:l~-~---.----,--...,----.--, 
EEC:  G  B  F  I  L  N 
Very  favorable effects 
Rather favorable  effects 
Rather unfavorable effects 
Very  unfavorable effects 
8  10 
62  67 
23  !  17 
7  6 
12 
69 
15 
4 
4 
56 
33 
7 
7 
64 
22 
7 
9 
67 
21 
3 
6 
58 
30 
6 
--- .. i" ---·---,---------------····----
T~t~-----·-lo~_:_l()()_~-1~--'-lo~---'--~oo  __  lo~ __ 1oo_j 
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2•  "It 7ou were  told to-aorrow that the oa..oD MArket  ia 
beillg abaadoDed,  would 7- feel verr sorrr, a  little 
sorrr, inditterent or reli-ed ,.. 
llthough favorable  etteots ot the oommon  Market  are perceived by  onl7 
tour persons out of ten in the countries of the  oommon  Market,  the public feels 
attaohed to it.  Six persona  out ot ten would feel  sorr,r it the oomaon  Market  were 
to disappear.  Thus,  even among  those  persons who  did not  respond to the question 
on  the effects ot the oommon  Market  or who  attribute unfavorable etfeots to it, so-
me  are tavorabl7 predisposed toward it. 
One  MQSt  not hide trom view,  however,  that this attachment is very strong, 
and that the proportion ot those who  would  teal ver,r sorr,r  represents  only  tour peo-
ple out  of ten in the Netherlands ani in Germany,  and onl7  two  out of ten in Luxem-
bourg,  J.l'ranoe  and Ital7. 
!tae peroclt  ..  e  of pereona Who  would feel relift'8Cl cloee  aot ditter T8r7 
-oh ~  •-trr to ocraatrr and ~n•  verr s.-11  •  aa aww..,. ot 5 ~ 
The  people who  are indifferent represent  one  fourth of the  respondents  1 
thq are relativel7 numerous  in :Belgium  (32 :()  and few in ~  (16  ~).  (See ta-
bles  46  &ad  47). 
The  MQltivariate anal7sis  demonatrates  that responaes  to this question 
are part ot the main scales measuring attitudes toward european unification.  Indif-
ference or relief oompose  the  three scales measuring negative attitudes.  However, 
there are some  indications that  thoee  persona who  would teal ver,r  sorr,r have  a  more 
parsimonious  and somewhat  Western view of ta-orrow's Burope  than those who  respond 
difierent17. Table  46 
DEGREE  OF  IDENTIFIC.A.'l'ION  WITH  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
(Respondents  aged 16  Wl.d  older) 
--~----- r--,  . ---1 
EEC  G  B  F'  I  L  li 
. 
% 
- --------- -----·-----"---~--~----·····---~ . ------------ --
%  %  %  %  %  % 
IV ere the  oo~non Market  abandoned, 
would you feel ' 
- very sorry 
- &OIIIewhat  sorry 
- indifferent 
- relieved 
- Do  not know  or do 
respond 
'----~-
\Vould  teal .  . 
- very sorry 
- somewhat  sorry 
- indifferent 
- relieved 
L 
28  38  27  21  .  22  20  40 
34  30  ·.  26  37  38  37  28 
24  16  32  30:  28  28  20 
5  6  3  5 
.  3  4  5 
'  not  I 
I 
9  10  12  7  9  11  7 
i 
~ --
Total  100  100.  100  100  100  100  100 
la152 
___  ...,. 
------~------- -i 
N  2021  : 1298  2046  1822 I 335  .1230 
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Table  47 
DEGREE  OF  IDENTIFIC.A.'l'ION  WITH  THE  COIIMON  lURKET 
(based on  respondents  expressing an  opinion) 
---r---·-
--~--:ST- F~r  N~  EEC  G  L 
!  '  _%_ ... 
%  . %~ --%--.  --% 
. -·- ., 
%  % 
31  42  31  23  24  22  43 
37  33  30  40  42  42  30 
26  18  36  32  31  31  22 
6  7  3 !  5  3 
I.  5  5 
r- ~~~- --~00 
I 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
I  ------------
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G.  DEGREE  OF  ATTACHMENT  TO  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
The  question was  worded  as  follows  1 
"Would you  be willing to accept  personal sacrifices, 
financially for  example,  to have  the unification of 
Europe  come  to  paaa  ?" 
Ae  for the previoue question,  the highest  percentages of positive respon-
ses are found in Germany  and Holland and  the higheet  psroentagee of negative  respcn-
aes, in llelgiUIII  and France. 
Of  the total respondents in all six countries  of the  Community,  over one 
third (34 %)  are not  at all willing to accept  some  sacrifices to see  european unifi-
cation come  about.  If the  persona  who  claim to be "little willing"  ( 22  %)  are added 
to this group,  one  observes that more  than half of the  respondents  (56 %)  have  only 
weak, if not negative,  attitudes toward unification. 
The  hypothesis  according  to which the most  positive feelings  toward  the 
european unification are expressed qy  those groupe  who  agree  the most  with '"hat  has 
been achieved to date  and who  have  a  rather "western"  view of  to-morrow's  Europe is 
confirmed u,y  the fact that responses  to  the question about  personal  sacrifices one 
would  be willing to accept  to  see Europe  come  about,  appear in no  scale,  except  one, 
and are not  associated with responses  to  the question measuring one's attachment  to 
the  CO!IIIDOn  fi&rket. 
The  exception concerns  the soale which measures  the hope  that Europe  be  a 
third power  between the United States and  the Soviet Union.  Thus,  there must  exist 
a  amall  minority of the  population whose  pro-european feelings  are inspired U.V  a 
kind of nationalist noetalgy and  another truly european minority that  does  not  agree 
with the manner  european unification has  taken place so far (1). 
(1) For the total aample  of all six countries, we  find the following diatribution 
-strongly attached to  the  common  Karket ~to  the political 
UDification of Europe  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . . . . . . . . . . 
- etroDgly attached to the  common  Market,  but weakly 
to political unification of Europe •••••••• 
-weakly attached to  the  common  Market,  but  strongly 
to the political unification of Europe •••••• 
attached 
. •  . . 
attached 
•  . •  • 
-weakly or not at all attached to the  common  Market,  nor  to 
the political unification of Europe •••••••••••• 
.  "  . . 
. . •  . 
•  . • 
. . . . 
Total 
18 % 
10 % 
16  <t 
100% Moreover,  one  notices  that  those  persons whose  immediate well-being is 
an important  aim1  namely  those who  give more  priorit7 to an increase in salar,y 
than to better human  relations in our society, express little or no  attachment  to 
the political unification of Europe.  Therefore,  a  favorable  attitude seems  foun-
ded more  on  hope  than  on  satisfaction with the tangible results of economic unifi-
cation aohieved to date. 98 
Table  48 
WILLINGNESS  TO  ACCEPT  SOME  PERSONAL  SACRIFICES  TO 
HAVE  EUROPE  COllE  TO  PASS 
(Respondents  aged 16  and  older) 
I  EEC!  r 
F)  i  '  j 
G  , 
B  I 
~ ;  :  '1>  '1>  '1>  '1>:  '1> 
Entirel7 willing  8  13  5  5  7  6 
Fairl7 willing  27  29  18  22  29  31 
!Jot  so willing  22  24  19  22  20  i  21 
!Jot at all willing  34  27  47  41  !  ,  34  29 
Do  not know  or do  not  ! 
respond  9  7  ll  10 !  10  13 
I  I 
------j-- ---t----- -
Total 
!  100  100  100  i 100  1  100 
I  100 
I 
'-- i 
>;~~-12046 i  18=-2 
i 
12021  ll  [8752  335 
, 
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Table  49 
WILLINGNESS  TO  ACCEPT  SOME  PERSONAL  SACRIFICES  TO 
HAVE  EUROPE  COllE  TO  PASS 
9 
34 
19 
32 
6 
100 
. 1230 
(based on  respondents  expressing an opinion) 
~--"-"""  r---- ---~-~ ... ---·-r  --·. 
EEC  G  B  F.  I  L  N 
'1>  '1>  1>  i-+  ~-'--- %  '1> 
Batirel7 willing  9  14  6  6  8  7  10 
, 
Fairly willing  30  31 
'  20  24  ,  32  36  36 
I 
!Jot  80 willing  24  26  21  24  22  24  20 
!Jot  at all willing  37  29  53  46  38  33  34 
l  .  '  -- ---·  - _,______~--------~---
Total  [100  100  100 
I  100  100  100  ! 
I 
_j 
I  1100 
' 
.. ' 
_j 5 - OVERALL  .ATTI'l'UDE  TOWARD  LIFE 
The  overall attitude toward life was  identified and measured on  two  di-
mensions  1  name17,  satisfaction or dissatisfaction with present living conditions, 
on  the  one  hand,  and optimism or pessimism about  an improvement  in liTing conditions 
in the near future,  on  the other. 
A.  S.ATISF.ACTIOli  .AliD  DISS..A.TISF.ACTIO!i 
".Are  ;rou  satisfied with ;rour present UTing conditions  '1" 
Almost  two  thirds of the respondents  throughout  the entire Communit;r  are 
satisfied with their present conditions of life.  In Ital7 and  espeoiall;r France,  a 
high percentage of dissatisfied people is observable  ;  in the latter ocuntr,r, it 
even  represents  a  slight majorit;r.  (See table 50). 
Table 50 
S.ATISF..lCTIOli  WITH  PRESBNT  LIVDIG  CONDITIONS 
Sati8fied 
Rather satisfied 
Dissatisfied 
Do  not know  or do  not 
respond 
Total 
'----------------- ---------
(Respondents aged 16  and older) 
-~---· ---
EEC  G  B  F  I  I 
'  ---------
"'  "'  "'  "'  "'  9  14  6  6  8 
30  31  20  24  32 
24  26  21  24  22 
; 
I ,  ~· ' , 
46  38 
~- ..  --.- - 100  : 100  100  100 
.  - . .  i - - ---·· 
r------~ 
•  L  I  li  I 
--.-------- ·t  .  '''"I 
'  "'  '  "" 
7  10 
36  36 
24  20 
33  34 
100  100 
__  _j 100 
B.  OPTDUSII  AllD  PESSIMISM 
"Do  you  think that your conditions of life will improve 
oonsiderably during the next five years fn 
On  the whole,  the optimists and  the pessimists almost  oanoel  eaoh other 
out,  though the first are,  percentage wise,  definitelT more  numerous  than the latter 
in Italy and :Belgium  and far leas numerous  in Ge:rmany  and the lietherlands. 
The  oase of Italy is typical of a  countr;r where  a  large minority of dis-
satisfied people is still in evidenoe, yet where  there is a  large majority  of opti-
mists  among  respondents  expressing an  opinion.  On  the oontrar;r, in France  the  per-
centage  of optimists is smaller than that of the dissatisfied (1).  (See  table 51). 
Table  51 
OPTIMISM  AllOUT  FUTURE  LIVUG  COliDITIONS 
(Respondents  aged 16  and older) 
r-------
- - -------------- -------·-------- .  1 
EEC  Q  ll  F  I  I  1 
"' 
. ---------t-. -------· 
"'  "'  '  "'  "'  "'  Think  that their living oondi-
tiona  I 
- will improve considerably du-
ring the  ooming  five years  40  30  46  43  48  44 
-will not  improve considerablT  41  56  33  37  27  36 
- do  not know  or do  not respond  19  14  21  20  25  20 
----------
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
---------------
li  8752  2021  1298  2046  1822  335 
L-- - ------- '  .. 
-1 
N  I 
"' 
l 
I 
I 
! 
34 
48 
18 
100 
'1230 
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(1) A joint analysis of responses  to the two  questions would make  it possible  to 
establish a  typology of "satisfied/optimists", "satisfied/pessimists", "dissa-
tisfied/optimists"  and "dissatisfied/pessimists"for each country.  No  doubt, 
this last oategor,y  gives a  particularly important  hue to socio-political life. 101 
It appear·ed  int  ares ting to  cE>.u t  ; i,;:  ..  '·  LLpon  i>h.\ . ,  "·' eL  t ""'" c5  c•lHO pean 
unification by  obtainini_~  reeponses  to  a  se;.·  "'l·'"·H"tiorL;~  J.r~  :~Jir.'-'  .;el~ .. fl.ill 
number of general  policy aims  l::it~ ·-.~h  as  pet:~.c~ ,  ~-; tf-1:'1,·,  r:)t,\ i.  f~.ri.c..1.  .;;<.;.ui c  '4  ~  nc~.  ~-, o-
na1  prestige.  Moreover,  since  his survey  vn  ...  .c>,ducted in 19T'  ~  .. ;  ques:i on wu 
asked about attitudes  toward  atudent  demo"•···"t;co-....  Another''''"  ""'  ·r;;;w  .  .:>  L".  pos-
sible to identify conservative,  ref<.•rmist  u"  revolutionar;y  attitt""  >LB--·1i·''•J.8  pre-· 
sent society.  Finally,  two  other questions were  directed,  rec:.-ilc .J.,,; ·  ,  .•  ,.he  t'i'lo 
concrete  aims  consid.e:  t.c  be  most  desirable and  the  degree  of  ;. ''~'"' c  •  .>.n.  ,,,  .·o: . .:d. bu-
ted to various  socio-~  .itical aims. 
A.  GENER.AL  .POLICY  AIMS 
'~~~o-,v  1  .Q..')t  going  t~_-.  lH.-.mt~  li::.  ::ertG.in  llt.H:'I.be.":'  of  t.h1.l~-:  .;,.n.-.:  ·,;i\,~~-- wish  __  ,..,.  "'.,.....  . ..._ __ --· 
t.o  r_;;6t;.  r.o.ccol!l.plJ.sl:-.~•·-·5~  For  f'eS.Oh.  on~_,  :<;_e·-~ne  tell  "!!(~  '-'iLe~-b~r  yCIU 
-;t;-aTIY:-·~.,..~ar: t  i  t-s-~~'~_70rl:~liS1~-.;T.;-Wheti1;f:--"~;-;.;t~  --~re  ~:-~p:~·  ,~ ;--;  ~-. - {  -~ 
f', 
world wars 11  or in  fs.v;:,r  of  "lj_v;nr_··  in  a  fr«:J"  co11nt.~r  where  aY!:?.T7' 
what  he  thinks 11 a  Glose  to  nine  _pfJ:rsor:iJ  out  of ten  strongly  •·<.z-·.;:·~ 
financial  dii'ficul ties in the  purchas•  .>.f  a  car  or  - hm.a.e,  foJ  .~ci  .. · 
proportion hopes  to  be  at:. e  to  "move  abou c  f:r-o;oeJ.y  in aJ ~  ,:ount:ri  e& 
Responses  to  tbreo  (;ther 1 temi::  mrJ~es  it- posa11:le  to  8Y_s·•  (_~y. 
nationalism or,  :rl:l.ther,  ('f tLe  aense  of nution&l  i(i~r_.ti ty  .. 
1°  Almost  eight  persons  out  of ten  (78  %)  keenly  d.,sire  ;J 
tr,y  make  important  scienti.fio discoveries.  The  percentage of po6  +.: · 
highest  ( 86 'f,)  in France  and  1 ovvest  (65  %)  in  Belgiucn.  Ve-r:;r  few  · .,,  ....  " 
n·  no 
'i3ci.m6 
"1  tape"  .. 
coun-
.ses is 
··~'  ~~ppc:~ed 
to thie aim, yet  more  thru'  or.e  fourth  of the  respondentc  i.:::,  '~n·m~  , ..  •eJM''''-"  end 
Holland and  more  than  one  third in  Belgiwn are  indiffe!•>r:t  · ..  r, ·  "·ior...  ~-
eluding Germany,  one  observes  a  rather striking difference  bet"ec>n 
ge"  and the  three  "small"  countriss  of tbe  European  Community 
'  ..  "'"" 
2°  Jul  uscta1,  t t  is in  France  and  in Italy where  ""  ·' l.Ja<H'·'<· 
portion of respondents  who  keenly  desi.rs  that  tb!d r  co1.u't. ,,;-,  ;.:.la,y  .;l.r. 
in world politics.  Orposi tion to  thl.s  ui m is not  nag  I 'D:'l bl!C  in :;"1"'"' 102 
Netherlanda.  The  percentage of indifferent respondents  and of those who  did not 
respond is particularly high in the Netherlands and in Belgium. 
3•  The  difference between  the forms  of national identification in the 
large and the small countries shows  up even more  clearly when  the percentages of 
persons who  want their oount:cy  to have  a  strong army are compared.  The  rank order 
of countries by  this proportion is the same  as the rank order according  to  economic 
she a11  measured,  for SX&IIIple,  b7  gros11  national product  a  GerDI&JlY•  France, Italy, 
Rolludr  Belgium and Luxembourg,  lagging far behind. 
In Gel'lll&ll7  and France,  the percentage ratio of those who  "keenly desire" 
that the countr.r have  a  strong &rm7  to those Who  are "rather against it "  is, respec-
tively, 1,72 and 1,62.  In Italy, the ratio is equal  tc 1,00, i.e.  there are as  many 
positive opinions as negative  ones.  In Rolland and Belgium,  the ratio is respective-
ly 0,64 and 0 r47' whereas it is only 0 r04 in Luxembourg. 
(See  table 52). '  ----·------.  ---
'fable 52 
CJINERAL  POLICY  AlliS  1 
PUCE,  FRUDOI[J  COKFORT  JJlD  llfJ.TIOliAL  PRESTIGE  (1) 
(Respondents aged 16 and older) 
I 
BEC;  G 
That there will be no  more  wars  1 
- desire it atrongly  97  97  I  95  98  97  96  97  I 
- indifferent  0  0  1  1  1  1  01 
- rather opposed  2  3  2  1  1  2  I  2  1 
~-do  aot b=o~<••;;•poM-~~~ _,;  1_1 _~_:1;  "-~~  -;~  l_,~j 
j  To  liTe ill a  free country where  i  l 
1 
'  i 
enr,rone freely sq what  he  thiDka1 i  ' 
1 
'  ' 
I,  I  I 
- desire it strongly  I  95  97  94  95  r  94  I  98  9522  II, 
=  ::::·:;...  I : I : I :  :  :  ~ 
- do  not know or do  not  respond  - 1  I  1  f  2  :,  2  2  1  . 1_1 
Total  [100  lOo  ll~---~lac;-:-100-- 1-1-00--l~lOO I 
i  I 
I 
1  ll'ot  to encounter financial difti- I 
I 
!  cul  ties in the purchase  of a  car 
i 
'  or a  house,  for example  1 
-desire it atrongly 
- illdifferent 
- rather opposed 
- do  not kaow  or do  not respond 
Total 
I  I  , 
!  88  1  88 
i  8  I  8 
87  I 86 I 92 
8  9 
1 
4 
5 
1  ! 
!  2 
92 
4 
1 
3 
83 
13 
2 
2 
---+-----+--+---+----- ---
100  100  100  100  I  ,__ ________________  -
(1)  The  items here are  r&llked  ill decreasing order of percentages based on the 
weighted aTerage for all of the countries in the Bllropean  CoiiiiiiiU11 ty. 
103 104 
- ~- -~ -~------- ~~--~~~--r~-~--~-T~ 
Bl!lC  G  :B  F 
To  be able to travel freely in 
all the oountriea without  artT 
red tapa  a 
- desire it strongly  86 
- indifferent  10 
89 
10 
8;1. 
12 
I  L 
93 
2 
83 
9 
- rather oppoaed  2  0 
88 
8 
1 
3 
5 
2 
87 
9 
2 
2 
3 
2 
100 
6  l 
2  i  - do  not know  or do  not  reapond  2  1 
100~  ------ Total  i  100  100 
I 
100  100  100 
'l'hat  their country make  great 
aoientific discoveries  1 
- desire it strongly 
- indifferent 
- rather oppoaed 
78 
18 
1 
69 
23 
2 
68 
27 
2 
- do  not know  or do  not respond  3 
73 
24 
1 
2 
64 
27 
2 
7 
86 
10 
1 
3 
79 
16 
1 
4  6  3  I 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100~l 
1----------------_.;....------'--~--~~--~--- -~~~~-- ~-~ 
'l'hat  their country plq an impor-; 
tant role in world politica  1 
- deaire it atrongly 
- indifferent 
- rather cppoaed 
- do  not know  or do  not  respond 
Total 
'l'hat  their country have  a  atrong 
&riiiT  l 
- deaire it atrongly 
- indifferent 
- rather oppoaad 
_  do  not know  or do  not  respond 
Total 
i 
56  54  50  59  59  54  43  i 
31  28  35  31  31  34  411 
7  12  5  4  3  6  10  1 
6  6  10  6  1  6  6  1 
-----+----i-----..~--1-~~  ~ -·  - .-l 
100  100  100 
38 
26 
43 
27 
21 
28 
100  !  100  100  100 
42 
25 
33  3 
28  10 
29 
22 
~  ~  fj,  H  33  ~  fj 
6  5  6  7  6  3  4 
100  100  i  100 f-ico .  100  100  1  100 
~752J2021  -~~:-~12~_46  1822  ___  33~J2~0 ·, 
.I 
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"Receutl;r  J.tt.:r·t;':~  (-:!tUd.":~:-·it  B.<S;i:\(  .. !iJ·:·J  t:;.'-;r{,i;l)tHi  havp;  "'l--zJ:o _,::"'::!  plaoA:  .in llalll' 
~-a·~U~i~Ti~  .... -~;ir:?rn~,;?:~"-·cto-you~E:11;;x;~-:taVc~ab:te, ra-
'liher  fe.·~h~:;-t:;r~tt;-\~~=~~:1'1'10  cl"  ~~£::~""'Uil:fmi&·bl  e  toward. ~ 
etudt1ntt1i  '7ho  t.av-,'9  -:.~;>•mml~~;.  !'~'~  ·---· 
Pereona who  aa.,v  they  1~-11el  ·~~l:JI  fa_.\~~·.:;r~~b1 fi  t~·)w&J~·(  er;~1~.~.0nt  d~~t"".it~t:ca:t1ons are 
VC%7  few  (7 %  in all of the EEC}  ccmp&r,o~~--~  '!:.o  .:_:n  ')  A.<~ o  ~·-r-·~l  ve:r::'  un.:·a~t"r!\ble~  The 
ilighefdt  proportion of un:f'avol"able  revpon.f.l~E  :!.e.  :.·,,.,J;.<l  1 '  P:l~;J,nc'\1  iillii>  to a  leese:r.  l!l:x-
tent in Germany.  In  Luxem.botl:Og ,,  n  cnu:::rU:;/  -,~;~-, th.  no un.i·;u:n: t 1i t;'·  ~r.  1. b~~  :'l  .. J:il.,  ·the smal-
lest propo:rtior1 of  'U.tl.favor~bl o  ::r·eepr.u:fH~;:.  :;J  n  .i\?tH>·"'i.~ 
(See  table 53). 
Very  favorable 
Rather favorable 
Rather unfavorable 
Very  unfavorable 
Do  not know  or do  not respond 
Total 
1J 
\.,. ______________ . _____  .. ___________________  ~--
.. 
SEC 
% 
.., 
• 
2(  ... , 
"'  ,,  .,,,, 
30 
,.- .. 
G 
% 
"' 
,  .. 
•"•"'i  .::..:.;. 
JO 
29 
14 
1fl0 
C:021 
ll  "'  "  "  -~- ....  ~----·--
"" 
"" 
'h  ,  .. 
I)  '  L~  !) 
... ,,., 
(.  5."..  "'  ~--
)..  1.~  2.~1 
26  .32  :2$ 
32  v;  .... - 29 
,.  ·'~ 
.t-~- 9  9 
100  J ({';  100 
1298  2046  }822 
., 
i 
I. 
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AND  REVOLUTIONARY  .1\.GTION 
"On  this ;'"'"'d  are  thri!!e  basic kinds  of •· ttHu.dea  to  ..  ·ard the 
societ;r  tr~:.,  oJ1-;'o1rve:-'-llia:Lw-'o:hoo~e$'  tha&.tlli~oh 
beat  deaG~::;ct;syvnr own  op,.n:tona~ n  ,.._.,.,.....,,..._,.._.,.,  .. ____  ~...  -
Advocates  of  ®>  r""'  .. ·''"· ·,  •• ,h=,.e·>  1.n  eociaty  tl:lro·agh  :o:-evolut:l.onary  action are 
very few in number in t:b.e  <Jt:i•.'I· t .. , "'''  <)f  tha  EEC  :  1  to  .5  'f  in l-uY.embourg •  Germeny  and 
:Belgium,  !Uld  5 to 7 'f.  in  FN·W''",  lio.L).I&'1d  and Italy. 
In all t.he  countries,  ths vwot  r.:~J;:crity  of the  p>tblio  tends  to  p1·efer gradual  impro-
vement in society by  jLn:ce11:!g"mt  :ref,:;;;-·ro.,  Also in tlU  the  cor.>.n'trtee,  'the ul  tra-conser-
vati  ves, namely  those who  rrrei'"r  tb"  s i.atement  the.·;  m~r pre,ent society ll!l.>.l'!t  be vali-
antly defended  ~ainat all t•ubve!•M'l?e  i'or·~!H'l•  are  coul'!;!dwr:~.hly  mo:.:-e  numerouB  than the 
revolutionaries  1  only  lt~.Jy i1'  em  r•;X'J~))Uon."  In  ·this  l:'tH.mt.'l:'."r,  t•he  oom.Jerva.tivea  are 
only  one  and a  half' t:!.m$S  mo:r-s  uume:.:-cu:e  than the :revolutionari ea, while  the ratio in 
France  and  the Netherlands is 2,5,  ;1l.b:<>et  ;;  in Bolg:Hm  ,  10 in Germa:::lY  and  27  in Lu-
xembourg. 
(See  table 54). 
i'able 54 
I 
Our  entire society Tuust  b~  J."D-~.:ioa.l  ... ,. 
ly  changed by  revolutiona:r::r  ~>.;: ;.1\Jt: 
Our society must  be  imp:r·:>'li:>:l  : i +tle 
by little by intelligent  ref<n·.u 
Our  present society must  be  ·<raJ.ia.ntly 
defended  ~a.inat all sub.o,c:rvi  <re 
forces 
Do  not know or do not  refi!)J(Ji.• 
EEC 
% 
15 
•j 
' 
i 100 
L 
I  __ ~· 
'  ~"'''t;-~ 
1.  :..~t.. 
' 
G 
1.-
20 
,. 
lOt: 
2021 
B  p; 
-·---~-----·-----
%  'f 
3 
14  1:? 
1.&  ~ 
·' 
·-··"'!·"-·-···--
100 ' 
100 
1298 
. 
' 
2046 
• 
··T-
·~il  I  L  . 
-~----: 
%  'f.  % 
I 
I 
I 
'  ' 
1  6 
65  75 
11  27  15 
9  7  4 
-- ----·-·-- ·-"  ~----·----._..., 
100  100  100 
.... ------..,j 
'  1822  335  1230  ! 
______  i D - THE  MOST  STRONGLY  DESIRED,  CONCRETE  POLICY  AIMS 
"Now  I'd like to indicate  some  policy aima  to you  • 
.Among  the following aims,  which  two  do you prefer 
the most  Y" 
This question included eight items of which  four were  relat«·:'. 
oonoerns  (job security, better human  relations in our society, wage  c .• u·;, 
worker participation in business  management)  and four other items  re1ato 
tioal concerns  (the maintenance of la-,v  and order,  the fight  against  r'.ni •. 
the protection of the  freedom  of speech  for  everyone,  and improvement 
oipation of oitizens in political decisions of the government). 
These findings  can be  presented in two different  \VIi;YS  a  fir"<. 
analyzing separately the responses  to  th<J  two  groups  of items  ;  or,  '""' 
lyzing the correlations between all  the  responses.  As  we  will see,  the  "~ 
sis turned out  to be much  more interesting than the first. 
1°  SOCIAL  AIMS  AND  POLITICAL  OBJECTIVES 
a)  In all the countries,  the  most  frequently  chosen sooial  otT<• 
the assurance of greater  job security,  although this peroentege is eigne 
lower in Germany  and Belgium  than in the other countries. 
At  the european level,  almost  half the respondents  ohoose  tl:~  ·. 
of making our society more  humane  (49 %).  This  objeotive is definitai; 
in Holland and definitely less frequent  in Gel"'llaey  and Luxembourg.  On  t.h" 
hand,  in these  two  countries, which were  seen  to be the least  revolut.lo'.·'· 
six, we  find  the highest  percentage of persons  'O!'ho  choose  the particip•H 
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kera in business management  as  one  of the  two  moat  preferred social  obj.,r.c·: '~'6B 
these are also the only  two  countries where  this last, more  precise,  cr.·· 
frequent  than the more  vague  objective related to  the humanization of  ·· 
In all the countries,  exoept  in Luxembourg,  an inoreaee in salaries ia  .. 
frequently  chosen objective. 
These  results seem  to indicate that  the population of the  cotw • 
the European  Community,  considered as  a  whole,  sets more  store by  job  ,. .  .., 
the quality of life than b7  an increase in income. 
.s  rn.ore 
<'i.ft.ty.  .  "'''. 
f  lllld 108 
b) Ievertheleas,  among  the four objectives of a  political nature,  the 
fight  against rising prices ia the most  frequently  chosen (68 ~), with a  relati-
vely high percentage in Gel"!ll8liY  and relatively low  percentage in Luxembourg.  All 
improvement  in the participation of citizens in the political decisions of the  ~o­
vernment ia the leaat frequently selected (27  ~) 1  in Luxembourg  this objective ob-
tains  onl7 12  ~ of the votes compared  to 38  ~ in the Ietherlanda. 
It ought  to be noted that in the  three large countries of the EEC,  the 
percentage of persons who  choose the maintenance of law and order as  one  of the most 
preferred objectives ia higher than the percentage of those who  oheose  the protecti-
on  of the freedom of speech  1  the  percentage ratio is 1,59 in German;r,  1,25 in Fran-
ce  and 1 120  in Italy.  In the Benel.x countries,  on  the oontrar;r1  the  protection of 
freedom  of speech is ohoaen at a  rate equal or greater than is the maintenance  of 
law and order. 
(See  table 55). 
Whether it is social or political objectives that are at stake, the diffe-
rences  observed between  countries  do  not  seem  to be  explicable at the macro  level, 
i.e.  in terms of data such as  the histor;r of the countr;r in question, ita present  po-
li  tioal regime, its total national  income  or its income  per capita.  If these varia-
bles have  an intervening effect, it is only  to the extent that they determine  the so-
cio-eoonomio1  socio-cultural and socio-political structure of each oountr;r.  In other 
terms,  as we  suspected in undertaking this researoh,  any attempt to identif7 and to 
measure  the determinants of attitudes,  especially favorable attitudes toward the uni-
fication of Europe,  has  to  emplo;r  more  refined instruments  than the sheer oountr;r  b.1 
oountr;r  comparison of responses  aggregated at the national level. 
A more  thorough analysis of the data just examined will allow us  to prove 
this assertion. 
2°  SETTING  OF  PERSONAL  GOALS  1  SECURITY  AlllD  COKroR'l,  FREEDOM  OF  SPEECH 
AND  SOCIAL  PARTICIPATION 
Taking  the work  of Abraham  H.  Kaalow  as a  starting point, it is Professor 
Ronald  InsJ.ehart  (University of Michigan and University of Geneva)  who  is responai-
ble for having formulated and verified the hypothesis that it is in our most  develo-
ped societies, often considered aa post-industrial, where  now  that the basic needa 
for physical and  economic  seouri  ty of a  large and ever increasing segment  of the po-
pulation have been largely satisfied, this segment  of the public has  turned to  the Table 55 
THE  TWO  MOST  PREFERRED,  CONCBETE  OBJECTIVES  (1) 
(Respondents  aged 16  and older) 
109 
(1)  The  itema here are ranked in decreasing order of percentages  based on  the weigh-
ted average for all of the countries of the EEC. 
(2) In ~  oases  the Luxembourg  interviewers understood the question wording in 
such a  w~ that  the  choice of only one  objective is sufficient. ! 
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pursuit  of other goals  1  its affective, intellectual, esthetical needs  have  becoT>e 
more  and more  important,  and  thus its value system and  behaviour are modifieu ln po-
litical spheres  as well  as  in other fields of activity.  In this respect,  lngl~hart 
distinguishes between values he qualifies as  "post-acquisitive" as  opposed  to  those 
called "aoqllisi  tive".  In fact,  among  the four political items we  just exMLtnc'L 
tv,o  of them can be considered as reflecting "acquisitive" values  (maintainillf  Jaw 
and order and fighting rising prices)  and two  as  "poet-acquisitive" values  (>';u~e.r·,n­
teeing the freedom of speech and improving  the participation of citizens in the  ;o·o-
litioal decisions of the government)  (1). 
The  respondents were  allowed only  two  choices  ;  apart  from  non-re~Spor," ·· 
each  respondent  was  able to chose  any of the six possible pairs of items.  The  ·:""'-
oe  of a  "post-aoquisi  tive"  item should be expected to  show  a  strong posi  ti.vA  c;orre-
lation with the choice of another item of the same kind in each national  sample  ; 
the same  relation ought  to hold for  the  choice of aoquisi  Uve  items.  This  hypo:lw-
sis was verified.  Approximately half the  respondents in each  oountr,r  eeleot.  or.e  of 
the  two  "pure"  pairs of objectives  ;  the percentage ratio of "aoquisi  tive"  t(.  ";oost-
aoquisitive" orientations is at least three to one.  (See  table 56). 
Table 56 
PAIRWISE  CHOICE  OF  "ACQUISITIVE"  OR  "POST-ACQUISITIVE" 
OBJECTIVES  (2) 
,--- ..  "1  -~-- .. -- ··--~ ·--·t ---- --:--- -·· 
i  Germany  r  Belgium  i  France  Italy  Netherlands  Greet 
'{.  '{. 
--~-- '{.  '{. 
Britain 
% 
Pairs selected  I 
- acquisitive  43  32  38  35  30  36 
-post-acquisitive i  10  14 
l 
11  13  17  g 
(1)  See  Ronald  INGLERART  1  "Changing Values Priorities and European Integra.E:>n", 
Journal of Common  Karket  Studies,  Vol.  X,  n°  1 0  September 197loPP  1-.36. 
See also  I  "The  Silent Revolution in Europe  I  Intergenerational  Change  in  c'csc-
Industrial Societies".  The  American Political Science Review,  Vol.  LXV,  ,-,''  4, 
Deo ..  ber 1971,  pp 991-1017. 
(2)  Cf.  IIJGLEHART,  Journal of Common  Karket Studies,  Sept.  1971,  p.  5·  Tha  ;.t<;ti-
nent  data for Luxembourg have not  been used because  of the  small  sample  'i.ze. 
On  the other hand,  the study was  extended by  INGLEHART  to include  Great  IJ;,:t tair.. 111 
In addition,  INGLEHART  oonfirmed the hypothesis that value  -,ystems  thus 
expressed are correlated with the other political preferences, for exaaple with atti-
tudes  toward student demonstrations  (see table 57)  and with support  for european uni-
fication (see table 58). 
Table 57 
AT'fiTUDES  TOWARD  STUDENT  DEMONSTRATIONS  BY 
PAIRS  OF  OllJECTIVES  CHOSEli  ( 1) 
(Percentage  favorable  to  demonstrations) 
.----------- - -
Maintaining law and 
order and fighting-
rising prices  (:a::) 
Gel'lll&lly  Belgium I 
14  18 
·~··'-Italy  ~B•<h.,lM+ ~ 
12  19  21  12 
Maintaining law and 
order and  freedom  of 
speeoh-
Maintaining law and 
order and partioipa-i 
tion  - · 
Fighting rising pri-. 
oes  and  freedom  of 
speeCh" 
Fighting rising pri-· 
oes  and  partioipati-i 
on 
Freedom  of speech 
,  and  participation  ,-
35 
29 
35 
46 
83 
29  18 
36  23 
32  38 
60  41 
65  66 
29  33  22 
36  42  9 
42  37  22 
54  47  60 
77  70  65 
r--------+----+------l------------------r-----+-------·---- Peroentage of res- !  ---- 1 
pondents  e:a::pressing 
an opinion  32  35  27  36  39  17  i 
-------------~------~----~------~----~'·---------~------~ 
(:a::)  Pure  pairs of items  corresponding respectively to acquisitive ans 
tive objectives. 
'  post-oquiBi- : 
~--------------------·---------·--------------------------- ---- __ _j 
(1)  Cf.  INGLEHART,  op.  cit.  p.6. 112 
r-· --~----------
: .Aoquiaitives 
. Post-aoquisitives 
i .Aoquisiti  vee 
i Post-acquisitive& 
I  r--· 
! 
Table 58 
SUPPORT  AND  OPPOSITION  TO  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
J.!lONG  "ACQUISITIVE"  .AND  "POST-ACQUISITIVE"  GROUPS  ( 1) 
~1----G_e~----------~---Be_l_gi_um  ________  ~ 
...  ......, 
France 
I  Agai:_st--For (N)  ._;_' _Ag_ai  __  n_s_t  ___  F_o_r  __  (_r_) __  Ag  __  a_i_n_s_t __  F_o~r  ( N) 
I  11  45  <  850)  a  31  <  406)  9  36  , 694) 
I  2  76  (200)  2  64  (174)  4  69  (216) I 
---+--------+-------.. - _J 
I 
Italy  Rolland  I Great  Britain 
' 
Against  For  (N)  Against  For  (N)  Against  For  (N) [ 
~-------------~---------------r-----------~ 
48  (604)  16  38  (561)  40  13  (704)!  5 
5 
I 
69  (224)  2  62  (313)  25  32  (148): 
'  -- -----! 
! (  1)  Cf.  IIGLEB.ART,  op.  cit., p. 21.  Note  that  "for" and "against" are calculated by 
the author aooording to an index,  the composition of whidh  he  explains  in the ci-
ted artiole,  pages  15  to 19. 113 
I  - DEGRII  OF  IKPORT.ANCE  ATTRIBUTED  '1'0  V.AliiOUS  SOCIQ-POLITIC.U. 
Oli.TICTIVRS 
Responses  to this question complement  those to the prfl'ious  OJle,  It 1J&8 
no  loDger a  matter of selectiDg the two  most  desired objectives from  two  separate 
aeries of aims,  but instead one of indioatiDg the degree of importance attached to 
each and ever,y  objective on  this scale  1  top priority,  important objective,  seoOJl-
dar.r  objective, objective of no  importance.  {1) 
In attributiDg a  I1UIIIerioal  value to each possible response, - are able to 
rank the objectives b7  the mean  score obtained in each  countr,y.  ·scores -re attribu-
ted in the followiDg manner  1 
- top priori  v  1  3  points 
- important objective  1  2  points 
- seoondar,y  objective  1  1  point 
- objective of no  importance  1  0  point. 
The ~  order of the means  obtained for the whole  of the ai%  countries 
confirms the ocmclusio:oa  drawn  from  anaJ.7sis  of the responses to the· prfl'ious ques-
t10Jl. 
The  five first objectives identified as most  desirable are all direotl7 re-
lated to the idea of security and stability a 
1•  Oa&rantee decent retirement benefits to all old persons ••• 2,68 
2•  Provide  empl07111ent  for young  people •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Stop the manufaoturiDg of atomic bombs  •  •  •  • • 
4•  Provide greater job security 
5•  Kaintain law and order •  •  • 
•  • 
•  • 
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
•  •  • 
•  •  • 
•  •  • 
•  •  • 
••• 2,44 
•  •  •  2,36 
Kore ideological preferences appear oD17  in Bi:dh place in the raak order, 
the first of which is freedom  of speech.  Jaong these objectives, a  more humane  so-
ciety and.  school  reform hsve higher mean  scores. than wage  increases,  Aid.  to -dar-
developed.  countries takes only tenth place,  foll~d  b7  the participation of workers 
in business Jll&l186ement  and the fostsriDg of private enterprise in the sphere of eoe-
nomi o  aoti  vi  t7. 
Issue-posi  tiona  on  coliiiiUJI.in  or oapi  talism come  in onJ.7  last, at the end 
of the list, which means  that these overarohiDg ideological ialllles interest only a 
(1) See  oomPiete relllllts in annes  {table 2). 114 
small  segment  of the population. 
Nevertheless,  rather large differences  by  oountr,y  are  observ~bl~ 1n the 
rank-order of objectives in term11  t>f  the degree of oonoern as well  as  t.<.  •  ··• aws  them-
selves.  (See tables 59  and 60). 
a)  The  degree of concern is meaaured by  the percentage of non-·I·.•  r<mse  • 
the higher this peroenta.ge,  the leas the public feels  oonoern-~:1  the 
question. 
It is interesting to  not~ that  1 
- 18  '1>  of the respondents in al  of the countries of the  oom~,  . .,.  li.>.rt:et  do 
not  take  a  position  o:>n  abolisl  ng  oapi  tali  am  ( 23  '1>  in Germa.;:.v  ""'"'  7  '!>  in 
the Netherlands). 
16  '1>  of the respondents  expreaa  no  opinion about  the foster:•  :-.y,  •f priva-
te enterprise  (21  ~ in  Germ~ and 9  '1>  in the Netherlands). 
13  '1>  of the  ~.nterv:leweee  do  not  respond to the question abott  t•.a  fight 
against  communism  (17  '1>  in Luxembourg,  16  and 15  '1>  respectiv·r.iy  in Fran-
ce and  Germ~, and  6  1>  in the Netherlands). 
- 12 '1>  of the interviewees  seem to have no  opinion about  soho0,  r-,.form 
and 11  '1>  about  the participation of worker&  in business  ll&n~~·~•mt. 
Generally speaking,  the  public whioh  seeme  to feel  moat  oonoernM \r the 
Tarious objectives proposed i8 the Dutch  public  1  the German  public  seeme  '•>  be  the 
least concerned. 
b) In respect  to the vi  ewe  expressed,  we  shall stress only  tho  !llll.:i n  diffe-
rences  observed in the rank order of importance attributed to  thea~ objec-
tives  1  (1) 
- Guaranteeing decent  retirement  pensions for all old people i•  •.. r.•  :;;rded 
the highest  priority in all countries.  On  the other hand,  per•· ··: •U.ng 
jobs for young  people  takes  onlJ' fifth plaoe in Holland  ans  ,_,: ·•"!:.h  in 
Gel'llllllQ'"  1  this difference is probably  due  to different oondi t'  ,.,,.  in 
the  job market within the countries at the time  of the  survey. 
(1)  To  compare  countries,  the differences in rank order of the objeot:l.vea  '~pear 
more  meaningfUl  to us  than the differences in the scores  on  the  inrla.x. 115 
- The  objective of stopp1Jl8 IU.I1ut'aoturill8  atomic  bombs  takes second place 
in Italy and the Netherlmds, 'but  only fourth place in Ge1'111&11;1  md ll'raa-
oe. 
- The  differences 'between  countries in the relative iaportmoe aooordsd to 
maintainill8 law and order are su'bstmtial.  In Lm:em'bourg  and  the J'ether-
lands, this objective takes sixth place ;  in llelgium,  Italy and France, 
it ranks fifth ;  'but  in Germ~ it is second (in a  tie with  job ..  ourit,-). 
- Freedom  of speech ranks higher in Luxembourg  and ths Netherlands than in 
the other countries. 
- A more  hUIIIIIIIe  society is a  relativel7 more  importmt objective in Italy 
thm in the other countries. 
It is poasi'ble that some  differences are the result of current  events or 
conditions peculiar to each oountr.r•  ao  it ia neoessar,r to avoid drawing conclusi-
ons  toe hastil7. 
• 
•  • 115 
bi8 
In summar,r,  compared to the  european public at large, the attitudee of the 
publics in the various countries regarding the  degree  of importance attributed to 
the objectives enumerated in the question show  the following characteristics  • 
- 'l'he  Dutch differ the most  from  the european average,  First of all, 
they feel more  concerned about  the  proposed objectives,  For  them  , 
providing  jobs for young  people and increasing wages  are objectives 
of leas importance  than in the other countries  1  on  the other hand, 
guaranteeing the freedom  of speech and  providing aid to undsr-devalo-
ped countries  rank higher than anywhere  else. 
Germans  take positions less frequently,  but  they give greater importan-
ce to the maintenance of law and order and lesser importance to the  pro-
blem of job opportunities for young  persons  than do  other countries. 
- Belgians hardly stand out  except for the relatively alight  importance 
given to school  reform,  and the Luxembourgers  stand out  only by  the re-
latively greater importance they attribute to  the freedom  of apeeoh. 
'l'he  French and Italian publics  come  ver,r  close to the  european  average, 
In this as in the  previous analysis, we  have  the impression that  the diffe-
rences in attitudes between the publics  of the memaer  states of the  Community  can be 
explained,  in large measure,  by  the differences in present socio-political and socio-
economic  conditions  and  organization of these countries  and not qy  differences in 
"mentality" or in historical predetermination.  Were  this hypothesis  confirmed,  we 
would  be  able to  draw  the conclusions that the differences are relatively superfici-
al, are strongly related to current  events  and merely  represent  one  motif as  so  many 
others in a  single,  common  european backdrop, 
!loreover,  responses  to the  following question support this hypothesis. Table  59 
DEGREE  OF  IMPORTANCE  ATTRIBUTED  TO  VARIOUS  SOCIO-POLITICAL  OBJECTIVE_!i  (1) 
EC  D  B  F  I  L 
no  no  no  no  no  no 
reply  Coeff.  reply  Coeff.  reply  Coeff.  reoly  Coeff.  reply  Coeff.  reply  Coeff. 
%  %  %  %  %  % 
1. Guarantee  a  reasonable  retire-
ment  pension  to alI  old 
persons  3  2,68  4  2,54  1  2,83  1  2,80  1  2,66  1  2,83 
2. Provide  jobs  for  the young  4  2,50  10  2,25  2  2,70  1  2,74  1  2,52  1  2,78 
3. Stop  the  manufacturing  of 
atomic  bombs  ·5  2,48  8  2,39  3  2,59  5  2  ,LIB  2  2,61  3  2,62 
4. Provide greater  job  security 
4  2,44  8  2,41  3  2,54  2  2,52  3  2,44  2  2,71 
5. Maintain  law  and  order  4  2,36  8  2,41  2  2,45  2  2,39  2  2,30  2  2,59 
6. Suarantee the  freed  om  of 
speech  6  2,31  10  2,30  7  2,44  5  2,36  4  2,28  3  2,72 
7. Make  our  socIety  more 
humane  8  2,20  16  1,88  4  2,42  2  2,34  5  2,28  3  2,48 
8. Reform  the  school  system  12  2,06  14  2,11  14  1,83  14  1,88  11  2,16  13  2,52 
9.  Increase  wages  7  1,88  12  1,71  3  2,15  4  2,02  5  1,91  6  2,29 
..,o.  Aid  underdeveloped  countries  7  1,81  11  '1,32  5  1,79  5  1,47  6  1,68  4  2,26 
ld·  Ensure  the  participation of 
workers  in  business 
management  11  1,79  11  1,83  8  2,04  9  1,78  13  1,71  6  2,30 
-
(1)  The  items  here  are  ranked  in  decreasing  order of  the  mean  score obtained  tor  alI  of  the countries of  the  EEC • 
.  .  .  / ... 
no 
reo ly 
% 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
4 
-------
N 
Coeff. 
2,62 
2,28 
2,55 
2,42 
2,26 
2,30 
2,22 
2,03 
1,69 
1,94 
1,80 
,_..  ,_.. 
"' Table  59  (C~ntinu~tionl 
EC  D  B  F 
no  no  no  no 
reply  Coeff.  reply  Coeff.  reply  Coeff.  reply  Coeff. 
%  %  %  % 
12.  Foster  private  initiative 
in  the  spere of  economic 
activity  16  1,76  21  1,41  13  2,15  13  1,90 
13.  F i aht  communism  13  1,53  15  1,62  13  1,72  16  1,21 
14.  Abo I ish  capita I ism  18  1,29  23  1,07  14  1,55  16  1,45 
mean  8  2,08  12  1,95  7  2,23  7  2,10 
-··---··--·-L.  ________ L___ 
I 
no  no 
reply  Coeff.  reply 
%  % 
15  1,87  19 
9  1,58  17 
16  1,35  21 
7  2,10  7 
-- --
L 
no 
Coeff.  reply 
% 
2,30  9 
2,00  6 
1,35  7 
2,41  3 
N 
Coeff. 
1,84 
1,74 
1,39 
2,08 
---
.,. ....  ....  .... 
'""' ! 
Table 60 
~~RDBR  OJ!'  THE  IXPOJiT.AICI  OJ!'  V.ABIOUS  SOCio-POLITICAL 
OB11CTIVES 
-- : 
DC  Q  :s  l!'  I  L 
' 
i 
Ou&rantee  deoent retirement pen- I  aiona to old people  1  1  1  1  1  1 
' 
Provide  ~oba :tor 701U16  people  I  2  I 
6  2  2  3  2  !  ; 
Stop the u.nu:taoturiq o:t  atolllio  j  I 
I 
I 
'boa  be  3  4  3  4  2  '  5  I 
Pro'f'ide creater  ~ob ..  ouri  v  4  2  4  3  4  '  4  ' 
: 
..,_.tail!. law ud order  5  2  5  5  5  I  6 
! 
Guarantee the :treedoaa  o:t  apeeoh  6  5  6  6  6  i  3 
Make  our aooiev more  hn•aae  7  8  7  7  6  8 
!  '  lie:to:m  the aohool a;yat•  8  7  11  10  8  7 
Inoreaae wa,rea  9  10  8  8  9  11 
.&14  the wa4erdenlope4 oOWltriea  10  13  12  12  12  12 
Bnaure  the partioipaUon o:t worker• 
in lruaiaeaa JUmaB81aent  11  9  10  11  11  9 
l!'oater priTate initiatiTe in the 
a  ph  ere o:t  eoonomio  aoU  'f1. t7  12  12  8  9  10  9 
J'1ght  oosmniaa  13  11  13  14  13  13 
Aboliah oapitaliam  14  14  14  13  14  14 
~·-~--~----·--
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1 
5 
2 
3· 
6 
4 
7 
8 
13 
9 
11 
10 
12 
14 118 
7 - DEGRIB  OF  TRUST  IN  FOllEIGJT  PBOPLES 
"J'cnr1  I  'II'Ould  lilte to &Ilk  ::rw  a0111a  quaationa about  the how 
1111oh  truat ::rou  have in n.rioua peoples of the worLlO  I  am 
goiDS"  to read the Dallies  of different peoples and would ;rou 
please tell 111a  whether ;rou  trust them  a  great dealt  aOllle-
what,  not  too muoh,  or not at all  •••  " 
'l'lla  Iegree of trust the inhabitants of a  given oountr;r have  in those of 
another oountr;r  does  not  seam  to be determined,  in aspaoiall;r large measure,  b;r  the 
natura of historical relations between  the countries oonoerned.  J'onethelass, it is 
a  little surprising, at first,  to notice that the  three countries obtaining the 
highest soore of trust on  the part of oitisena of the countries of the  BBC  are the 
nationals of countries whioh  do  not belong to the COIIDIIUli t;r.  'l'llesa  are the Swiss, 
the Americans  and the British.  (1) 
The  numarioal values, whioh  make  it easire to  compare  oountries,  were 
obtained in the follcnriag  w~  1 
- a  great deal of trust 
- some  trust 
- not  too  11110h  trust 
- no  trust at all 
- other responses 
+  2 
+  1 
- 1 
2 
0 
The  aaan scores obtained b::r  the various peoples  proposed are graduated 
as follo1r11  1 
- the Swiss  + 1,10 
- the .Amarioana  + 0,68 
- the British  + Ot37 
the Frenoh  + 0,13 
the Germans  - 0,13 
-the Italians  - 0,52 
-the Russians  - 0,85 
- the Chinese  - 1,41 
(See  table 61) 
The  comment  previousl;r made  about  data anal;rses,  11a111el;r  that the  tenden-
ar  to attribue high aoores varies froa oountr;r to oountr;r,  also holds here.  It is 
still neoessar;r to distinguish between the general predisposition to  place trust 
(in others)  and the  axaot  direction of this predisposition. 
(1)  For the ooaplete results,  see the annex  (table 3). 119 
1°  GIIERAL  PREDISPOSITION  TO  TRUST  OTHERS 
At  the  european level, the mean  score is negative (-o,os).  The  Luxembourg 
and Italian publics are the least disposed to pla.c'!  their trust in other peoples  (res-
pectively -o,17 and -o,l6).  The  French p.1blio  also has  a  negatin average rate (..0,12) 
whereas  the  German  and  the Dutch  publics have  average rates ver,y  oloae to O.  The  Bel-
gium public seems  to be  the least xenophobic  (0,09). 
28  DIRECTION  OF  TRUST 
One  first finding is that there are differeaces between countries in the 
ratio of mean  trust placed in Western  peoples  (Germans,  Bri  tishr Franchr Italians' 
and  Swiss)  to the mean  trust placed in the peoples in countries under communist  rule 
(the Chinese and Russians). 
The  difference between the trust placed in Western peoples  and in the peo-
ple under communist  rule is greatest  in Belgium,  Germany  and Luxembourg.  Holland is 
located at  an intermediate position.  Italy and especially France,  a  oountr.r with a 
powerful  communist  party,  are those where  the difference in favor of Western  peoples 
is the lowest. 
(See table 62). 
Among  all the countries,  the  Swiss  enjoy the greatest trust, followed qy 
the Americans  who  come  in second everywhere.  The  British rank third among  all the 
countries,  except in Belgium where  the French precede  them. 
I• Ge~,  Italy and Luxembourg,  the index of trust p.1ts  the French in 
first plaoe.  But  they are  only fifth in the Netherlands behind the Germans. 
Ill Belgium,  France and,  of course,  the Netherlands,  the index  of trust puts 
the Germans  in front  of the Italians ;  Luxembourg  is the  only oountr,y  to show  more 
trust in Italians than in Germans. 
The  Russians  take seventh place,  and  the  Chiaese eighth,  in ever,y  instance. 
The  rank order of the countries by  this trust index allowe us  to advance 
the hypothesis that the criteria used by  the great majority of the p.1blio  interviewed 
must  be  of the same  kind as those which  prompted  them  to indicate priori  ties for v-
rious political objectives.  In all likelihood,  these are criteria anchored in fee-
lings of security and stability.  We  oan nonetheless  conclude that the mutual trust 120 
the citizens of the three large countries  of the european  CoiiiiiiWiity  have  in one  :mo-
ther is certainly no  greater than the trust they have in other Western  countries which 
are not  members  of the Community  1  Switzerland,  an isle of peace and prosperity;  the 
United States, rich and  powerful  ;  Great-Britain,  alread7 so close to the European 
Community  in 1970.  This might  mean  not  only that  the membership in the  same  economic 
grouping has not yet created a  true feeling of ComiiiUlity,  but also that historical 
antagonisms,  suoh as  those between France and Germany  for  example,  pl~ only a  minor 
role in the expression of present attitudes. 
In all conjecture,  as in this hypothesis,  one  must  oonsider these above  re-
sults as data requiring especially careful interpretation. 
The  image  that people fashion of one  another is a  oomplax  phenomenon  where 
a  great many  factors  intermingle  1  historical, geographical,  political, cultural,  and 
so forth.  More  detailed studies would make  it possible to capture these images in 
which  trust is refleotion of only  one  facet.  To  state that two  groups understand 
each other is to assert that  each one  regards  the behavior of the other as  predicta-
ble ;  to state that  they trust  each other is to assert, moreover,  that  each  expects 
the other to behave favorably in his behalf.  Favorable behavior of this k:L1d  can  be 
expected in very varied spheres of activity  1  cultural,  economic,  military cooperation 
and  even integration within the same  political system.  Even  the favorable  images  one 
people have of another might  vary considerably in content  ;  moreover,  each and  every 
one  of these images  has its roots in the images  fashioned by  eaoh social group making 
up  an entire people. The  Swiss 
1  The .Americans 
The British 
The  French 
The  Gemans 
The  Italians 
The  Bussians 
The  Chinese 
Jlean 
i 
i.-- ----------
r-·-· 
In Western countries 
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Table 61 
DEGREE  OF  TRUST  Ill FOREIGN  PEOPLES 
-- t- ·r  ---- - ---T---~~ 
EEC  G  F  !  I  .  L  N  I 
- --~--- .  ··- -~---•"'-
1,10  1,38  1,17  1,06  0,81'  1,14  1,29 
o,68  0,90  o,73  o,35  o,62  o,85  o,8o. 
0•37  0,48  0,69  0,19 
0,13  0,27  0,81 
0,05  ,-0,03 
I o,o7  o,55 
I 
i  ,-0,13·  0,44 
I  I 
I  I 
i-0,30! -<>•74 
I  . -0,67 
0,28 ' 
0,09 ' 
0,27 
-0,39 ; 
• -0,85  -1,08  -1,00  1-0,57  -0,77 '-1,291-0,83 
'-1,41  -1·48  .~1-~-2-1-1-·39_  -~~~-~--1,65  -~·47 ·, 
..o,o8  -0,03  o,o9  [-<>,12  -0,16 
1 
-0,17  o,oo5 i 
--·  ~  ,.'l,  ·- - ,_,. _j_  --- --------- ----- -~  ~- -~  --~ 
Table 62 
IllDEX  OF  TRUST  Ill WESTERN  COUNTRIES  AND 
Ill THE  COMMUNIST  COUNTRIES 
EEC  G  B  F 
0,27  0,47  0,54  o,23: 
-'' 
I  L 
0,21  0,26 i  0,39 
I 
In communist  countries  -1·13  -1,28  -1,26' -0,98  -1,09  -1 ·47!  -1,15 : 
I 
Difference  1,40  1.75  l,8o I  1,21  1,30  1.73  1,54 i 
I 
.,_. _____ ·- ----··· ----- '"  -' 122 
I  I 
C~CTERISTICS OF  FAVORABLE  COMMITMENT 
TO  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
In this  second chapter,  we  shall no  longer attempt  to  compare  the  psrcen-
tage distributions of the responses  of the interviewees in each country  to  the ques-
tions asked,  but will  try to  show  instead,  on  the one  hand1  what  attitude scales are 
detected b,r  a  multivariate analysis  of all the interviewees in the six countries of 
the European Community  and,  on  the other hand,  what  are the variables which  covary 
the most  with the attitudes we  defined as  pro-european.  (1) 
The  first analysis represents  a  sort of reading of the hidden meaning  of 
the entire set of findings  ;  based on  a  rigorous statistical method,  this analysis 
makes  it possible to interrelate responses  to  items which,  at first glance,  are whol-
ly disconnected and,  thus,  to identify attitude clusters of some  clarity which exis-
ted in the minds  of the  european  public  at  the time of the survey.  This method,  now 
applied to the entire sample  of respondents,  is exactly the  same  as  the  one  previous-
ly used to  stu~ the results of the  second phase  of the  research, which involved a 
restricted sample of young  people  aged 15  to 16  and 19  to 20  years  old.  (2) 
The  second analysis involves us more  particularly in the study of variables 
which characterize, more  or less well 1  an attitude of favorable  commitment  to  euro-
pean unification. 
We  wish to stress that in each of these analyses,  the total N is made  up 
of all the respondents,  i.e.  the  sum  of representative samples  of each country. 
This  total is not weighted by  the population size of each country  ;  aB  a  result, 
ths small  countries are relatively over-represented in the total sample,  but this 
is not  a  handicap since,  in this instance,  our objective is no  longer to state that 
"europeans  think like this or like that",  but instead to try to discover the nature 
of europeans'attitudes toward Europe  a.nd  to  explain how  relatively  committed,  favo-
rable attitudes toward unification are formed. 
1) See  page  25 
(2)  See  part It chapter II  1  "Analysis  of responses  to the pretest questionnaire". 123 
1  - ATTITUDE  SCALES  AND  THE  EUROPEAN  PUBLIC 
The  first scale has  already been presented  1  it is the scale which repre-
sents what  we  have called the index of pro-eu.cop"an attitudes (1).  We  consider it 
here once again in order to  present it along with two  other scales and  to expose it 
fully,  although only the responses to  six of the items making  1 t  up have  been kept 
for the calculation of the different values of the inde%  ranging from +  6  to - 1. 
Scale I 
INDEX  OF  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDES 
,. - 8750  1 ~ 
--- -··--······· ... ..  ·1  --- ......  l" . 
Items 
- Is very favorable or rather favorable  to  european unification ••• I  6377  ! 7 3 
- Is favorable  to  the evolution of the  common  Market  toward a  i  1 
political grouping in the form  of the United States of Europe  •  •  .1  6094 
-In the case of an election of a  President of the United States 
of Europe by universal suffrage,  the  respondents would vote 
for a  candidate who  would not  be  of hie  own  nationality - pro-
vided that hie personality and his  program were  better suited 
to hie ideas than those of the candidates of hie  own  country.  • . ·I 
- Is in favor of the election of a  European  Parliament  by direct  I  . . . I  universal  suffrage  •  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . 
1  - Accepts that above  the government  (of hie country),  there be a  j
1  european government  responsible for common  policy in the areas 
of foreign affairs, defense  and  economic  questions •••••••• i 
-Is favorable that the currency (of hie country)  be  replaced  j 
by  a  european  currency.  .  •  •  .  .  •  •  .  •  .  •  •  .  .  .  •  •  .  •  •  • 
-Takes a  personal  part in political activities or follows  poli-
tics with interest without  participating actively ••••••• 
- Is entirely willing or rather willing to make  certain personal 
sacrifices, financially for instance,  to have  Europe  oome  to 
•  • 
pass.  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  .  •  •  .  .  •  •  •  •  .  .  •  •  •  •  .  •  .  •  .  • 
- Would  feel very sorry if he  were  told to-morrow  that  the  common 
l 
5673 
5483 
4453 
3450 
3000 
70 
65 
• 63 
51 
39 
I  34 
Market is being disbanded.  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  I  2510  25 
I  -- ···-····.._.L__  _ _j 
(1)  See  pages  25  to  30. 124 
Fifteen more  scales reflecting attitude dimensions  of interest to  our 
research have been identified in addition to three more  scales with nc  direct  re-
ference  to  european unification which  we  deemed  usefUl  to present  here for fUrther 
study. 
A.  SCALES  REFLECTING  DIMENSIONS  OF  ATTITUDES  TOWARD 
EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
In the scales detected during  the analysis, it is possible to  disting~ish 
two  types  defined by  the manner in which favorable attitudes  toward  european unifi-
cation play a  role. 
On  the one  hand,  we  have  scales which directly express  a  favorable  attitu-
de  and which are made  up of items such as  the position for or against  the evolution 
of the  common  Market  toward the political establishment  of the United States of Eu-
rope,  the election of a  European Parliament,  the setting up of a  european  government, 
the vote for a  President  from  another country other than one's  own  and  a  generally 
favorable attitude toward the unification of Europe.  We  will call these  "A  scales". 
On  the other hand,  we  have  scales made  up of items expressing a  commitment 
to unification achievements  or plans  1  great sorrow in oase  of the eventual disappea-
rance of the  common  Market  and  predispositions to accept  personal sacrifices to see 
that  european unification takes  place.  We  shall call these  "B  scales". 
Nevertheless, it is possible that  these two  groups  of items  do  not  always 
appear in one  soale or another.  It is also very interesting to note what  aspects of 
unification cannot  be brought  into harmony  with the dimension in question  1  for  exam-
ple, in the event  that all the questions of type A are accepted except  the question 
about  a  "supranational"  government. 
It may  also very well  be  that  responses  of this  type are found in inver-
ted form  in a  given scale  1  the discovery,  for  example,  of negative  responses  in a 
scale reflecting a  favorable attitude. 125 
Finally, it ~  turn out that one  response  of several of type A or B is 
present  in a  scale ;  one  example is that for a  given scale, tbe correlation m~ on-
ly exist in the case of a  strong attitude (gre«t  SOl.'\'OW  h, case of the  diaap1Jes.ranoe 
of the  common  Ka.rket)  or,  on  the contrary, witlJ  iii.  l<~ss  strongl;~ held attitude (groat 
sorrow and little concern). 
Generally speaking,  1 t  oan  be said that the scales containing Hems  of 
type A express  a  pro-european attitude which is less l3trongly  held tbat:  tho<u•  with 
items  of type  B.  It is more  "diffioul  t" to express  a  commitment  (to aocolllpliahments 
or to  plans)  than to express  an apinion which is known  to be widely·  shared bw  the 
group to Which  one  belongs  (1). 
1°  Moderate  pro-european  attitudes (scales Ia, lb and  Ic). 
Three  ~oalea, rather similar one  to the other, measure these attitudes. 
The  soale Ia, type B,  seems  to reflect a  certain relationship between 
favorable attitudes toward european unification and concern with the standard of 
living.  Note  that  no  reference to the election of a  european  parliament  appes:ra 
in this scale.  In reversing the direction of this scale,  one ~  better grasp what 
kind of relationship is involved  1  those who  expected that european unification will 
have negative effects  on  the standard of living also  tend to hold a  negative attitu-
de  toward unification. 
Scale Ib,  type A,  which reflects a  less strongly held attitude,  differs 
from  the previous  one  in the  presence  of the item about  daily reading of political 
news  in the newspapers.  The  use of radio and television cannot  be  included in the 
scale and,  moreover,  show  hardly any significative relationship with any of the 
responses in the questionnaire. 
Scale  Io is onoe  again of type B,  with one  slight difference  compared to 
scale Ia  1  it also includes  persona who  would feel only  a  little sorr,y if the oo.-
!1011  llarket were  disbanded.  In addition, it introduces  a  new  aspect  t  the positive 
relationship between familiarity with a  great  number  of foreign countries and a 
favorable attitude toward european unification. 
(1)  Remember  that an  item placed at  the bottom of the scale with the lowest  percen-
tage of responses is said to be  "the moat  difficult".  In pl'inciple,  this i tern 
determines  the content  of the scale ;  the  same  applies for all the other items 
which follow,  each  compared  to  the  others,  as  one  reads  up  the scale to the 
"easiest" item. 
The  correlation coefficients are given in the genar£.1.  repoz·t  by  INRA  (doc.  C. 
01.197 ). 126 
Scale I  a 
r------------ ------
Items 
- Is very  favorable or rather favorable  to  european unification.  •  • 
- Is in favor of the evolution of the  common  Market  toward  the 
political establishment  of the United States of Europe ••• •  •  • 
- Agrees  that  the most  underprivileged segments  of the  population 
in the United States of Europe will  have  more  opportunity to  i~ 
prove  their status.  •  •  •  •  •  . . . . . . . .  •  • 
-Agrees that the United States of Europe will undoubtedly  haTe  a 
higher standard of living ••••••••••••••••••••• 
I 
- Aooepts  that above  the government  (of his country)  there be a 
european government  responsible for  common  polioy in the areas 
of foreign affairs,  defense and  economic  questions ••••••• 
Is favorable  to  the  idea that  the currency (of his oountr.r)  be 
replaced b,y  a  european  currenc,y  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ., 
- Agrees  that  so far  the  common  Market  has  had a  favorable  effeot 
on  his standard of 11  ving  •  •  .  •  .  .  .  .  •  •  •  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
- Is entirely willing or rather willing to make  certain personal 
sacrifices,  financially  for instance,  to  Rae  that  european URi-
I 
•  • 
~  •! 
i 
I 
fioation takes  place •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
j  - Would  feel  very  sorry if he  were  told  to-morrow that  the  oommon  l  Market  is being dis-anded  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
••  8750  "' 
6377  73 
6094  70 
5272  60 
5133  59 
4869  56 
4453  51 
3698  42 
3000  34 
2510  29 Scale I  b 
Items 
-------- --
- Is very  favorable  or rather favorable  to  european unification 
- Is favorable  to the evolution of the  OO!II!IIon  Market  toward the 
political establishment  of the United States of Europe •••• 
. . 
•  • 
- Agrees  that  the most  underprivileged segments  of the population 
in the United States of Europe will have  more  opportunity to im.-
p.rove  their status  •  •  •  •  •  .  •  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  .  •  •  .  •  •  •  •  .  .  ; 
- Agr$ee  that  the standard of living will undoubtedly be higher in 
the United States of Europe  ,  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . .  ~  . ...  •  • 
- Aooepts  that above  the government  (of hie  oount:cy)  a  european go-
vernment  be  responsible for oolll!llon  polioy in the areas of foreign 
affaire,  defense  and  economic questions  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . . . 
-Is favorable  to the idea that  the  currency (of his country)  be 
replaced b.y  a  european  currency  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
;  -Reads political news  in the newspapers  daily  I  ____  _  •  •  . . . . . . . . 
---~--------------- L 
N -875C 
6·/.'1" 
"t1  I 
6094 
5272 
4869 
4453 
2384 
127 
!  -% 
73 
'I u 
60 
59 
56 
51 
27 
____ _i_ 
-I 
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Scale I  c 
I~--··---·~·-···-·-----
1 
'  Items 
- Is ver,y  favorable  or rather favorable  to  european unification •• 
- Is in favor of the  evolution of the  common  Market  toward 
tical establishment  of the United States of Europe ••• 
the ;POli-j 
•  •  •  •  • i 
- Is favorable  to the  election of a  European Parliament b7 4ireot 
universal suffrage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •  •  •  •  • 
-Would feel  ver,y  or little sorr,y if to-morrow he  were  to hear that 
the  common  Market  is being disbanded  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
- Agrees  that  the most  underprivileged segments  of the population 
in the United States of Europe will have more  opportuni  t7  to im-
' 
I  prove their status • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •  •  •  •  •  •  I 
- Agrees that the standard of living will undoubtedl7 be  higher in 
the United States of Europe •••••••••••••.••••• 
- Aooepts  that above  the government  (of his oountr,y)  a  european g~ 
vernment  be responsible for common  policy in the areas of foreign 
affairs,  defense and  economic  questions •••••••••• •  •  • 
-Is favorable  to the idea that the  currency  (of his  oountr,y)  be 
replaced by  a  european  ourrenoy  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
-Has visited at least four foreign countries for sojourn of at 
least  one  d~ .  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  • 
I 
I 
' 
I  •  8750 I .,.  1 
i 
I 
6377  73 
70 
5483  63 
5364  61 
5272  60 
5133  59 
4869 
4453  51 
2489  28 129 
2°  Pro-european attitudes of the "post-aoqu.isi  tive"  and "aoquiei  ti  ve" 
type (scales II and III) 
Remember  that borrowing from  the work  ar::i  terminology  ot  l'rofen<>o:r  li.onald 
INGLEHART,  we  distinguished between "post-aoquisi  tiva" values  (free  do'"  ,f speech 
and increaaed participation in socio-political  decisions)  and  "aoquisit:cve"  valueR 
(security and comfort). 
Scale II, type A,  expresses  a  positive relationship be.i.:·.,een  a  moct.ern c r i .. 
favorable attitude to,,.ard  european unification and the various  concrete  mea~;na•;,s  ,t 
implies  (Ji.'uropean  Parliament  and  governmen·~),  on the one  hand,  and  ite•ns which,,.,, 
identified as characteristic of new  aspira·~ions and  values  (a preference for oi ti.-
:.en  participation over the fight  against  r:lsing prices)  on  the other hand. 
Scale III, type  B,  confirms  our  l~pothesis by  showing  a  neg.~.tive reL>tiou-
ahip between a  strongly hald pro-european 11.tti tude  and  aspirations or valuos  of the 
traditional, acquisitive type. 
However,  it seems  that the post-acquisitive tendency has  less of an influ-
ence in the direction of pro-european atti  ·~udes than the acquisi  tiv&  tenden<:'  does 
in the  oppos1 te direction.  These indicaticme  obviously would have  to be verified 
when  other studies dealing,  in particular, with the younger generations in "bou:r-
geois"  or at least weal thy oiroles, are unciertaken. 130 
Scale II 
r 
I  Items 
Is ver,y  favorable or rather favorable  to  european unification 
- Is in favor of the evolution of the  common  Market  toward  the 
political establishment  of the United States of Europe ••• 
l~. 
!  6377 
6750 
•  • 
•  •  • 
- In case of the election for a  preS.ident  of the United States 
of Europe by universal  suffrage,  the  respondent would  vote for 
a  candidate who  would nOt  be  of his  own  nationality provided 
that his  personality and his  program  would better suit his  own 
opinions  than those  of the candidates  of his  own  country ••••• 
Is in favor of the election of a  european  parliament  by  univer-
sal  suffrage  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ,  . 
-Accepts that  above  the government  (of his country)  a  european 
government  be  responsible for common  policy in the areas of 
•  • 
foreign affairs,  defense  and  economic  questions  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
- Does  not  consider the fight  against  rising prices as  an  impor-
tant  objective .. ,  .  .  .  . ...........  .  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Considers  an  improvement  of citizens'participation in the deci-
sions of the government  to  be  an  important  objective •• ,  •  ,  , 
Scale III 
Items 
6094 
5673 
5463 
4669 
3102 
2364 
I  !  %  . 
j  __ : 
i 73 
70 
65 
63 
56 
35 
27 
~  ~ 6750  1% 
-----------·-- ... -L. ....  ----------+--
- Would  not  feel  sorr,y if to-morrow  he  were  told that  the  common 
3!arket  is being disbanded  .  •  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  .  • 
Is not willing to make  some  personal  sacrifices,  financially for 
instance,  to see that  european unification takes  place  •  •  •  •  • 
Consider that making  our society more  humane  is not  an  important 
objective  •  •  •  •  .  .  .  .  .  ,  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  •  • 
Believes  that  increasing wages  is an  important  objective •  •  •  r 
Considers  that increasing wages  is an objective which must  be 
L__given top priority •••••.•• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
'  I 
6240  71 
5750  66 
4407  '  50 
3004  34 
2566  29 
~.-l ... ---- .. - _... 131 
3°  Politicized pro-european attitudes (scales IV  and V) 
Scale  IV  and  Scale v,  both of type At  reflect  a  relation~bip betwaell  a 
certain type of political commitment  and  a  fa.vc•r~ble attitude toward concrete mea-
sures for european unification.  In both cases,  the relationship seems  to  touch 
upon  attitudes toward political parties. 
One  ought  to notice, nonetheless,  that it is impossible to introdu""  i.nto 
the  same  scale  : 
both  proximity to a  party and  a  strong commitment  to this party at the 
same  time  (scale IV), 
- or1  bot,h  the  two  previous  items  and  the willingness to  change  cae's 
preference i:f one's preferred party were  to modify its attitude t,:,ward 
Europe  (scale v). 
Thus  it seems  that the attitude toward a  political party  does  not  d~ter­
mine  attitudes toward  european unification ezoept  for those who  strongly identify 
with their party.  Moreover,  the dimension  expressed by  party identificati?n io dif-
ferent  from  that  implied by  the readiness to change one's party preference  for rea-
sons  based on his  own  attitude toward Europe. 
When  dealing with scales of type A1  we  know  that the pro-european attitu-
de  they  express is not very strongly held.  The  second scale (V),  however,  se~me 
stronger than the first  (IV), 132 
Scale  IV 
Items 
---- ---------- --~---------l-
11  •  8750  I  f,  ! 
- -- -·- ------ ---------~?···---~  ~-~-- -------- - . ...  ----.j 
- Is very favorable or rather favorable  to  european unification,  , 
- Is in favor of the evolution of the  common  Market  toward  tAe 
political establishment  of the United  States of Europe ••• ,  •  • 
- In case of the election for a  president  of the United States 
of Europe  u,y  universal suffrage,  the respondent would vote for 
a  candidate who  would not  be of his  own  nationality provided 
that his personality and his  program  better suited his opini-
ons  than  those of candidate of his  own  country •••••••• . I 
!  Is in favor of the election of a  european parliament  u,r  a  di-
rect l,Uli versal  suffrage  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  •  . 1 
I  Takes  part  personally in political activities or follows  poli-
i 
tics with interest without  participating actively ••  •  •  •  •  •  • i 
Is strongly committed to  the political  party he  feels closest 
to  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . 
·---
6377  73 
6094  70 
5673  I  65 
I 
5483  63 
3450  39 
1557  18 
I 
I 
_i___J Scale V 
Items 
··---·--·····-------····--
Is very  favorable  or rather favorable  to  european unification 
Is in favor  of ·the  evolution of the  common  IU.rket  toward the 
establishment  of the United States of Europe ••• o  o  ••• 
•  • 
•  • 
In the case of thE·  election for a  president of the United States  , 
of burope  b,y  universal suffrage,  the  respondent would vote 
candidate who  would not  be  of his  own  nationality provided 
hie  personality and his program better suited his  o~inions 
those  of candidates of hie  own  country  •  •  •  o  o  •  o  o  •  • 
for a 
that 
than 
0  •  0 
Is in favor  of an election of a  european parliament by  direct 
universal  suffrage •••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
' - Accepts  that  above  the government  (of hie country)  there 
european government  responsible for  common  policy in the 
of foreign affaire, defense  and  economic  questions ••• 
. . . . 
be  a 
areas  . . . . 
-Would definitely or  probably vote for another political party 
were  the leaders of hie preferred party to  take an attitude to-
ward  european unification different  from  his own  •  o  •  •  •  o  •  • 
. -Would definitely vote for another political party, ware  the lea-
'  ders of his  preferred party to take an attitude toward  european 
~~-tication different  from hie  own ••••• o  ••••••••• 
133 
1.'1  •  8750 
6377 
6094  ' '10 
5483  63 
4869 
2886  :n 
1280  15 
.L 
j 
I 134 
4°  A politically disinterested or rather unfavorable  conservative 
attitude toward  european unification (scale VI} 
This  scale of type  B reflects very clearly the relationship between a  rather 
authoritarian attitude of conservatism and  an unfavorable attitude toward  european uni-
fication. 
This relationship is accompanied  qy  a  lack of interest and  perhaps  a  certain 
contempt  for political life. 
Scale VI 
Items 
-- -,- .  ----~- ---T ----, 
:N  •  8750  · %  • 
-------'---------
- Would  not  feel  sorry if to-morrow he  were  told that  the  common 
Market  is being disbanded  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Is not  ver,y  favorable  to  european unification •  •  •  • 
Is not  ready  to make  personal sacrifices, financially for instan-
ce,  for the  european unification .........•.....•. 
Is not  interested in politics •• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Is not  favorable to the  idea that  the  currency (of his  country) 
6240 
5817 
5750 
5300 
71 
66 
66 
61 
be  replaced by  a  european currency •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  4297  41 
-Does not agree that it is necessary  to improve  our society little 
by little through intelligent reforms  nor to  change it radically 
by  r-evolutionary  action •  •  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  1980  23 
- Believes that our present  society must  be valiantly defended against 
all sub"Yersive  forces..  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  •  1303  15 135 
5°  Idealistic and progressive pro-european attitudes (scales VII  and VIII) 
Scale '!II is related to scale II which  expresses  a  post-acquisitive k:r:,d 
of pro-european attitude, ;yet it also reflects ar'  attitude c,f idealiam  and  genc::t~si­
t;y.  Among  the most  difficult items in this saale we  find aid to undarde·veloped  coun-
tries, humanization of our society,  and freedom of speech, all considered aa  ·t''1'  pri-
orities.  This is a  scale of t;ype  A,  but it includes nonetheless,  in all  ;:.tttuct.:r.ted 
wa,y,  one  type  B item (a great deal or a  little sorrow in the  event  that  t.'J.<>  oolllrl\on 
Market is d.isbanded). 
Scale VIII is similar to scale VII,  though it appears  to  ex.r-res•,  a:.  "·a-
tude  mo:ce  directly related to  the mentality of protest (i.e. ,  a  :favon.ble  o  p!.r!..l.on  of 
student demonstrations). 
We  do  not  find any  i tam  expressing directly attitudes toward  revolu·;.-, onar,y 
action,  reformism  and  the  defense of established order in ei  th":' of ·::hese  two  ,c;;,alc'Js. 
The  relationship between  a  favorable attitude toward european unif:! natiol>  and.  the,;< a 
more  or leas idealistic or even protest kinds of progressive attitude£  does  exist, 
but it seems  that it is neither very  clear nor very  strong. 136 
Scale VII 
Items 
Is very  favorable  or rather favorable  to  european unification 
- Is in favor of the  evolution of the  common  Market  toward  the 
political establishment  of the United States of Europe •••• 
In the case of the  election for a  president  of the United States 
of Europe by universal  suffrage,  the  respondent  would vote for  a 
candidate who  would not  be  of his  own  nationality provided that 
his  personality and his  program better suited his  opinions  than 
those of the candidate of his  own  country ••••••••••• 
- Is favorable  to the election of a  European Parliament  by  direct 
universal  suffrage  • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-Would feel very or a  little sorry if to-morrow he were told that 
the common  Market is  being  disbanded •  •  •  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
-Accepts that  above  the government  (of his country)  there 
european government  responsible  for  common  policy in the 
of foreign affairs,  defense  and  economic  questions ••• 
be  a 
areae  . . . 
- Considers aid to underdeveloped countries  as  top  priority •• 
- Considers that making  our society more  humane  is an  objective 
of top priority  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •••• 
Considers  that guaranteeing  the  freedom  of 
L_ __  tive of top  priority ••••••••••• 
speech is an objeo-
. . . . . . . . . . 
iN  •  8750 
6377 
6094 
5673 
5483 
5364 
4869 
3745 
3243 
1414 
'1> 
71 
.~ 
70 
65 
63 
61 
56 
43 
37 
16 
I 
J Scale VIII 
ItQI!lS 
Is vel"J  favoraC>le  or rather favorable  to  european unification 
Is in favor  of  t~e evolution of the  common  Market  to~ard the 
political establishment  of the United States of Europe ••• •  • 
In the case of the election of a  president  of the United States 
of Europe  through universal  suffrages,  the respondent would vote 
for  a  candidate who  would not be of his  own  country provided that 
his personality  ar~, his  program better sui  ted his opinions  than 
those  of the candidates  of his  own  country . . . . . . .  . . . 
Is in favor  of tl:.e  ;;lection for  a  european  parliament  by univer-
sal  suffrage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-Accepts that  above  the government  (of his country)  there be  a 
european government  responsible for common  policy in the  areas 
of foreign affairs,  defense  and  economic  questions •••••• 
Considers  that guaranteeing the freedom of speech is an impor-
tant  objective .•.....•..•..•..••.••.... 
Is very favorable  or rather favorable  to students who  have  de-
monstrated  .  •  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  •  •  •  •  .  •  •  .  •  .  .  .  .  •  •  • 
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=  8750  1  ~ 
-1  . 
i 
6377  73 
6094  70 
5673  65  ' 
5483  63 
4869  56 
3978  45  • 
2701  31 
_  _J 1~ 
6°  Three views  of united Europe  :  Europe  as  a  power  (scale IX), 
Europe  as  surpassing the nation (scale X)  and Europe  as  a  means 
to  improve  our society (scale XI) 
What  these three scales have  in common  is that all three  express  different 
views  of a  United Europe  (1).  But,  in general,  the items  making  them  up  play here  a 
less important role than  the  one  we  had observed during  the intermediary  survey whiah 
dealt  only with youth,  In  the  present  study,  which concerns  the entire population, 
pro-european attitudes  seem  to  show  a  closer relation with concerns  about  the eo-cal-
led new  society, with an interest in politics and political parties and also with tra-
ditional social  concerns rather than with one  or another image  of the  hopes  or fears 
that  the  process of european unification evokes. 
Scale IX  includes the item that  the United States of Europe  should become 
a  third power  equal in strength to the United States of America or the URSS,  but  this 
relationship is not  very  strong, 
Scale X introduces an  item  of dissatisfaction with or distance  from  natio-
nal values  1  "I am  not  proud to be  a  citizen (of this country)", 
Finally,  Beale XI,  has  its roots  in an item which  seems  to  express  the op-
posite of an attitude of resignation about  the status quo  ;  to refuse to agree that 
the  powerful will  always  dominate  the  weak  is an opinion,  a  hope  or  a  moral  impera-
tive which is related to a  certain kind of pro-european attitude. 
Scale IX  belongs  to  type  B ;  the  two  other are of type  A. 
(1)  See  pages  81  to  91, 139 
Scale  IX 
Item: ____________ ]:  .· B75~ j __ ~ 
i  I  Is in favo.c  of  ··""  evolution of the  common  Market  toward the 
political  &c. l-«''l i  .. atmant  of the United Sta,es of l!.'urope  ,  ,  ,  , 
- Agrees  w:i.th  ti1c  ·,d.ea  that  the Unihd States of Europe  ought 
to become  a  th1.cJ.  power  equal  to that  of the United States of 
America,  o-r  tha  JRSS .......  .  ..  ..  •  •  •  •  •  •  <r;  •  of 
,;,:cep·ts  tha:  iJ.tlC.  '"  the government  (of his country)  there be  a 
europear.  govart:.· ··n'G  responsible  for  common  policy in the areas 
of foreign  V-f:faJ..:.~,;:  defense  and.  economic  questions ••••• 
Is ve:ry  favo~·atle to  european unification •  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  of  • 
- Would  feel  veT:'•  sorry if to-morrow he  were  told that  the co.-
.  mon  '>rarket  is  b;Jing  disbanded  •  •  •  •  •  •  • . . . . .  •  • 
L___  ---- ---- -- --------------···---
Scale X 
Items 
Is very  or rather favorable  to  european unification ••••• 
Is in favor  of  the  evolution of the  common  ~arket toward  the 
political  establ.ishment  of the United States of Europe •• ,  , 
! 
iN  • 
--+-· 
In the  case of the election for a  president  of the United States 
of Europe  by  universal  suffrage,  the respondent  would vote for a 
candidate of  another nationality other than hie  o~ provided that 
Lis  personality and hie  program better suited his opinions  than 
those  of the  candidates  of his  own  country  •  ,  •  •  ,  •  •  •  •  , 
Is  favora·ole  to  ti:ie  election of a  european  parliament  by  direct 
universal  suffrage  ..  •  •  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
-Accepts  that  above  the government  (of his country)  there be  a 
european  government  responsible for common  policy in the  areas 
of foreign affairs, defense  and  economic  questions  ,  ••  •. 
Is not  proud  to  o~ a  citizen (of this country) •••  •  • 
6094  70 
4869 
2933 
2510 
6377 
6094 
5673 
5483 
4869 
1500 
65 
56 
34 
29 
73 
70 
65 
63 
56 
17 
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Scale XI 
C"----
j-· 
Items 
~ Is ver.r  favorable  or rather favorable  to  european unification 
Is favorable  to  the  evolution of the  common  Yarket  toward the 
political establishment  Of  the United States of Europe ••••• 
In the case of the  election for a  president of the United States 
of Europe by universal  suffrage,  the  respondent would vote for a 
candidate who  would not be  of his  own  nationality  t  provided that  i 
his personality and his program better suited his opinions  than 
those of the candidate of his  own  country  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
- Aooepts  that above  the government  of hie country there be a  eu-
ropean government  responsible for common  policy in the areas of 
foreign affaire, defense  and economic  questions •••••••• 
.  " 
-Does not agree with the  statement  that nothing oan be  done  about 
1  the fact  that the strong will always  rule over the weak  •  •  •  • 
\,  __ ·- "  "  """ --
6377  73 
6094  '70 
56'7 3  65 7°  Three  scales of conservatism unfavorable  to  suropean unification 
(scales XII  ,  XIII and  XIV) 
141 
These  scales have in common  the fact  that  each  one  expresses  a  certain 
type  of conservatism composed  of a  certain &m<•l.nt  of nationalism (scale XII),  of 
dissatisfaction with  the existing state of affairs (scale XIII)  and  of ethnocen-
trism combined with disinterest in politics (scale XIV).  This last scala is of ty-
pe  B. 
Note  that  scale XIII includes  the item,"ia not very favorable  to  european 
unification".  Thus  it seems  that  these aspects of conservatism and  ethnocentrism 
only prevent  the formation of very strongly held attitudes favorable  to Europe, 
Scale XIV  shows  certain similarities with scale VI,  but  the latter seems 
to  express  a  more  authoritatian tendency  (defense of the established order)  whereas 
scale XIV  expresses  more  the aooeptanoe,  ae  fact,  that  european unification is a  u-
top,y  of little interest. 142 
Scale XII 
Items 
- I  am  proud to be a  citi~en (of this country)  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
- Agrees  that  european unification is impossible since we  speak 
different languages  •  •  • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
In principle, has nothing against  foreign workers,  but  agrees 
that there are really too  many  of them  (in his country) ••• 
Scale XIII 
Items 
Is not very favorable  to  european unification •  . . . . . 
In principle, has  nothing against  foreign workers,  but  agrees 
that there are really too many  of them (in his country) •••• 
-Agrees that all is well with us  and  thew~ things are,  so 
why'  change  ?  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . . 
Scale XIV 
r=-=--~----····· 
Items 
i 
'  - Would  not feel  sorry if to-morrow he were  told that  the 
common  Market  is being disbanded •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . . 
Is not willing to make  personal  sacrifices, financially for 
example,  in order to see that  european unification ooours •• 
-Is not  really interested in politics ••••• . .  . . . . . 
- Agrees  that  european unification is 
L_~ff~~~nt languages  •  •  •  __ ••• 
impossible since we  speak  . . . . . . . . 
N •  8750 
7250  83 
6873  79 
4439  51 
5817  i66 
4439  51 
2175  32 
-------·--------
. N  •  8750 
6240 
5750 
5300 
1871 
% 1 
66 
61 
21 143 
8°  1':w  entry of Great  llri  tain into  the  common  Market  (scales XV a, XVb, 
XVc  and  XVd) 
'rhe  rcleitionsnips  between att:i.tudes  to·11ard  european unification,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Great  1Jr:itain's  joining the  common  '~arket, '''·the other hand,  are not 
simple.  As  ve  nave  already noticed,  the question about  membership appears  related 
to  some  degree:  of interest in poli  ticc;  (3.).  We  are no'<  aule  to  be  more  precise and 
to  distinguis!'t  ''"veral  kinds  of attitudes. 
"' '[<- r  "''" .e  the direction of sc.Ue xva,  'Nhioh  is of type  B,  we  C>bllerve 
that  a  favorab>  a tti ;ude  to·~ard Great  B1·i tain'  a  membership  and the  lack  of trust 
in the  Bri ti  sL  ,-;o  along with the absence of a  strong  contmi tment  to  Europe  and with 
a  lack of inte!'est in politics in general. 
Scale  X'.'o,  1f "'e  reverse it too,  shows  that  refus.U  of Great llritain's 
entry goes  so  f,_,.  t. ,,.  it includes  refusal  of european u:nifi.cation,  in general,  and 
political  u.n::. c·:,_  c .•  ··n,  in particular·  :  here appears  a  sort  of nationalJ.E t  conserva-
tism which i'  Ci, , ,,,sed  by  a  reluctance  to  de  away  with the national  currency or the 
national  f.l!if'. 
Scale2  XVc  and XVd  cannot  fail  to surprise  :  one,  by introducing an item 
which  we  would qualify  as  acquisitive  (namely,  top priority to wage  increases)  and 
the other,  by  brine;i.n;;- up  trust in Americans.  Subject  to qualification by  future 
studies,  this  f'c,vcrable  attitude  toward  llri  tish membership also seems  to  be  related 
to  a  sort  of  eurc ;>e!ill  conformism,  "bourgeois"  and "atlantic" in character. 144 
Scale XVa 
~---·  ·---- ----------- ------·---
Items 
Is favorable  to Great Britain's entry into the  common 
Market  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . . 
-Trusts the British •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
-Participates personally in political activities or follows 
politics with interest without  participating actively ••• 
- Is entirely or rather willing to make  certain personal sa-
crifices, financially  for instance,  to see that  european 
unification takes  place  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • ••••••••• 
I N s  8750 
'  '  ~- - -
' 
5904 
5532 
3450 
3000 
- Would  feel  sorry if to-morrow he would be told that the com- I 
•  2510  L_mon ~~Ike~  ~~~eing disb~ded •  •  •  •  •  • _ •  •  •  •  •  • 
~·-'.--- ----
Scale XVb 
Items  I  ! N •  8750 
--4 
Is very  favorable  or rather favorable  to  european unification ! 
Is in favor of the  evolution of the common  Xarket  toward  the 
political establishment  of the United States of Ellrope ••• ., 
Is favorable to Great  Britain's entry into the  common  Market  • 
- Would  feel very or a  little sorry if to-morrow he  were  told 
that the  common  Market is being disbanded •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Is favorable  to the idea that  the currency (of his country) 
be  replaced by  a  european currency  . . . . . . . . . . 
-Is favorable  to  the idea that  the flag (of his country) 
placed by  a  european flag during  important  ceremonies  • 
•  •  • 
i 
be  re-l  . . .  I 
6377 
6094 
5904 
5364 
4453 
2255 
67 
63 
39 
34 
! 
29  ! 
_j 
% 
73  : 
70 
67 
61 
51 
26. Scale XVc 
Items 
Is very  favorable  or rather favorable  to  european unification 
Is in favor  o~ the  evolution of the  common  Market  toward  the 
political establishment  of the United States of Europe  •  ,  ,  • 
Is favorable  to  Great  Britain's entry into the  common  Market  • 
L--Considers that  wage  increases are an objective of top priority 
Scale XVd 
Items 
Trusts Americans  (the United States)  ,  •  •  •  • 
Trusts  the British ••• . . . . . .  •  •  • 
- Is ready  to  make  certain personal  sacrifices, financially, 
for example,  to  see that  european unification takes  place  , 
- Is very  sorry if to-morrow he  were  told that  the  common 
Market  is being disbanded  ,  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
- Is very  favorable to european unification ,  •  ,  ,  •  ,  ,  ,  • 
N  ~ 8750 
6.377 
6094 
5904 
145 
70 
67 
2566  29 
N •  8750 
6032 
5532 
3000 
2510 
2933 
- _..  __ 
69 
63 
34 
29 
I 
'  34  I 
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B.  SCALES  WITHOUT  ANY  DIRECT  REFERENCE  TO  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
(SCALES  At  BAND  C) 
~rea scales whioh  did not refer directly to european unification were 
identified.  Although these scales  bear no  direct relation to attitudes  toward the 
integration of Europe,  they are interesting from  the sooio-politioal point  of view  1 
they  correspond respectively to  dimensions  which  one  might  quali~ as  expressing po-
litical tendencies of liberal conservatism,  of humanitarian progressism and  of strict 
nationalism. 
The  two  first scales  have  several items in common,  but soale A emphasizes 
the participation of workers in business management  as well  as  the  encouragement  of 
private initiative, whereas  scale B includes  no  item related to the maintainance of 
order•  but refers instead to the humanization of our society and aid to underdeve-
loped countries. 
Soale  C clearly expresses a  dimension  of traditional  nationalis~ Scale A 
LIBERAL  CONSERVATISM 
Items  \N  •  8750 
------------------- ___  ) 
Considers that guaranteeing decent  pensions  to all old people is 
an objective with top priority ••••••••••••••••• 
- Considers  that  providing  jobs for young  people is an objective  i  . . . . . .  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  i  with top priority ,  •  ,  •••••• 
I 
insuring greater job security is an objective withj  - Considers that 
top priority ,  '  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  'Ill 
- ~~;s~~~~~:~a~ ~a:n~a~n~~ ~·~ ~~  ~~·~ ~s.~  ~b~e~t:v~ ~~h.  J 
i 
-Considers that guaranteeing the freedom  of speech is an objeotivei 
with  top  priority  •  .  •  •  .  .  .  •  .  •  .  .  .  .  •  .  •  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  ! 
-Considers that insuring workers1partioipation in business manage-! 
ment  is an objeotive with top priority ••••••••••• ,  • 
-Considers that fostering private initiative in the sphere of eoo-
nomio  activity is an objective with top priority ,  ,  ,  ,  ••••  j 
I 
6144 
4888 
4356 
4123 
3745 
1991 
1691 
147 
70 
56 
50 
47 
43 
23 
19 
~-; 
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Scale B 
HUIUNIST  PROGRESSIVISK 
.....--·----·----·-----·····------------ .. 
Items 
1--------------------------·----
- Considers that guaranteeing decent  pensions  to all old 
paople is an objective with top priority •••••••• 
- Considers  that providing  jobs to young  people is an ob-
jective with top priority •••••••••••••••• 
- Considers that insuring greater job security is an  objec-
tive with top priorit7 ••••••••••••••••• 
- Considers  that guaranteeing the freedom of speech is an 
objective with top priority •••••••••••••• 
- Considers that making  our society more  humane  is an ob-
jective with top priority ••••••••••••••• 
- Considers that aid to underdeveloped countries is 
jective with top priority ••••••••••••  l__  ___________  _ 
Scale C 
anob- . . . . 
TRADITIOllAL  NATIOllALISM 
ll  •  8750 
--·--~ 
I  ~  I 
j 
I 
I  -1 
I 
I 
I 
I  I  6144  70 
I 
4888  56  i 
4356  50 
3745  43 
3243  37 
1414  16 
----··------------------··  ·---.. ------------------.-------,-----., 
ll  •  8750  ~  1  Itema 
r-----------------------------+------+--- ·--l 
I  I 
- Desires keenly that his country make  important scientific 
discoveries  •  •  •  • . . . . . . •  •  •  •  . . . . . . . . . . 
• - Desires keenly that his country  pl~cy"  an important role in 
the world politics •••••••••••••••••••• 
C_e~-~~es keenly that his country possess a  strong army  •  •  • 
6586  75 
4727  54 
2886  33 149 
2  - THE  DETERMINANTS  OF  PRQ-EUROPEAN  A'I"''ITUDES 
Apart  from  the analysis presented later whioh  will  examine  how  responsas 
to various questions of demographic  variables vary  &s  a  iilllotion of scores  on  th~ 
scale measuring pro-european attitudes (1), it i.e  usef'u.l  to determine where  theM-
ghest  and lowest  mean  scores are  found. 
A.  OVERALL  TABLE  OF  PRQ-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDES 
The  table below gives  the  rank order of all the subgroups  th<>  rplastioru  .. 1.i· 
re  was  able to identif:y by  their mean  scores on  the index  of pro-european  attitu~•s. 
It is obvious  that  the various  subgroups are not  IIIUtually  exclusive  ;  it simply 
amounts  to a  serial partition of the entire sample,  eaoh time  according to  a  ~  .. :.f; .,  .. 
rent ori  terion ( 2).  The  first thirteen and  the last fourteen  subgroups  :>:'Aprt"'''''"+,, 
respectively,  one-sixth of the total  subdivisions. 
(1)  See  pages  154  to 200. 
( 2)  The  maximal  value is 6 ,oo  and  the minimal value is 1 ,oo. 150 
1. 
2. 
'l'able  63 
RANK-ORDER  OF  SUBGROUPS  BY  THEIR  MlWf  SQOliE 
ON  THE  INDEX  OF  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDES 
Subgroups 
Heads  of firms  and upper management  •  •  •  •  • 
Professionals and high-ranking oivil servants • 
Persons with high eduoation level  ,  •  •  •  •  •  • 
•  •  •  •  •  •  • 
•  •  •  •  •  •  • 
•  •  •  •  •  • 
4.  Persons within a  household whose  head is a  business head or 
V:ean  Soore 
upper management  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ,  •  •  ,  •  ,  •  •  ,  ,  4,06 
6. 
Persons within a  household whose  head is a  student •  •  • 
Persons who  se;y  they  are members  of a  weal  thy  family  ,  • 
Persons who  would vote for a  liberal  party  ,  •••• ,  • 
•  • 
•  •  • 
•  •  • 
8,  Persons within a  household whose  head ie a  high-ranking oivil 
serTant or a  professional ,  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Students  •  • . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
10.  Mid-management  and white collar workers  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
11.  Persons having  a  political preference different from  their pa-
rents  1  •  •  •  •  •  •  . . . . . . . . . . . •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
12.  Inhabitants of the North-Eastern part of Italy.  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
13.  Persons who  attended a  non-technical  eecondar,y  school  •  •  •  • 
14,  Heads  of a  family who  are not  union-members, yet identify with 
&·  union •  •  •  ,  •  ,  • . . •  •  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
15,  Non-practising protestants  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ,  •  ,  •  ,  3,58 
16,  Heads  of a  family who  are union members  and who  feel  identified 
with it .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  3t57 
17.  Males  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  . .  . . •  •  •  •  •  • 
18,  Persons who  show  a  week  party identification ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
19,  Heads  of household who  are union members,  but  do  not identif.T 
with it .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  3•52 
20,  Persons who  say  they  are members  of a  fairly  wealth~y family,  3,52 
21.  Persons 
party • 
who  would  vote  for  an  extreme left-wing, non-communist  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
22,  Members  of households whoee  head is a  mid-management  or white-
23. 
24. 
collar worker ,  •  •  • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Persons who  would vote for social-democratic parties •  •  •  •  • 
Inhabitants of the Western part of Holland.  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 25.  Inhabitants of the central  part of the Federal Republic  of Ge~ 
26.  Persons who  show  a  strong part,y identification •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
27.  Persons with the same  political preference as their parents •••• 
28.  Persons  born between  1950  and 1955  (aged 16 to 20  years old) 
29-30  Persons  born between 1940  and 1950  (aged 21  to  29  years old) 
•  •  • 
•  • 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
Persons who  show  a  very weak  party identification •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Inhabitants of the North-Western part of Italy ••••••••••• 
· Germans •• •  • . . . . . "  . . . . . .  ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Shopkeepers  and  artisans  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
35-36  Inhabitants of localities with more  than  20.000  inhabitants  •  •  • 
37. 
38. 
39. 
Persons  born between  1920  and 1925  •  •  ~  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Persons who  attended a  technical  or vocational  school  •  •  •  •  • 
Italians ••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  •  • . . . .  •  •  •  • 
•  • 
•  • 
•  • 
40.  Union-members,  who  identifY with the union and who  are not  heads  of a 
household ••• . . . . . . . . . . .  ..  . . . . .  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
41.  French who  vote for·the UDR  (Gaullists) •• •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
42.  The  Dutoh  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
43.  Union-members,  who  do  not  identifY with their union  and  are not  heads 
44. 
45. 
of a  household  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Inhabitants of the  Southern part of the Netherlands •••• •  •  •  •  • 
Inhabitants of the Southern part of the Federal Republic in Germany  • 
·r~lffl 
~,.•occ·.  '1'..  j 
.  ·Y . . 
Jr41  d 
3t40 
3t37 
3t~5 
3.34 
3.34 
3t32 
3t30 
3t30 
3t29 
3t27 
3t27 
3t27 
3t23 
3t22 
3t2l 
46.  Non-practising oatholics  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  3,20 
47.  Luxembourgers  •  •  •  •  •  •  • . . . . . . . . •  •  •  •  •  •  . . . •  •  •  • 
48-49  Persons  born between 1925  - 1935  (aged  35  to 45  years old).  •  •  •  • 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53· 
54. 
55· 
Persons  born  between  1915  and 1920  (aged 50 to 54  years  old).  •  •  •  • 
Persons  without  a  religion • ••••••••• •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Persons  who  vote for  a  ohristian-demooratio party or a  centre party • 
Inhabitants of the Paris area.  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Inhabitants of the central  part of Italy  ••• •  •  •  •  •  •  • . . .  . . . 
Persons in a  household whose  head is a  shopkeeper or an  artisan  •  •  • 
3.19 
3tl8 
3,18 
3tl8 
3tl7 
3tl6 
3tl5 
3tl4 
56.  Heads  of households  who  are neither union-members  nor union-identifiers  3tl2 
57. 
58. 
59. 
Inhabitants of the Southern part of Italy ••••••• ,  •••••• 
Practising catholics  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Persons who  are not  union-members,  nor heads  of a  household,  but who 
identity with a  union ,  ••••••• •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
3,12 
3tl2 
60.  Persons who  say they  are members  of a  family with average means  •  •  •  3,11 
61.  Persons  born between  1935  and 1940  (aged  30  to  34 years old)  •  •  •  •  •  3,10 Inhabi  tante of the Northern  part  of the German  Federal Republic 
Inhabitants of the Northern part of the Netherlands •••••• 
•  •  •  •  • 
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62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
Persons voting for a  very right-wing party  •  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  , 
Persons  belonging  to  a  non-christian religion •  •  • 
Laborers.  •  .  •  • . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  •  •  •  • 
6?.  Practising Protestants ••••••••••••••••••••  •  • 
3J09 
3,05 
3,04 
3J04 
3,03  • 
2,98 
68.  Persona  born  between 1905  and 1915  (aged 55  to 64  years old)  •  •  •  ,  2,93 
69.  Inhabitants of localities of lese than 20,000  inhabitants  ,  ••••• ,  •  2188 
70.  Inhabitants of the Bravant  provinoe in Belgium •••••••••••• ,  2188 
71.  Persons whose  head  of household is a  worker •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  2187 
72.  Inhabitants of the Italian islands  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  2,85 
73.  Persons in households whose  head ie the  housewife •••••••••• ,  ,  2184 
7 4.  The  Wallons  Belgians  •  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  .  •  •  .  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  2 182 
75-76  Inhabitants  of the North-Eastern and  South-Western part  of France •  •  •  2182 
77.  Balgial'ls  •  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  2 ,eo 
f8,  Frenoh ......•  ,  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  2,79 
79-80  Retired persons, with or without  a  retirement  pension  and members  of 
their household •  •  •  .  •  •  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  2,79 
81,  Persons  who  are neither heads  of a  household,  union-members  nor identi-
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
fied with  a  union •.•..........•.•.........  ,  •  •  2,78 
Persons who  do  not  identifY with any  part,y •••••••••••••••• 
Inhabitants  of the Eastern part of the Netherlands  , ••••••••••• 
Inhabitants of the South-Eastern part of Franoe  •  •  • 
Women  •  •  • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Farmers  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ~  •  •  •  •  •  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
The  Flemish  Belg_  ... ans  •  •  .  .  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  .  •  •  .  .  .  •  •  •  .  ,  .  •  •  . 
Members  of a  household whose  head is a  farmer  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Il.ousevri ves  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  .  .  •  •  • 
Persons  born before 1905  (aged 65  and  older)  •  ,  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Persons with no  education past  the  primary school level •• 
Inhabitants of the North-Eastern part of Franoe •••••••• 
•  . . . . . 
Persons  who  say  they  are members  of a  family with few  means •••••• , 
Persons who  refuse  to  say for what  party  they would  vote  or who  answer  a 
11for  no  political  party".  •  .  .  •  .  .  .  . ..•.  •  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  • 
Persons who  would vote for a  oommuniet  party •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Persons  whose  head of household is a  salaried farm  helper •  •  •  •  •  •  ,  • 
Persons  ~~ho  say  they  are members  of a  poor family  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ,  •  •  • 
People 'JVho  do  not  respond to  the question about  their party identifioa-
tion .. 
Salaried 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
farm  n,orkers  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  • 
2o78 
2,77 
2,73 
2J71 
2,66 
2,64 
2,63 
2,62 
2,60 
2,56 
2,54 
2,54 
2,53 
2,40 
2, 32 
2J23 153 
,What  strikes us  immediately in reading this table is the faot  that  the 
average scores on  the index are higher among  the privileged categories. 
The  mean  is 3,11 with a  standard deviation of approwimately 1,8 (1).  The 
five  subgroups  obtaining an  average score olearly higher than the overall  mean  be~ong 
to privileged segments  of the population •  These  are persons who  are employed in posi.;.. 
tiona of high  prestige, responsibility and salary or who  are members  of a  household 
whose  head holds suoh  a  position,  as well  as  persons who  attended oentres of higher 
education.  One  must  go  down  to the subgroup ranked in twelveth place in order to find 
a  geographical  area whioh  apparently is not  a  privileged group in society  1  these  are~ 
the inhabitants of the North-Eastern part of Italy.  But  in all of Italy, this region 
oan  be considered and  considers itself to be relatively privileged  1  it does  not  en-
joy the highest  income  per capita in Italy, but its internal gross produot  p  r  oapita 
has increased th most  per annum,  on  the average,  during the last twelve years (2). 
On  the other hand,  at  the bottom of the table we  find a  larger number  of 
underprivileged  subgroups who  have  good  reamn to consider themselves as  suoh •  far-
mers,  housewives,  old people,  persons whose  education level  does  not go  be,yond  prima-
r,y  school,  people not interested in politios, and  persons who  belong to a  family of 
few  means  or to  a  poor family.  In this same  part of the table, one finds  segments  of 
the population who  are opposed  to the existing socio-political organization and ~struc­
ture and who  probably oonsider themselves as  oppressed  1  for example,  communist  voters 
and the Flemish in Belgium:  The  inhabitants of underprivileged regions like the North-
Western  part of France are also found in this  part of the table. 
The  conclusion is obvious  1  the ideals and  the aspirations, which  presently 
engender a  strongly held attitude favorable  to european unification, are not  out of 
the same  cloth as  the tensions which ~  exist  among  the underprivileged segments  of 
the  present  day  european population.  As  a  stimulus for taking a  favorable  position, 
the image  of united Europe  attracts only groupe  whioh  are privileged from  the socio-
economic  and sooio-cultural  pointe of view or which  considered themselves as suoh. 
Recall, however,  that the findings  discussed in this report  are drawn  from 
a  sample whioh  represents the european  population as  a  whole.  The  values, views,  ima-
ges  and attitudes whioh  may  exist only among  ver,y  small, minority groups  cannot  be 
(l) The  standard deviation measures  the dispersion.  It indicates from  how  much  the 
different soores are far from  the mean. 
(2) See  "L'evolution r6gionale dane  la Communaute",  Commission  of european  Communiti-
es, 1971,  pp  291  and  292. 154 
statistically detected in a  study  as  overarching ae this  one, 
B,  VARIOUS  VARIABLES 
We  shall  examine,  successively,  five variables or sets of variables  1 
nationality and region of residence, 
personal  characteristics  :  sex  and age, 
socio-demographic  characteristics  1  occupation,  education level, sise 
of the locality, (subjective)  income  level,  and religious,  political, 
union and other membership, 
- level of knowledge, 
- attitudes toward other countries. 
1°  NATIONALITY  AND  REGION 
Region ie a  better predictor of a  pro-european attitude than nationality. 
While  the mean  scores between  countries  are narrowly spread,  ranging  from  3,30 for 
Germany  to  2,79 for France,  the mean  scores between regions are ver,r  dispersed,  ran-
ging from  3,71  for  the North-Eastern part of Italy to 2,54 for the North-Western part 
of France.  Nonetheless,  neither nation nor region are  as  good  predictors as is ooou-
pation (heads of firms  and upper management  1  4,53;  salaried farm helpers  1  2,17)  or 
the level of education (higher education  1  4,23  ;  primary sohool  level  1  2,56). 
Graph  2  shows  the  dispersion of mean  scores  by  region and by  oountr,r.  Ta-
ble 64  gives  the  percentage distributions  by  region and  countr,r for each value on the 
pro-european attitude index. 155 
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Table  64 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX  BY  REGrON 
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Table  64  (continued) 
Luxembourg 
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Within six regions we  find that  between  30% and  40% of the respondents 
obtain a  soore of +  5 or +  6  which  can be  considered as a  ver.r  favorable attitude, 
These  are the following areas  : 
- Centre of Germany  36  % 
- Western Holland  36  % 
- Northern  Germany  34  % 
Southern  Germany  3.3  % 
North-Eastern Italy  33% 
- North-Western Italy  30 % 
It is, nonetheless,  the inhabitants of North-Eastern Italy who  obtain the 
highest  mean  score (3,71),  since there are ver,r  few  persons with a  zero or negative 
score  :  indifferent, undecided and  hostile persons  represent  only 6%  of these res-
pondents, whereas  in the three  German  regions these responses  var.r  between 13 %  in 
central and 18 %  in northern  Germany.  In Western Holland,  they account  for 9  %• 
The  population of Northern  Germany  seems  to  show  the most  mixed attitude, 
in spite of its rank order on  the previous scale,  In faot,  more  than  one  third of 
the respondents in this region obtain scores of 5  or 6, yet 18 %  have  a  score below 1. 
Only  in the Felmish regions  of Belgium  do  we  find an  even greater proportion of zero 
or negative  attitudes (20 %). 
Thus  the assertion that  the most  favorable  attitudes are  found  among  privi-
leged groups in the population is supported by  these data.  Throughout  all the coun-
tries, the highest mean  score and the highest  percentage of ver,r  favorable scores is 
observed among  the inhabitants of the most  developed area of the countr,y,  which is, 
except for Italy, the  region where  the capital is located, 
2°  PERSONAL  CHARACTERISTICS 
a)  SEX  - The  male  population is definitely more  favorable  to  european uni-
fication than the distaff half,  The  average  score for men  is 3,55  and 2,71 for womenJ 
the percentage of "ver.r favorable"  men  (score 5  and 6) is 36  %'  and 19% of women. 
(See table  65 ). 
The  importance  of this difference leads us  to think that at least  two  fac-
tors intervene.  One  of the factors  probably is the lesser interest in politics shown 158 
Qy  women  (and rr,y  old people,  among  whom  women  are muoh  more  numerous  than men  1 
namely,  after 65  years of age, more  numerous  throughout  the entire european Community), 
But  a  second factor probably adds  to the first  1  it is the  image  of Europe- muoh  more 
technical  and  eoonomio  than political in character, more  intellectual than affective  -
in short,  a  sort of "masculine"  image,  which,  undoubtedly, is not of a  kind to mobili-
ze the interest of women, 
Table  65 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX  BY  SEX 
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Index  So ore  Total  lien  lfomen  __________ %  _____ 
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---, 
+  6  12  17  7 
+  5  15  19  12 
+  4  19  20  18 
+  3  17  16  18 
+  2  13  11  15 
+ 1  11  8  13 
Indifferent  4  3  6 
Undecided  5  2  7 
- 1  3  4  3 
No  response  1  0  1 
Total  100  100  100 
Mean  score  3,11  3,55  2,71 
N  8749  4230  4519 
- -------159 
b)  AGE  - The  highest mean  score  a  and  percentages for low values  on  the 
index are  observed amone  the youngest  age groups,  i.e.  among  people lees than 30 
years old, i.e.  born after 1940,  For the age groups  from  35  to 54 years  old1  the 
mean  score is still slightly higher than that of the entire population.  From  the 
a«e  of 55  on 1  the attitudes become  markedly  lees positive.  Bote the relatively lew 
scores  and  percentages  of the  30  to  34 years old age group,  i.e.  of persons born 
bet~een 1935  and 1940  ;  in this instance,  one  might  be observing the  consequences 
of the conditions under which  the "political socialization" of this generation (l) 
took  place. 
We  find1  nonetheless,  that  the differences in mean  scores among  the age 
groups  of persons less than  55  years  old are not  due  to high scores, but instead to 
zero or negative scores.  It is for this reason that  the  percentage of high scores 
in the 21  to 55  age group is greater than that  ~e find among  the less than  20  year 
old group, yet  the  percentage of zero  or negative values increases rather steadily 
as  a  function of age.  This is a  reconfirmation of the hypothesis that  the favora-
ble attitudes toward european unification we  find among  the youngest  age  groups are 
not  se much  the effects of truly very positive views  on  their part, i.e.  a  very 
strong attraction of the ideas  or plans  for unification,  as they are the effect of 
the lesser pull of traditional resistance  (based on  nationalism,  ethnocentrism,  etc.) 
(2),  (See table 66  and graph  3). 
(l) On  this point  see Ronald INGLEHART's  research,  especially "The  Socialization of 
Europeans", University of Chicago,  1967,  and  "An  End  to European Integration  ?11 , 
The  American Political Science Review,  Vol.  LXI,  n° 1, MarQh  1967,  pp,  91-105, 
(2)  Already stated in the  preceding chapter,  this hypothesis merits  closer examina-
tion,  Are  we  confronted with a  general  phenomenon  ?  Are  the old value  systems 
weakening or disappearing among  the younger generations at a  faster tempo  than 
new  ones  are adopted  ? 0 
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3°  SOCIO-DBMOGRAPHIC  CHARACTERISTICS 
a)  OCCUPATION  - Of all sooio-demograpbic characteristics,  emploTBent 
in such  or suoh  an  occupation is the most  discriminatory.  Among  the firet five 
subgroups  of the population to obtain the highest  mean  scores, we  find four ooou-
pations.  Among  heads  of firms  and upper management,  nearly two  thirds of the res-
pondents have  one  of the two  highest scores ;  the proportion is still 50  ~ among 
high civil servants  and  professionals.  At  the opposite  axtreme,  the highest per-
centages of sero or negative scores are foUnd  among  farmers,  housewives,  retirees 
or pensionees,  and,  most  of all, among  salaried farm workers.  Shopkeeper., arti-
sans,  and workers  are also close to the average.  (See table 67). 
Attitudes of persons holding a  job are more  or less the same  as those 
of the members  of their household. ;1, 
~  ... 
~-,,_.-.... '\"  ...  ,.,..~;  .. ~,-~f..~.  _,. ·r r· 
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b)  LEVEL  OF  EDUCATION  - This variable shows  a  olose relationship with 
pro-european attitudes.  Persons who  attended centres of high education haTS  a  mean 
soore two  thirds higher than those who  did not go  b&Tond  pri111&17  school  1  the per-
centage of both maximum  scores is almost  three times greater among  the former  than 
among  the latter.  Inversely,  the proportion of zero and negative soores is five ti-
mes  greater among  persons who  do  pursue studies bqond the pri111&17  level  than ..  eng 
those who  went  on  to higher education. 
Note  the significant difference between  the scores for a  seoondar,r  leTSl 
of education,  on  the  one  hand,  and  for technical or vocational training,  on  the 
other.  (See table 66  and Graph  4). •. 
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c)  SIZE  OF  THE  COMMUNE  - The  number  of inhabitants in the commune  of resi-
dence  apparently is related to  pro-european attitudes.  The  mean  score is significant-
ly lower in communes  of leas  than  20.000 inhabitants  (2,88)  than in larger communes 
(3 129).  The  difference  can  probably  be  attributed to socio-occupational 1  economic, 
and cultural differences  that exist between  residents  of a  rural  commune  and those 
of larger urban areas. 
d)  RELIGIOUS  M~~BERSHIP AND  PRACTICE  - The  preceding observation, also, 
probably applies to variables  of a  religious  type.  For  example,  that  protestant& 
who  do  not  practice their religion (which,  by  thew~, represents only 4% of the 
sample)  have a  significantly higher mean  score  than the other respondents must  be 
interpreted qy  taking into account  the fact  that  the majority of this  subgroup is 
made  up of Dutch and Germans  living in large url:ran  areas of their country.  The  dif-
ference with the  practicing protestants,  who  obtain a  much  lower mean  score,  can pro-
bably be  explained qy  the fact  that  the latter are more  numerous  in rural communes. 
The  difference between  practicing and non-practicing people also  shows  up 
among  the catholics, but it is less marked. 
e)  STANDARD  OF  LIVING  - Table  69  brings out  a  strong correlation between 
pro-european attitudes and  the  respondents'opinion about  the financial  means  at their 
disposal.  The  mean  score increases almost linearly,  from  2,23 for persons  who  consi-
der their family  poor to 3,92  for wealthy  families. 
That  this is not  simply  a  question of information level is shown  ~  the 
fact that the  percentage of persons with neg,,tive  scores also decreases linearly as 
a  function of the standard of living.  Indeed,  as  we  shall see later, the minority 
of persons with negative scores is not  less informed than those who  have  high scores 
on  the  pro-european attitude index  :  this is a  minority often made  up of persons of 
the  extreme left or righi.  Similarly,  we  saw  above  that negative scores are scarce-
ly influenced by  education level.  (See  table  69  and graph 4). 
(1)  In order to verifY whether and  to what  extent  religious membership  and  practice 
directly affect  pro-european attitudes,  an  analysis of the following variables 
would suffice  1  religious membership  and  practice,  respondents'opinions about 
the financial  means  at their disposal,  and  the index itself. ""  \0 
.-< 
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~----f)  POLITICAL  PARTICIPATION  AND  PARTY  IDENTIFICATION  - Persons who  indio~ 
te a  preference for a  liberal party obtain the highest mean  soore (3,85).  After the-
se come  those who  identify with far left-wing,  non-coiDllJU!liat  parties (3,49)  and with 
the social  democratic  parties (3,46),  followed by  identifiers with oentre or rightist 
parties.  (See  table 70), 
To  understand fully this table,  one  also has  to take other factors into 
consideration,  such  as nationality.  For example,  the difference in the attitudes 
between  persons who  identify with far left-wing  non-com~unist parties  and communists 
is striking ;  the first have  a  score much  higher than the  european average,  whereas 
the latter have  among  the lowest  scores.  Only  salaried farm  helpers  as well  as  per-
sons  who  say they  are members  of  a  poor family  and those without  any  party identifi-
cation whatsoever obtain even lower  ~ean scores. 
This leads us  to  think that  the ·ney  politics intervenes as  a  factor in the 
formation of pro-european attitudes  and its importance  as  a  factor depend upon one's 
party preference. 
Where  scores very  clearly  deviate  from  the  european  average,  i.e.  among 
respondents of liberal  tendency,  on  the  one  hand,  and  among  communists,  on the other, 
one  can  assume  that  the political factor -which is, itself, correlated with other 
faotors,  has  a  direct influence on  pro-european attitudes. 
With  regard to  other parties including the  extreme right, it can be  assu-
med  that  pro-european attitudes,  on  the  one  hani,  and  the  party preference,  on  the 
other,  depend  a  single set of economic  and  pacial factors,  but  that  there is no  di-
rect  relationship between the  two  variables  themselves. 
Without  a  doubt,  one  of the factors which  has  as  much  influence  on  party 
preference  as  on  pro-european attitudes is the  degree  of interest in politics and 
strength of party identification.  It is well-known that  some  parties, particularly 
those in the centre, attract - be  it permanently  or occasionally- a 
ly larger number  of people who  show  little interest in politics (1). 
persons  also obtain lower scores  on  the  pro-european attitude scale. 
proportionate-
Indeed,  these 
Table 71  shows 
(1)  See  Emeric  DEUTSCH,  Denis  LINDON  and  Pierre WEILL  :  "Les  familles  politiques 
aujourd'hui  en France", Paris,  Editions  de Minuit,  1966. 
These  authors classify under  the  name  "Marias",  on  the  one  hand,  "false cen-
trists", i.e.  voters  who  located themselves in the centre, but who  are not in-
terested in politics and,  on  the other hand,  those who  are unable to locate 
themselves  aQYWhere  (on  a  left-richt scale). 170 
that  the mean  sc;:,re  of respondents  who  strongly identify 't.ri th a  political party 
is much  higher than  the  european averS€e  ( 3,40), yot  n•ot  as high as  those respon-
dents  who  show  e.  weak  party identification ( 3,53).  '·'l>c  ,lifference between these 
two  scores  can beattributed to  the fact  that  e.::tre:.;;.s·ts,  whom  we  know  have lees 
favorable  european attitudes,  are found in the first e=·oup.  From  this point forth, 
however,  mean  scores rapidly devrease  as  the strength of party identification de-
creases.  Respondents  who  claim no  party identification whatsoever obtain one  of 
the lowest  scores  among  all the  subgroups  we  have  Gtwlied, 
i1' interest in politics and  the  strength  o,:  ~arty identification lead to 
a  favorable  ,.ttitude toward european unification, it is to be  expected that the vo-
ters of ma;Jor:L ty  parties obtain lower mean  scores.  In fact,  these parties draw  pro-
portionately  sm~Ller numbers  of strong  identifier~. 
Poi;, t10al heredity also  plays  a  certain role..  Respondents  who  state that 
their part,v  •.•:-e:oe.rence  differs from  that  of their pa.rents  obtain a  mean  score of 
3 172.  Observe,  ho·.vever,  that political intexest  ru<i  oc.'llm~.tment  probably are the 
reason for it.  In faot,  respondents  who  claim to hav"  tee same  party preference 
as their parents  also obtain a  mean  score above  tha  european average  (3,37),  Only 
those  intervie.,.ees  who  do  not know  their parents'politioal  preference or who  do  not 
have  one  therc.a8lves  or who,  for that matter,  do  not  raspond to the question obtain 
scores  lower  than  the  average.  (See  table 72). 
So  far,  we  have  examined  the relationship between party preference and 
pro-european attitudes as if the latter were  a  reeult  of the  former,  Yet it is pos-
sible that  european attitudes influence party preference rather than viae-versa, 
This hypothesis,  however,  does  not  seem  defendable.  It is true, as  the  data in ta-
ble 73  show,  that  people  who  are very  favorable  to  european unification also haTe  a 
tendency  to attribute these attitudes to the representatives of their preferred par-
ty,  and  that  the  respondents  who  are unfavorable  to  european unification  attri~te 
the  same  feelings  to their political leaders,  but  these data do  not  inform us about 
the  extent  to which  the  european feelings  of political leaders are known  to the vo-
ters.  Indeed, it would  be  rather difficult to come  out,  on  the one  hand,  as  an  avid 
partisan of european unification,  and  to admit,  on  the other, that one votes  for a 
party 'Nhose  leadres  hold a  contrary position. 
In this respect,  table 74 is more  revealing,  The  correlation between a 
european attitude and  the  tendency  to vote for another party if the presently pre-171 
ferred party were  to  take  a  position  on  european unification contrar,y to the inter-
viewee's  opinions is practically nul. 
Thus,  we  must  conclude  that  opinions,  feelings  and attitudes toward euro-
pean unification generally  have  hardly  any  influence  on  political behaviour and  pre-
ference.  This means  either that unification is not  considered to be  an  important 
problem compared  to those at stake in elections,  or else that unification is immua-
ble and runs its o~ course.  In both cases,  the hypothesis we  already advanced is 
confirmed once  againo  namely  that  plans  for  Europe  have  not yet  touched the affecti-
ve  oore of human  response. g:!_ 
..... 
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Mean  score 
N 
Strong  Party 
Total  I  dent If  i ers 
'}1  % 
12  16 
15  18 
19  20 
17  15 
13  12 
11  9 
4  3 
5  3 
3  4 
1  0 
100  100 
3,11  3,40 
8749  1556 
-
Table  71 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX 
BY  STRENGTH  OF  PARTY  IDENTIFICATION 
Weak  Party  Very  weak  Party  No  party 
l dent if i ers  Identifiers  Identification 
%  %  "' 
I" 
16  10  8 
18  23  13 
21  20  18 
18  17  17 
12  12  15 
8  7  12 
2  4  6 
2  4  7 
3  3  3 
0  - 1 
100  100  100 
3,53  3,34  2,78 
3000  96  )235 
.. 
Don't  know 
% 
4 
9 
14 
18 
15 
14 
9 
12 
4 
1 
100 
~ ,21 
862 
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DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPE.Ur  ATTITUDE  Illl>Elt  :BY  PARTY 
PREFERENCE  COKPARED  WITH  P.A.RENTS'PREFERENCE 
-----------------------1 
Index  I  Total  Same  as  Different f'ro11  Den't know 
Score  ,  parents  parents 
~  ~  ~ 
"'  +  6  16  14  19  10 
+  5  18  18  20  27 
+  4  20  20  19  21 
+  3  18  17  19  20 
+  2  12  13  10  10 
+  1  9  9  7  9 
Indifferent  2  3  2 
Undecided  2  3  2  1 
- 1  3  3  2  1 
llro  responde  0  0  1 
Total  100  100  100  100 
ll(ean  Score  3t50  ·.  3t37  3t72  ''7lj 
____ ;_ 
-···---·~-·-
1i  (:x)  3506  2330  1105  71  ·--
L ..  ..J  ·--··  -- ----- __ L_ 
(:x)  Included are only respondents who  express a  party preference and who  also 
know their parents•party preference, ""  <- ..... 
Index 
Score 
Total 
% 
+  6  14 
+  5  17 
+  4  19 
+  3  18 
+  2  13 
+  l  10 
Indifferent  '  .I 
Undecided  3 
- l  ' 
J 
No  reply  0 
Total  100 
Mean  Score  3,32 
N  6499  (x) 
Table  73 
DISTRIBUTION  Of  SCORES  ON  THE  PRD-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX 
BY  SUPPOSED  DEGREE  OF  COM\ll TMENT  OF  PREFERRED  PARTY 1 S 
REPRESENTATIVE  TO  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION 
Supposed  Attitude of  Preferred  Party's  Representatives toward  European  Unification. 
Very  favorable  R~t~er favorable  Rather  unfavorable  Very  unfavorable  Don't  know 
" 
d!  "'  %  "'  ,'  I  ,, 
I" 
28  14  7  4  1 
25  18  ll  l  9 
19  24  l'  6  lC 
14  19  l7  lO  19 
7  13  ll  g  17 
4 
7  I<c  31  16  ' 
l 
~  7  3 
7 
"  '  ' 
l  l  ?  - g 
l  2  lc  37 
r 
J 
- 0  - - l 
100  100  100  100  100 
4,28  3,58  2,30  0,93  2,27 
-- 1--
1626  2498  212  72  2091 
--- ------
(x)  Included  are only  people  expressin~ a  preference tor a  oolltlcal  party. 
-· 
I 
I 
I 
' 
I \{) 
<-- ..... 
Index 
-::cor-,·· 
+  6 
+  c 
+  4 
+  3 
+  2 
+  l 
Indiff. 
Undecided 
- l 
No  reply 
Total 
Mean  score 
N 
1-------
fetal 
14 
1~ 
' 
19 
1P 
l3 
10 
' 
' 
3 
0 
Table  74 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX 
BY  TENDENCY  TO  CHANGE  PARTY  PREFERENCE.  IN  FUNCTION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  ATTITUDES 
OF  THE  REPRESENTATIVES  OF  ONE'S  PREFERRED  PARTY 
Would  change  political  preference 
.  ------T -------------- ------- .. 
·  ~eti·•·+ely  I  ~robBbly 
.. -------·· ------
~ 
l6 
19 
19 
17 
12 
9 
} 
2 
3 
0 
1 
F 
19 
?'  -~ 
l7 
l? 
7 
3 
1 
2 
0 
--r -------------
Probably  I'Ot  Clef i 111-~e I y  r.ot 
----------~----- -------------
"  " 
17  1~-
19  1( 
19  18 
18  19 
12  14 
0  ll  / 
2  3 
1  l 
}  3 
"--------- --, 
c)Qn It knOW 
-~-------- --·--··  ___ _. __ _ 
,"{: 
5 
10 
15 
17 
16 
15 
6 
11 
4 
1 
1----------t------+------+  --+-------- -·-··---
lt"""  "vv 
"1,3:"' 
6~r;r  (x) 
lOD 
1  -~ Q  J. ~--· 
l?_)~ 
100 
~,(1 
lrr:--;-
100 
"}  C'l' 
' .  ' 
}"lC"'l  '  ,_ 
lCO  100 
"}  "l"}  _j,_,_;  2,36 
"l  ""~  l"_n 
..:._  .... ..._./  1183 
\x)  Inc I uded  are on I  y  respondents  who  express  a  prAfP.rAnCA  for  a  pn II tl  ca I  party. 177 
g)  UNION  MEMJ3ERSHIP  OR  IDENTIFICJ.TIOll  WITH  .A  UNION  - Table 75  showa 
that the scores on  the pro-european attitude index  covar,r with  the three variables 
examined, i.e. whether or not  one  is the head of household,  a  union member  or (stron-
gly or weakly) identified with a  union. 
The  fact that, generally speaking, the heads  of household are more  :taTor-
ble than the non-heads stands  to reason,  since the housewives  and women  who,  on ~ 
lance,  have low scores represent the large majority of non-heads  o:t household. 
Even  among  strongly committed union members,  heads of households haTe  significantly 
higher soores than non-heads  1  3t57  to  3t25.  Similarly amollg  respondents who  are 
neither union-members  nor union-identifiers, heads of household·are more  european  a 
3,12 to 2,78. 
In general, union members  obtain a  higher average soon than non-members. 
But,  as already seen, it seems  improbable that this more  positive attitude ia attri-
butable to the influence of union leaders (1).  .A  more  probable  ~pothesis is that 
most  union members  identity themselves in some~  with the sooio-eoonomioal struo-
tures whioh  exist in the countries of the common  Market,  eTen i:t the,r oritioize 
them.  This  ~pothesis, which  remains to be verified, squares with the general  ob-
servation we  made  according to which  "privileged persons",  however  relative the ad-
vantage,  hold the most  positive attitudes toward european unification. 
The  highest  score is obtained by  the subgroup of non-union heads of house-
hold who  identifY with a  union  ( 3,64  ).  It is likely that in this subgroup, we  find 
heads  of finns and upper management,  high civil servants and professionals whioh are 
are categories we  know  to be by  far the most  favorable  to the unification of Ellrope. 
The  relative importance of this category  (more  than 7 'f.  of the sample)  shows  that 
the union phenomenon is aooepted in the milietl%  presently holding ke.y  posi  tiona in 
society and favorable to the european unification. 
The  third variable, i.e.  strength of union identification, also shows  a 
positive correlation with scores on  the  ~ro-european attitude index.  Whether heads 
of household or not,  those respondents who  belong to unions and who  identif,r with 
them  obtain higher scores than union members  who  do  not  identifY with their union. 
Similarly,  respondents who,  ~thout being union members,  feel attached to one  ob-
tain higher scores  than non-identifiers.  Lest we  :forget,  this does  not  mean  that 
those milieux which  identity most  strongly with a  union or are most  :favorable to 
unions feel more  "European"  because  of their union ties or sympathies,  but because 
(l) See  page  47. 178 
it is in these groups we  would consider aa  reformist or progressive where  pro-euro-
pean attitudes are more  widely held and more  firmly rooted than in other social 
groups. 
Aa  in the oaae of party preferenoe, those persona who,  either as union 
members  or identifiers, are relatively more  favorable,  as  we  just observed,  than 
others to  european unifioation attribute similar views  to union leaders.  But  in 
neither instanoe does  this finding inform us  about  the knowledge  these people  &ave 
about  the views union members  truly hold (See table 76). a-. 
<-- ..... 
Index  Union 
Total  Members  or 
score  IdentIfIers 
"' 
1[  i" 
+  6  12  17 
+  5 
1<  21  '~ 
+  4  19  19 
+  3  17  16 
+  2  13  10 
+  1  ll  9 
Indiff.  4  3 
~ndeclded  5  2 
- 1  3  3 
No  reply  1  -
Total  100  100 
Mean  score  3, 11  3,57 
N  874')(x)  ,,..., 
/  J  '-
Table  75 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX ____ 
BY  UNION  MEMBERSHIP  AND  IDENTIFICATION 
Heads  of  household  Non-heads  of  household 
-Union  Non-Union  Neither Union  Union  Union  _Non-Union 
Members  but members  but  member  nor  Members  or  members  but  members  but 
non  sympathizer  !dent  I fier ·  Identifiers  non  sympathizer 
l dent! f I  ers  I  dent I tiers 
"' 
')1.  "' 
')1  "'  "' 
I"  I"  i"  I' 
17  17  14  12  ll  ll 
18  19  16  17  14  1~ 
/ 
20  22  18  22  2~  20 
17  17  14  18  1~  19 
12  10  13  9  1C  14 
8  10  9  11  13  10 
3  1  5  4  3  3 
2  2  6  4  3  4 
3  2  4  3  1  4 
0  0  1  - - 0 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
3,~2  3,64  3,12  3,25  3,23  3,12 
773  636  ~167  170  366  GAo 
~/ 
(x)  Included  are  94  respondents  who  were  not classified. 
NeIther  Un Lo1 
Members  nor 
Identifier 
% 
8 
12 
18 
19 
14 
13 
c 
/ 
7 
3 
1 
100 
2,78 
2_~0:? 0 
CXl  ..... 
Index 
score 
t- 6 
+  5 
+  4 
+  3 
+  2 
'  r  • 
I:Idifferent 
Undecided 
- 1 
No  reply 
Total 
Mean  score 
:'i 
1------
Total 
"/, 
l? 
17 
21 
17 
p 
') 
~ 
3 
~ 
0 
l  ~~  .vu 
'  "'  /  'Lt'-' 
l_....,..,,...  I  \ 
,~..:_.  \X; 
Table  76 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRD-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX 
BY  SUPPOSED  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  EUROPEAN  UNIFICATION  OF  LEADERSHIP  INUNIONS 
TO  WHICH  ONE  BELONGS  OR  IDENTIFIES 
- -- - . -
Union  leaders'  attitude toward  European  unification 
-- ----- -
'/erv  favorable  Rather  favorable  Rather  unfavorable  and 
very  unfavorable 
<;Z  "'  t. 
29  l9  5 
22  ?2  ll 
20  2j  14 
15  lG  '~  ., 
8  10  12 
'  19  ·;  I 
1  1  1 
l  1  3 
0  l  15 
- - -
·----- -----------------
100  lOO  :oc 
-
II  '?C 
+t'-/  3,~0  2,19 
-
-+55:  996  L!8 
f~)  Resoondents  who  are either union  members  or  identifiers. 
-
Don't  know 
'ta 
S' 
'  A 
·~ 
?0 
18 
1'  ~ 
12 
I 
4 
5 
4 
c 
-------
100  I 
2,7'4 
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4 °  LEVEL  OF  KNOWLEDGE  AND  EXPOSURE  TO  MASS  llEDll 
From  the preceding analysis, it oan certainly be  expeoted that the level 
of knowledge  is strongly correlated w1 th soores on  the  pro-european attitude index. 
Indeed, it is natural for you  to be better informed about  subjeots dear to you  than 
about  those indifferent to you.  On  the other hand,  we  have  observed that the most 
favorable attitudes toward european unification are found among  persons and groups 
which,  judged by their level of education,  represent  an "intellectual elite".  Thus 
table 77  shows  that respondents  who  are able to oite exaotly the names  of all the 
six member  states of the  common  l'iarket  obtain a  significantly higher mean  soore 
than the others  1  3,89  compared to 2o58. 
It is also natural for persons with a  clearly positive attitude toward 
the unification of Europe to know  better the internal political life of their oOUD-
try.  To  know  the name  of the Prime 'Minister of the government  in offioe was  taken 
as  a  measure  of the level of knowledge  we  expected do,  indeed,  exist.  If a  person 
holding a  positive attitude toward european unification was,  everything considered, 
more  interested in foreign policy than in domestio polioy,  the knowledge  of the 
Foreign Minister's  name  ought  to be  more  strongly related to the scores on  the pre-
european attitude index  than the knowledge  of the Prime 'Minister's name.  'l'his is 
also verified.  The  mean  score for respondents who  know  the name  of the Foreign 
Vinister of their country is 3,49, whereas  the mean  soore of thoee who  know  the 
Prime Minister's name  is 3,19.  Note  that both soores are considerably higher than 
the average for the total sample.  (1) 
(1)  The  difference in the mean  scores between  persons who  know  the nMle  of the 
Prime lfinister of their country,  on  the one  hand,  and those who  know  the Fo-
. reign Minister's name,  on  the other, might be the effeot of a  greater interest 
shown  for international affairs by  respondents with a  ver,y  positive attitude 
toward european political unification, but this is not  proof of the hypothesis. 
In fact, with fevr  exceptions  (the Netherlands,  for instanoe), more  people know 
the names  of the Prime Minister than those  of the Foreign Jlinister.  'l'his meana 
that it is more  "diffioul  t" to know  the Foreign lfinister'  s  Dillie  than the name 
of the Prime Vinister.  Given  the higher level of general knowledge  among  people 
who  demonstrate very positive attitudes toward european unification, it is pos-
sible,  indeed probable,  that the mean  score of persons who  cive the right ana-
wer increases as a  fonction of the difficulty of the question. 182 
Taking as a  point  of departure newspaper  reading of current political news 
and  exposure  to news  broadcasts  on  radio and  television - phenomena  already analyzed 
in the  previous chapter (1) - one  can predict that newspaper  reading is a  better pre-
dictor of european attitudes than  exposure to news  broadcasts  b,y  other media.  The 
figures  in table 79  confirm this prediction.  They  also  show  that  az:posure  to  n91f8 
broadcasts  or political articles, no  matter what  the medium,  covary positively with 
european attitudes.  This is illustrated by  the graph below,  on  which  the frequency 
of exposure  to mass  media is recorded  on  the abscissa and  the mean  scores  on  the pro-
european attitude index,  on  the ordinate.  (See graph 5). 
As  we  already commented  in the previous chapter,  information programs ~ 
be  both  the cause and effect of a  strengthening of political oollllllitment  and,  hence, 
of attitudes toward european unification.  Undoubtedly  this e:z:plains  why  newapaper 
reading of current political news  shows  a  stronger covariation with european attitu-
des  than the exposure  to news  broadcasts by other media, 
If only it were  possible to measure  the sole effect of information on  the 
attitudes of people by  eliminating the  confounding effect that actively informing 
them  hae  on  their attitudes,  then it is likely that  the slope of the relationship 
with exposure to  teleVision news  broadcasts would  ehow  a  better fit. 
(1)  See  pages  51  to 56. 183 
Index 
Score 
+  6 
+ 5 
+  4 
+  3 
+  2 
+ 1 
Indifferent 
Undecided 
- 1 
No  responae 
Total 
Table  77 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRCl-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX 
BY  KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  EXACT  COID'OSITION  OF  THE  COMMON  MAl!KE'l' 
Total 
12 
15 
19 
17 
13 
11 
4 
5 
3 
1 
100 
3.11 
8749 
Know  the  exact  composi-
tion of the  common  Mar-
ket 
--- ---, 
Don't know the  : 
exact  composition [ 
of the  common  1L  :  __  .._ ___ ------- -. -- -. 
l 
21 
22 
21 
16 
9 
6 
1 
1 
3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
6 
11 
17 
18 
16 
14 
6 
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i  1 
-- ------------r----------- -- -~ 
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Table 79 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX 
BY  DEGREE  OF  EXPOSURE  TO  MASS  MEDIA 
---~~----- ----
Index  Read  political current  news  in newspapers 
Score  i  .  ------ ---~---~  -----
tl'otal  Daily  Several  times  Once  or twice  Less  than.  Never 
a  week  a  week  once  a 
week 
--~-- .. ---+- -------- ·----- --- -
.'~>  %  %  %  %  % 
+  6  12  23  15  11  7  4 
+ 5  15  21  22  17  12  8 
+  4  19  18  21  23  19  16 
+  3  17  15  18  19  20  17 
+  2  13  10  11  12  14  17 
+ 1  ,11  7  7  10  14  15 
Indifferent 4  2  2  3  6  7 
Undecided  5  1  2  3  4  10 
- 1  3  3  2  2  4  4 
No  .respon-1 
se  1  0  0  0  2 
'  '  ' 
·---~ 
·-----------
Do  not  : 
know  or 
do  not 
respond 
% 
16 
11 
16 
16 
8 
8 
11 
11 
3 
'  ...... ------ ·----~----· 
'  Total  100  100  100  100  100  i  100  100 
---- -~- --· ---·------------·  -··-+--------·  -· 
Mean  score  3,11.  3,84  3.65  3.32  2,76 
i  2,27  2,84 
87491 
--------- : 
N  2384 
i  1233  1097  1490  .2508  37 
~  I  L.  . ---Index 
Score 
Table 79  (continued) 
Watch  news  broadcasts on  television 
Totei-l Daily  l--se-;~;.~  time-;---0~~-e--~;11~-;;-than l 
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l a  week  twice  a  ·.  once  a  i  kn01r or 
------+---.,..-·---..,,---+-!  _  --~ we~-- r-::~::---~·~l  -...,---+-1  :~:,a;::d  ' 
~  ~  ~  I  ~  !  ~  f.  !:  f-8  II 
+  6  12  15  ,  11  10  1  9  7 
r  !  !  r 
+  5  I  15  17  :  16  12  i  11  1  11  i  8  , 
+  4  I 19  I  20  '  19  l  20  i  17  i  15 
:  :  ::  •  ::  I  :~  I  ::  i  ::  I :: 
+  1  11  9  9  I  13  I  14  I 
Indi:f'ferent 
Undecided 
- 1 
No  response 
Total 
Mean  soore 
N 
'  't' 
4,3  5  15  1 
5  ;3  '·  4  617 
3,3'  4  3  4 
I 
1  0  i  0  1  i  l 
I 
14 
6 
10 
4 
2 
! 
i 
i 
I 
23 
15 
12 
13 
3 
17 
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Table 79  (continued) 
r-----------~-------------------------------·--------------------------------~ 
Indn 
Soore 
+  6 
+  5 
+  4 
+  3 
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+  1 
Indifferent 
Undecided 
- 1 
No  response 
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Mean  Score 
N  L_  ___ 
Listen to radio news  broadcasts 
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%  %  % 
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5°  ATTITUDES  TOWARD  OTHER  COUNTRIES 
In this study,  three questions brought up the relations - real or imagined -
that the respondents might  have had with countries other than their own.  One  question 
dealt with countries which are not members  of the  common  'Market,  but which one  might 
wish to see  join :  this is an attitude question.  Another question on  attitudes tended 
to measure the degree of trust in one  or another foreign  people  1  namely,  in this case, 
in the three large countries of the  european Community,  the British, the Swiss,  the 
Americans,  the Soviets and the  Chinese.  A third question, more  characteristio of so-
cio-cultural level,  revealed to us  the degree  of openness to the outside world measu-
red by the number  of countries visited for sojourns of at least one.day. 
a)  ADMISSION  OF  :roREIGN  COUNTRIES  INTO  THE  COMMON  MARKET 
Table 80  shows  that the predisposition to  allow other countries to enter 
the common  Market  increases as  the attitude  toward the unification of Europe  becomes 
more  positive.  From  this table,  however,  we  run the risk of drawing  erroneous con-
clusions by  presenting, in eaoh instance,  scores on  the pro-european inde%  for the 
total number  of persons who  would accept  a  given country  :  this is why  the mean  sco-
re of those  persons who  accept  Eastern Germany,  Poland and the Soviet Union is higher 
than the mean  score of a  much  greater number  of persons who  speak up in favor of Den-
mark  and Switzerland. 
Table 81  and  Graph  6  present  the same  data,  in a  more  meaningful wa;y,  by 
giving the percentages  obtained by  each of the countries for all respondents whose 
scores for pro-european attitudes are  ranked in descending order. 
This table  shows  that the average number  of accepted countries systemati-
cally decreases as the score on  the  pro-european attitude index tends  toward zero. 
We  also observe  a  rather striking difference between  the indifferent and undecided 
responses,  on  the one  hand,  and the respondents  obtaining a  negative score,  on  the 
other.  Not  only does  the latter group respond more  easily to the question  (21  ~ 
"no response"  compared  to 56%  in the former group), but also the percentage of res-
pondents who  would admit  no  new  country into the  present  common  :Market  is much  higher 
among  those people with negative  scores  (28 %). 
Significant differences also exist between  the  percentages of respondents 
who  would admit Western countries and those who  are favorable to the admission of 
countries under communist  rule.  Thus,  among  the group of persons obtaining the ma-
ximum  score, Denmark  was  chosen 4,4 times more  frequently  than by  those in the group 
of indifferents or undecideds.  This  ratio is 4,6 for Spain,  4,0 for Switzerland. 190 
For the three Eastern countries (the Democratic Republic  of Germ&nT•  Poland and 
the Soviet Union)  the ratios are respectively 7,8 and  7•5·  The  difference between 
the views  of the respondents with maximum  scores and  those with scores  equal  to ze-
ro  thus is much  greater for Eastern European  countries than  ~or Western countries. 
When  the group of respondents with maximum  scores is compared  with those 
respondents with negative scores,  the differences are  not  the same.  We  find a  ra-
tio of 2,3 for Denmark  and  2,0 for Switzerland ;  this means  that respondents with 
negative scores more  readily accept  these  two  countries.  The  same  applies for Po-
land and  the Soviet Union  (2,7),  On  the other hand,  Spain and,  odly enough,  the 
Democratic Republic  of Germany  have  many  more  advocates in the group with negative 
scores  ;  the ratios are respectively 4,6 and 4,9, 
These results prove  once  again that a  large number  of protesters in our 
present society are found in the group most  hostile to  european unification,  This 
group includes  communists  and right-wingers  though  the former are greater in number, '··  .....  -~~.·  -·I  .  I  ....  .....  0'\ 
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Table  81 
CHOICE  OF  COUNTRIES  ONE  WOULD  LIKE  TO  SEE  ENTER  THE  COMMON 
MARKET  BY  THE  RESPONDENTS'SCORES  FOR  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDES 
~- --- -- ----- .. 
Countr,y  Score 
L~=-=~=- ---·,------· -,  --,----,.---······ 
chosen 
1  +61  +5
1
;  +4i 
!  I 
---·--------
Switzerland 
Denmark 
Spain 
Democratic Republic 
of'  Ger;nan;y 
Poland 
Soviet Union 
None  of these countries 
Does  not know  or does 
not  respond 
Total 
'  I  '  % .  % 
I 
84  80 
88  78 
55  49 
39  31 
38  1  30 
I 
3o  1  22 
1  i 
I 
'  ' 
3 
+  3 
%  % 
73  67 
68  58 
42  39 
27  20 
25  20 
19  17 
3  5 
+  2  +  1  0  - 1 
I  %  %  %  % 
58  46  21  42 
50  37  20  39 
31  23  12  12 
16  16 
I 
5  8 
15  14  5  14 
13  13  4  11 
8  10  11  28 
3  1  4  7  12  18  27  _)_ __ .:~~= _ 
Mean  number 
chosen 
338  I  297  I  264  :  238  I  209  186  :  134  :  175 
of'  countries  -----t--;·- +-. -t  --- T-- .........  --~ ·-·--
- -~-:·_34  L~·90·-~  2,~~J  2_,_21  l ~~89  l_l  ·~~----0·6~ __  1,26  L.... __  _ 193 
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b)  DEGREE  OF  TRUST  IN  FOREIGN  PEOPLES 
Trust  in foreign countries generally increases  as  a  function of the score 
on  the  pro-european attitude index (1).  But  the  reading of the results is more  inte-
resting when  an index  of the degree  of trust in each of the eight  suggested countries 
is used  to  rank  the  pro-european attitude scores in descending order for all the res-
pondents. 
Table  82  and  Graph  7  show  that  the rate of decrease in trust  by  scores  on 
the  pro-european attitude index varies  according to  the  country in question. 
The  relationship between  european  scores  and  trust in Germans  is stronger 
than  the others  ;  this means  that the degree  of trust  the respondents  place in Ger-
mans  is a  better indicator of a  favorable attitude toward  european unification than 
the  degree  of trust in other peoples.  (Recall  that  the  respondents ware not  asked 
to  express  an  opinion  on  their countrymen).  The  correlation between  european  soc--
res  and trust also is rather strong in regard to  opinions  about  Italians, British, 
French,  Swiss  and  even  Russians. 
With  respect  to trust in Americana,  we  observe  that it too decreases  as 
function of decreasing scores  on  the  pro-european attitude index  ;  this decrease is 
especially  pronounced in the drop  from  zero  to  negative scores.  On  the other hand, 
an  inverse  tendency is observable with respect  to trust in Chinese.  The  greatest 
mistrust  of Chinese  is found  among  respondents  who  score from  3  to 5  on  the  pro-eu-
ropean  index.  From  score  3  on  down  the scale, mistrust  of Chinese  tends  to diminish. 
Among  the  people who  obtainas  a  negative score,  the degree  of trust in Chinese is of 
the  same  magnitude  as  those who  score near 6  and  even  slightly higher.  These  results 
justifY our speculation that the respondents  of the  extreme left, who  obtained a  ne-
gative score on  the  pro-european index,  also  have  a  tendency to feel  closer to  the 
Chinese  than  to  the Russians.  All  groups distrust  Chinese  more  than Russians. 
Table  83  brings to light the distance in the  degree  of trust  separating 
the Russians  and  the  Chinese,  respectively,  as  a  function of decreasing scores  on 
the  pro-european attitude index.  One  observes  that  the relative trust in Russians 
compared  to trust  placed in Chinese,  increases slightly the further  one  gees  down 
the scale of european scores until it reaches ita maximum  at  a  score of 4.  From  this 
point  on,  the relative trust in Russians  decreases  and  becomes  negative at a  score of 
(1)  See  the  complete results in annex  (Table  4). 195 
- 1. 
In conclusion,  one  ought  to  remember  that a  favorable attitude toward 
european unification is accompanied  Qy  a  greater open mindedness  toward other coun-
tries, other peoples and other cultures.  Among  respondents with high  scores,  this 
openness  depends  less on  the ideological or political setting of the  peoples in 
question than it does  for  respondents  with negative scores.  Nonetheless, we  obser-
ve that,  SIIIOng  the interviewees who  obtained the maximum  soore on  the pro-european 
index,  trust in the  peoples  of Europe is no greater than trust in North Americans. 
The  sole exception concerns attitudes  toward the  Swiss. 
The  fact that trust in Americans  decreases very rapidly as  a  function of 
decreasing pro-european scores, is equivalent  to  saying that trust in Americans  is 
a  better predictor of pro-european attitudes than the trust placed in the Swiss. 
Thus,  we  have confirmation of the  hypothesis that a  large number  of persons very 
favorable  to  european unification view their belonging to Europe as what  we  might 
consider as "atlantic" or else that  they view the building of a  united Europe in 
the hopes of good  relations with the United States. 196 
Table  A2 
DEnREE  OF  THTTST  IN  F'f'T(!'Tr;tl  Pl';OPLES  BY  T'iE  RESPONDENTS'  PRO-EUROPEAN 
ATTITUDE  SCORES  (1) 
--~  '  I 
'  Mean  trust  i  in  Scores  I  foreign  ' 
-~"----·----·-- --- -- -------- ,---~----; 
peoples  +  6  +  5  +  4  +  3  +  2  +  1  0  t  - 1  l 
I  I  t  ~-~-
Swiss  1,20  1,16  1,07  1,02  0,98  0,86  0,64 I 
0,86 
Americans  0,85  0,80  0,7 3  o,65  0,54  0,34  0,40  I 0,21 
British  0,61)  0,63  0,44  0,45  0.35  0,24  0,14  J-o ,05 
French  0,40  0.30  0,32  0,20  0,23  0,05  0,08  -0,32 
Germans  0,57  0,26  0,02  -o,lO  -0,27  -o .45  -0,45  l-o,67 
Italians  -0,18  -o,28  -o,  37  -o ·43  -o ,56  -o,6o  '-o  >47 
I  i-1,02 
I 
Russians  -0,54  -0,68  -o,69  -o,87  -o >93  -o,n  -o ,96  i-1,26 
l 
Chinese  -1,07  -1,22  -1,27  -1,24  ·-1,18  -1,17  -1,15  l-1,04 
L_-~--~ 
'  i 
_...__ __  -·  _____ ..._  ----- __  ____J  ------- I 
~ 
(1)  ·rhe  index  of trust has  benn  calculated in  the  follo"ling manner  :  a  great 
deal  of trust = 2,  some  t~1st •  1, not  too  much  trust  •  -1,  no  trust at 
all  =  -2,  other  responoes  = 0. 
~  ~  ---- ~-~-~~- ---~--~--~-~--~  - ~  ~--------~---------------197 
Table  83 
RELATIVE  TRUST  IN  RUSSIANS  AND  CHINESE  BY  THE  RESPONDENTS' 
PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  SCORES 
·-···-·-----·-·----·-- - .. -.-· -·--·.  -·---, 
Difference in degree  of trust in Russians 
ores 
+  6 
+  5 
+  4 
+  3 
+  2 
+ l 
0 
- l 
and  Chinese 
+  0,53 
+  0,54 
+  0,58 
+  0.37 
+  0,25 
+  0,26 
+  0,19 
- 0,22 
'------------------'----·-·--·· ------- -.-
! 
I 
'  I 
~ Graph 7 
MEAN  VALUES  OF  THE  INDEX  OF  TRUST  IN  FOREIGN  PEOPLES  BY 
PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  SCORES 
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c)  DEGREE  OF  FAlllLIARITY  WITH  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES 
As  one  might  have  expected,  the greatest  open-mindedness  toward other 
countries  b;y  persons  111ho  hold a  positive attitude  toward european unification de-
pends  upon their personal  experience.  The  highest scores  on  the pro-european in-
dex  are found among  those groups  in the  population who  have  the means,  and proba-
bly (professional  and other opportunities)  to travel  abroad, 
Table 84  shows  that  there is a  positive correlation between the number 
of countries visited and  the  pro-european attitude index. 200 
Table  84 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX  BY  NUMBER 
Index 
Score 
+  6 
+  5 
+  4 
+  3 
+  2 
+  1 
Indifferent 
Undecided 
- 1 
No  response 
Total 
Mean  Score 
N 
r··-
OF  COUNTRIES  VISITED  (1) 
15  10  16 
19  17  20 
17  17  18 
13  15  13 
11  14  12 
4  6  4 
5  9  4 
3  4  3 
1  2  0 
I ·- ·---- ~---. 
100  100  100 
3tll  2,50  3t09 
--+---------------~-- ----·-------
87 49(x)  2631  2816 
;_ _______ 
1  (x)  Included are  32  responses  ·.~hich were not classified, 
(1)  For sojourns  of at least one  day. 
3  to 5  6  countr:l.es 
countries  or more 
%  % 
16  25 
19  21 
19  20 
18  13 
12  9 
8  6 
3  2 
2  2 
3  2 
--- .  - --------~------- -~ 
100  100  I 
- .. ··-- - ....  _J 
I 
2202  1068 
.1  ... -----
- ··--------·-----------·---' 201 
CONCLUSIONS  AND  PROSPECTS  FOR  ACTION 
Now  at  the  end of this analysis,  we  are able to  summarize,  without  pre-
judice to other analyses  of these data which  might  be  conducted,  the  present fin-
dings  as  follows  1 
1  - One  "European"  out  of  three is very  favorable  to  the unification of 
Europe  ans  he is very little opposed to it. 
To  say,  as  is often heard,  that  three-fourths  of the respondents  among 
the  siX countries in the  European  Community  are  "very  favorable"  or "rather favo-
rable"  to  european unification is not very  meaningful. 
On  the  one  hand,  the question is  to~ general  - WUat  kind of Europe  and 
what kind of unification do  the  respondents  favor  ?  - and,  on  the other hand,  the 
opinions  expressed are  tallied up  as if they ·.vere  of the  same  nature  and of the 
same  intensity, 
Nevertheless,  building an  index  from  several  questions which  form  a  sin-
gle, hierarchical scale allowed us  to  classifY the attitudes by  a  small  number  of 
categories in decreasing magnitudes  of intensity  1 
very  favorable  (+6  and +5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
favorable  (+4  and +3) ••••• 
slightly favorable  (+2  and +3) 
indifferent, undecided or unfavorable 
• 
• 
•  •  •  •  • 
27% 
36% 
24 % 
13% 
Thus  constructed,  the scale locates  responses  on  a  continuum  on which the 
extremes clearly reflect  immuable  attitudes,  but  on  which  the  intermediate positions 
are less stable depending  on  the questions  asked and  on  the  circumstances  prevailing 
at the time  they were  asked (1), 
What  is certain is that  approximately  two  thirds of the  population, bet-
ween  the  ages  of 16  and older,  in the  six countries  of the European  Community, 
would not  be  opposed  to  an  extension of efforts to unite Europe  from  the  sphere of 
(1)  This  is the  reason why  survey  research of this kind should be  periodically re-
peated by asking,  among  others,  the  same  questions used to construct  the  index. 
Another index  might  be better, but it seems  that the  concern for continuity 
prevails  over perfectionism. 202 
economics  to politics,  But  a  large  segment  of  the  public  (60 %)  abstain from  expres-
sing an  opinion about  the  possible effects of european unification,  even  though the-
se effects are more  or less vaguely  believed to  be  positive, 
"Committed"  europeans  are in a  minority.  More  than half of the  public is 
only slightly or not  at  all ready  to  accept  personal  sacrifices to see that the uni-
fication  of Europe  occurs. 
On  the  other lH:nd.,  xi tt,  the  exce  1•ti on  <lf  scnall  organized groups  w:l. th ex-
treme  political vie·Ns,  there is no  real  opposition  •  .ilecause  of their small  nume-
rical size,  these groups  are hard  to  study,  but  they  seem  to  be located more  at  the 
extreme left than  the  extreme  right. 
2  - There  are more  differences  between  recions  and social groups  than 
between countries. 
The  country by  country  differences  observed in attitudes  toward  european 
unification are  lees  strong  than  one  would  have  generally thought  and appear to be 
related more  to differences in present  socio-political,  socio-economic  and socio-
cultural conditions  than to differences in historically determined "mentality". 
This  is the  reason why  we  generally observe stronger mean  differences between re-
gions  within  a  country  than  between  countries  ;  the  differences among  social groupe 
are  even  stronger.  A markedly  favorable  attitude to  the unification of Europe is 
found  much  more  frequently  among  segments  of the  population who,  fer whatever reason, 
are  or feel  advantaged.  Inversely,  slightly or very unfavorable attitudes show  up 
much  more  frequently  among  groups who,  for various  reasons,  are or believe themsel-
ves underprivileged. 
3- Attitudes  toward the  common  ~!arket and,  most  of all, toward  the effects 
expected  are  a  good  te~of attitudes to·,.ard  european unification. 
The  construction of a  serie of attitude scales  allo•Ned  us  to identify va-
rious ·mzys  of be  in!"  pro-european ·:;l.icb  may  be  combined,  to varying degrees,  in the 
same  person and  even  more  so  in  one  and  the  same  social  group or country(l). 
( 1) ·rare  than  any  other  part  of the  analysis,  this  part  deserves closer examination, 
In fact,  the  scales  are,  by  definition,  built  from  responses  to the questions 
asked  ;  undoubte·ily,  other questions 'vould  make  it possible to refine the analy-
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Generally  speaking,  the majority of the public is rather satisfied with 
economic unification  as it has  developed to date  ;  this is especially true forGer-
many  and the Netherlands.  But  a  favorable  attitude toward the  common  Market  depends 
less upon  the  perceived effects than upon  the effects expected  :  the majority of the 
public is incapable of responding  to  the question about  the effecte of the  common 
Market  on  their standard of living.  It is noteworthy  that in countries with already 
high standards  of living like Germany  and the Netherlands,  the proportion of those 
who  expect  favorable  effects  on  their standard of living is smaller than in the  other 
countries. 
An  obviously  favorable  attitude toward  the political unification of Europe, 
which implies  a  readiness  to  accept  sacrifices to achieve this goal,  also implies sa-
tisfaction with the  common  \larket. 
4  - Two  "Europeans"  out  of three  speak out in favor of a  federal  kind 
of  european government. 
Of  the  three  types  of unification  proposed  to  the  respondents,  more  than 
two  thirds of the  european  public  chose  the  one  proposing  a  european government  which 
would handle  the most  important matters, yet leave  to  each national  government  the 
responsibility to deal with the  particular problems  particular to ite own  country. 
5  - Two  "Europeans"  out  of three  favor Great  Britain's membership. 
More  than  two  thirds of the  european public  and  86  %  of  those  persons  ex-
pressing  an  op1n1on  are  favorable  to  Great  Britain's  joining the  common  Market, yet 
this attitude is independent  of attitudes  toward european unification. 
In regard to the  ad.mi ttanoe of other european countries,  the  public of a 
given country is willing to  accept  another country to the extent  that  : 
a)  the  population of this  country is better known  than others, 
b)  the  country is closer than others, 
c) its political  system is more  similar to the  one  the  persons,  lives in 
or prefers, 
d)  one  does  not  attribute motives  of domination  to the  candidate country. 204 
Thus  in France  and  in Italy,  one  observes  the lowest  percentages of res-
pondents  opposed to the admittance of Eastern  european countries.  In the  Federal 
Republic  of Germany,  a  relatively high  percentage  (29  %)  would admit  the Democratic 
Republic  of Germany. 
6 - A majority is in favor of Europe  as  a  "Third Power". 
The  majority of the  european  public is attracted by the  image  of Europe 
perceived as  a  "third power"  -between the United States and the Soviet Union -but 
this majority is less  pronounced in the Netherlands  and Luxembourg, 
The  French public appears more  sensitive to notions  of prestige.  Thus, 
for  a  larger part of this publio, attraction to european unification means  an oppor-
tunity to catch up technologically with the Americans. 
The  motivation of the German  public  draws  its inspiration from  political 
rather than  economic  considerations.  The  Italian public,  on  the contrary, is parti-
cularly sensitive to premises of greater prosperity. 
The  Luxembourg  public is favorable  to  european unification, most  of all, 
because  of the absence  of any  strong resistance.  It expects little change  in its 
present situation. 
The  positive motivation of the Dutch  public is comparable  to that of the 
German  public.  Hmvever,  the existing sort of latent  "nationalism" in the Netherlands 
merits  further study. 
As  for the Belgian  public, it is rather sensitive to the effects of unifi-
cation on its standard of living,  but  the  respondents  expressing an  opinion are  re-
latively less numerous  than in the other countries. 
7 - Obstacles  1  nationalism,  ethnocentrism,  conservatism and the 
techno-bureaucratic  image  of present  day  accomplishments. 
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unification are nationalJ c.•  · :h.:;cen(.nsm and  conservatism as  well  as  the very 
technical, indeed  t echn~-1 ,, r;.,,·.  ''"  t icc,  "haract er  of  present  da;y  european  accom-
plishments. 
The  nationalist  11·:·'· 
than  does  the  pro-europe~x 
hold at  once  nationaliet  v;•  ,,. 
v'.tivn  seems  to fall  more  on  an attitude dimension 
·;cct j  ccc;.  In  other words,  the  same  individual oan 
·.··.~  c dea~ or feelings  favorable  to  european unifi-
cation.  Nevertheless,  Lc- ~ ··+.:' cnc'' :·ct.  ont:! ook  wj_ll  ru.n  counter to his  adopting 
views  reflecting  a  ver;;  7 .,:·:· ··' ··'  ;·c:-.,.,  of united Eur·ope.  Moreover,  there  are 
probably feelingc  of nationo..:  'entity that  are related more  strongly  to the in-
dividual's cultural  iclen+ity  t:.al"  t;o  'll'hat  we  generally consider in Europe  as na-
tionalism or as  an  e:xa~ hti•:•  c,:  n<.tional  feeling.  Measures  favorable  to  econo-
mic  and  monetary  unific<;'cior·  <:TeiOlacement  of national  currency  by  a  european cur-
rency)  and  even  to  ;:o>.:.',•)~:  ·_,,_o;:'jcation  (symbolized by  the adoption  of a  europe-
an flag)  would  be  acceptec.  n  t"8r  mol'S  easily than measures  in favor  of oul tural 
unification, like the  creatlc·>·  ,,f  a  european  Olympic  team.  This sort of ethno-
centrism or at least  ~"is fe<:c·  of a  standardized culture imposed  on all nations 
in an  "integrated"  Europe  n:  counter to a  favorable  attitude  toward  euro-
pean unification than to a  co,,,,,·., .J.,nt  to  too  narrow a  view (or too  rapid a  deve-
lopment)  of integration ;  t. ..•  ·  :,c  ;  ~c.rt  of latent opposition,  especially found 
the  Netherlands,  whi '·'h  rnigc t  Rh•WI  up as hostile responses  whenever  important  de-
cisions  taken  on  matter8  ., •.  '"] · t;  •oaJ  unification and cultural diversity appear 
in danger. 
Pure  C0TIS9TVS.t:, o-T1: 
quo  at all costs  1  is  a  b>>l'J ;. "' 
pean attitudes.  This is  ~"'  "ta • 
pears  as  less favorable. 
'h,c  t;endenc:;  to want  to maintain  the  status 
· .• 1~  c~eation and  the  development  of pro-euro-
• ·Hwon  why  the Belgian public  1  as  a  whole,  ap-
But  the  biggest  obstacle  to  the  development  of pro.,-european attitudes 
----.---"'---· 
seems  to be  the very  image  the great  mass  of the  public has  of present  da;y  achie-
ments,  i.e.  of the  Europe  of  the  common  :.!arket.  This  image  is truly technical 
---------·-·· 
and  even techno-bureaucrat:!:,  st.tractive from  a  rational  point  of view,  yet it 
does  not  appeal  to  one's  i'i;, ·  · ,~·s  for it conv•eys  more  the  image  of administering 
things  than governing  men. 
This  barrier  prever!~.o  ,. , CJ-europea.YJ  ;~ tti  tudes  from  developing both in 
breadth and in intensity.  c;nJoubtedly  this  explains why  the trust  the  public of 
one  Community  country  rl&cec  ,,.  >motner  does  not  depend  at all on whether or not 
the  country  in question  ''''  i. ,_,_,,.-s  ·~o  the  iurope;an  Economic  Community  :  generally 
speaking,  one  places  more  .. ,..,,qt  in the  Sw:iss,  the Americans  or the British than 206 
in the French,  the  Germans  or the Italians.  With  a  view to trust as a  concept 
expressing  an  expectation of both  predictable and favorable behavior on  the  part 
of another party,  a  "Western"  or ".Atlantic"  feeling  presently seems  more  alive 
and kicking than  the feeling of belonging ot the  common  Market. 
8- There  are very weak  relationships between  pro-european attitudes 
and  participation both in political and union life, but  a  strong 
relationship with exposure  to  mass  media. 
Finally,  recall the kinde  of  relatio~ship we  found between  pro-european 
attitudes and  participation in political and union life and exposure  to mass  media. 
a)  On  the whole,  there is scarcely any  apparent  relationship between 
party identification or even  political  tendency  and attitudes toward european ani-
fica ion,  except  perhaps in Germany.  .A  substantial  percentage  of respondents  ex-
pressing a  party  preference  (  31  %  in all the  european  countries,  38% in Italy 
and  46  ~ in Belgium  )  does  not know  whether the representatives of this  party are 
favorable  or not  to the creation of Europe.  If the  political parties were  to a-
dopt  a  more  explicit position on  european problems  and  made  it known  to the public, 
this might  influence,  on  the average,  the vote  of only  one elector out of five 
among  those voters who  express  a  party  preference. 
b)  The  influence of unions  on  the european attitudes of their members 
or their identifiers ie even weaker.  Only  the membeTB  of far left wing unions  in 
France  &nQ  in Italy attribute hostile feelings  about  european unification to the 
leaders of their organization. 
c)  There is a  ver,r  strong relationship between  pro-european attitudes 
and  exposure  to mass  media. 
The  Dutch,  German  and Luxembourg  publics are  among  the most  exposed to 
mass  media  :  in Germany,  television and  radio  are used relatively more  frequently 207 
than in other countries, whereas it is the newspapers  in the Netherlands  and Lu-
xembourg, 
The  publics  of countries where  the mass  media are most  intensively used 
are also better informed about  political problems  and about  the European  Community, 
The  relationship between  exposure  to media and levels of knowledge  is 
strongest for newspapers  and the weakest  for television  :  this does  not  necessa-
rily imply that  television is a  poorer source of information than newspapers,  but 
rather that  persons interested in politics are more  easily inclined to read poli-
tical ne•.vs  in the newspapers  than  are other  people. 
The  index  of exposure  to  the media covaries with the pro-european atti-
tude index  :  the relationship is even stronger for  the daily press considered se-
parately. 
9- Pro-european attitudes are  permissive attitudes. 
In the last analysis,  although  pro-european attitudes are widely spread 
and undoubtedly are solidly implanted in a  large minority of about  30% of the eu-
ropean  public who  are found  among  more  educated,  better informed and more  politi-
zed circles, these  attitudes are  more  permissive  than binding in character.  So 
far,  the  economic unification of Europe has  taken  place in a  relative calm and even 
amidst  a  certain indifference.  For the majority of the  public,  this is a  good 
thing ;  it is more  the  concern  of specialists than  of citizens.  However generally 
accepted it ~  seem,  political unification will not  necessarily  proceed in an at-
mosphere  as  peaceful  as  economic  integration.  To  the extent that specific decisi-
ons  will have  to be  taken,  somme  opposition~ become  visible;  even though  the 
resultant of these  component  forces  is not  easily predictable, it seems  likely that 
favorable views will  prevail for the very  reason that the views· of the most  stron-
gly  committed minority will strengthen in an  atmosphere where  the energy of these 
affective vectors will be  transposed into rational motivations  • 
• 
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Prospects  for an  effective information policy. 
Since  the  aim  of a  study like the research  just presented is to inform 
the actions  of decision-makers,  this question must  be  asked  1  "What  is to be  done?" 
Three  important characteristics of the general  attitude of the  european 
public will allow us  to try to  answer this question  : 
a)  its hopes  for a  change  in society  through  progressive  reforms without 
revolutionary turmoil  :  in each  country  the  partisans  for revolutiona-
ry action does not  exceed 7%  of the total public (in Italy), namely 
bro  times less  than  the ultra-conservatives  (15%  on  the  average); 
b) its hopes  for a  markedly more  democratic  society and for more  direct 
participation in the running of the  country  :  this attitude goes a-
long with a  real  commitment  to  european unification, whereas,  inver-
sely,  an authoritarian attitude is usually accompanied  by  opposite 
tendencies  ; 
o) its greater hopes,  on  the whole,  for security and happiness  than for 
prosperity, for the quality of life and for a  more  humane  society 
than for  the acquisition of new  riches. 
As  '"'e  have  seen,  presently  the political unification of Europe is not  a 
problem of overriding importance in the minds  of the  european public.  This is 
probably  one  of the  reasons  why  political parties in most  of the countries abstain 
from  trueing clear cut  positions  on  this issue or  from  giving detailed planks  on 
this problem in their programs.  But,  on  the other hand,  the reticence  sho·m by 
political parties with  respect  to integration involving  the  progressive creation 
of_  a  european political  system going beyond simple  economic  and monetary union is 
one  of the major  causes for the public's relative lack of interest.  Thus  ws  find 
ourselves in a  vicious circle that  must  be  broken  (1). 
(1)  From  this  point  of view,  candidate countries  for membership - Great Britain, 
Ireland,  Denmark  and  Norw~ - hold a  privileged position.  In these countries, 
the European  cause  has  often given w~ to  passionate political  debates in the 
parliaments,  inside parties  and in the press  ;  this has  hardly  ever happened 
in the  case  of the first six member  states.  Soon  after these countries'  entry 
into the Community,  it will  be  interesting to  study what  was  the effect of 
thie  phenomenon  on  the nature  and  the intensity of attitudes toward european 
unification. 209 
This  study has shown  that  E>uropean  unification has  reached a  point in 
its development where if leaders want  more  progress,  they will have to take the 
risk of politicizing public  debate.  It seems  likely that  a  regression in attitu-
des  favorable  to unification,  observed in certain cases of the  sudden appearance 
of serious  problems  which  cannot  be  solved to  the satisfaction of all the govern-
ments  at the same  time (for example,  in the  case of a  monetary crisis), would  be 
far less serious if the views  of these  problems  and  their solutions were politi-
oi· ed  to a  greater degree,  namely  if the most  varied kinds  of men  and groups in-
volved in the  developing  process of the entire mu1tinational  system were  to beco-
me  conscious  of the  aims,  the plans  and  the means  they have  in common  as members 
concerned about  the  cohesion and  longevity of this gloval society, 
This  politization should find both its expression and its stimulus in· 
the  existence of a  european  assembly  elected via direct universal  suffrage, i.e. 
qy  all citizens of voting age. 
From  the solely social-psychological  point of view we  adopted here,  and 
taking as given that  the creation of a  european political system is a  desirable 
end,  there is no  doubt  that as  long as  the  communal,  regional or national vote of 
an  elector cannot  be influenced,  however slightly,  qy  european tensions or con-
flicts, the decisions  taken at this level,  no  matter the nature or the aim, will 
be  of little concern  to  the  public because of their very diplomatic  na~ure. 
• 
In a  diplomatic debate,  solutions are negociated between government  spo-
kesmen.  In a  political debate,  they  are  discussed between  spokesmen  for  the citi-
zens,  political parties and interest groups. 
The  first kind of negociation gives  too much  weight  to a  single varia-
ble, namely  the interests of the national  communities  each  taken separately- a 
gross simplification  I  - as  an  integral whole,  In an  elected european assembly, 
this variable will undoubtedly  remain important,  but there would be more  opportu-
nity for other variables to become  manifest,  for interests would overlap either 
in opposition or in harmony,  one  to  the other across  national borders, whatever 
the  decision-making procedures,  When  confronted with european  problems,  a  German 
elected official will probably react as  a  German,  a  French representative ae  a 
Frenchman,  yet in the face of other problems,  he  will  respond as  a  progressivist 
or a  conservative,  as a  oentraliser or a  decentraliser,  ae  a  socialist, a  liberal, 
a  christian-democrat, or also as  a  communist  or a  nationalist. 210 
In other words,  the politization of european unification would  allow numerous 
transnational ties to  find one  another,  to be  created and to manifest  themselves, 
which is a  necessary  condition for the formation  of strongly held attitudes (in-
deed,  favorable attitudes, in our opinion)  toward unification. 
Practically, this means  that, first of all, one  would have  to stimulate 
the  demand  for the creation of an elected european assembly  endowe4  with real  po-
wers.  This  demand  can be  expressed only by  existing groups  or political parties 
who  are the first that one  has  to  persuade.  They  could be  more  easily persuaded 
if they knew  that planks in a  program for the political unification of EUrope  car-
ried weight,  at least potentially,  as an electoral  argument  (1). 
(1)  These  lines were written·well before the publication of the so-called the 
"Rapport Vedel"  (Brussels, March  25, 1972).  There is a  striking convergence 
of conclusions.  This report notes that "the Parliament of the european Commu-
nity shows  a  considerable amount  of democratic representation.  The  great po-
·litical tendencies of the member-states  find a  place there.  Moreover,  their 
regrouping at the european level is not  negligible,  although there are still 
some  lacunae( ••• ).  Yet  this representation finds its expression in a  closed 
circle.  The  debates and work  of the Parliament,  the manifest  tensions  them-
selves which  are proof of a  political institution, hardly find an echo in the 
press,  in public opinion or in the life of the political parties.  Therefore, 
the Parliament  carries out  only very imperfectly the functions  of expressing 
and  shaping political opinion normally  incumbent  upon  a  parliament.  11  (page  35) 
The  nVedel  Report" underlines  two  very important  deficiencies in the  european 
Parliament  :  the  "na=owness of its powers,  on  the one  hand,  and the method 
of appointing its members,  on  the other.  It is underscored that "direct elec-
tion would  strongly contribute to  the democratization of the common  order and, 
henceforth, its legitimacy". 
"An  electoral  process offered to the peoples of EUrope  would,  undoubtedly, 
represent a  force for unification because it would,  at one  and the  same  time, 
encourage  the mobilization of the existing parties  around political issues on 
a  european scale and stimulate the  formation of larger groupings  drawn  toge-
ther from  the diverse political tendencies  represented in the member. states." 
(Page 6a,  our italics). 211 
The  results of this study  show  us  not  only that it is now  neoessar,y 
to take the risk of politizing the  process  and democratizing the proceedings in 
the unification of Europe  by giving powers  to an elected, representative assembly. 
It also shows  that it would be  possible to let eventual  tensions and conflicts 
increase to the point  that  the political passions  of the elected candidates and 
the mass  public become  actively involved in the  process.  In other words,  the mo-
ment  seems  appropriate (still taking as given that political integration is a  de-
sirable goal)  to let issues of "high politics"  (foreign affairs,  defence,  etc  ••• ) 
enter the public arena, without  forgetting  thoE,e  concerning the very type  of socio-
political organization (union or federation,  ce•ntralization, etc  ••• )  or the future 
of our societies and o:f'  mankind  (growth,  environment,  etc.). 
Should this run  the risk of  increasir~ the number  o:f'  outspoken opponents, 
of bringing latent opposition to light  and  arousing  polemical  debates,  it is a  risk 
we  have to take.  Indeed,  this is the only way  to finally get  the majority of citi-
zens who  are at least occasionally or somewhat  interested in politics to take seri-
ously the uniting of Europe  so  that it is supported by  a  truly popular movement  1 
otherwise, it appears  to  the  "man-in-the-street" or even the "rank-and-file mili-
tant" as the  technioo-bureaucratic  execution of decisions  taken in high quarters 
- or be it, as is said,  "at the  summit"  - for J.ssues which  do  not  appear to be of 
concern to them  in their everyday  lives. 
Generally,  as we  have  seen,  the  part:L11ans  of the unification of Europe 
are  more  sensitive to the issues of democratic values,  to the quality of life and 
the humaniZation of society than  are  the oppon<mts.  This  means  that  the  present 
institutions of the  Community  and  the  economic  goals set by  already existing trea-
ties have  only been  accepted temporarily,  for lack of anything better, as  one might 
say.  Yet,  among  the most  ardent  partisans of 11nification, there is a  latent, per-
haps increasing,  impatience with the goals  proposed and the institutional setting, 
an impatience which reflects three aspirations  :  more  democracy,  more  oonoern for 
the quality of life and more  transnational integration at the european level. 
Practically, it would  be  timely to make  public,  at short notice,  concrete 
projects concerning relatively straight forwar•i goals for  the mid-run which are 
easy to understand and  to  popularize.  In so  s•,ing,  priority should be given to 
goals which  respond to the three aspirations above  and,  moreover,  which reflect 
areas of action where  the impotence  of the  "in•iepe::ldent  and sovereign"  national 212 
State is easily perceptible, if not  already clearly perceived (1). 
If the  problems  of european unification were  politized in this w~, it 
would obviously  ne  necessary  to foresee  the  probable  reactions  of the  forces  pre-
sent.  The  conch.tsions  drawn  from  this study deal  only with the  six "founding" 
countries  of the  European  Community,  but we  have  no  reason to  think that  the dis-
tribution of attitudes differs very much  in the four countries  presently in the 
process  of joining the  Community.  In any  case,  a  si~lar survey  ought  to be un-
dertaken as  soon as  possible after their membership  becomes  effective. 
We  clearly find the most  ardent  partisans of european unification among 
the relatively privileged groups  of the  population.  Nevertheless,  this does  not 
imply that  these groups  are conservative.  On  the  contrary, we  discovered progres-
sive,  indeed protest,  vie1vs  among  what  ought  to  be  called the bourgeois  classes, 
especially among  youth.  )fore  conservative about  acquired status  even when it ho-
pes  for more  change  in the  production and distribution of wealth,  the working 
class  seems  to us  as  opposed,  on  the whole,  to  taking any kind of risk.  The  far-
mers,  ''lho  represent  about  10 %  of the entire electorate in the six  me111ber  states 
and certainly less in a  community  which included Great  Britain,  share  two  kinds 
of attitudes  determined by  many  variables which,  in the last analysis,  probably 
have  more  of a  conservative  than  a  progressive effect. 
For unwavering as  well  as  moderate supporters of Europe, it would be 
>rise  to  explain the  aims,  the  plans  and  the means  of unification to  them in a  lan-
guage  they will understand  ( 2 ), 
With respect  to the opponents  of european unification, we  know  they 
are presently  found at both extremes  of the traditional  "left-right"  continuum 
and are more  to the left than to the right.  Does  this  mean  that  there exist so-
me·  segments  of the  population 1vhich  are  opposed to  the  w~  Europe has  been uni-
fied so far,  i.e.  to  the  common  Market,  but which,  on  the other hand,  would  be 
favorably  predisposed to  take  an  active part in plans for political unification ? 
(l) Of  course,  other projects might  be  presented even if they were  less easily 
accepted by the majority of the  population representing "the european  people"  ; 
for  example,  this is the case of common  policy for  development  aid,  which we 
know  finds  real  support  only  among  minorities. 
(2)  One  never insists enough  on the language  problems  in political communication. 
Public officials,  necvspapers,  radio  and television often  prove incapable of 
expressing themselves in a  language  and in a  style ''lhich are adapted to modern 
menas  of communications  and understandable to  the  recipients. The  findings  of this study give no  clues  to  this question,  At  first 
sight,  one  might  expect find such  an attitude among  a  progressive,  internationa-
list, anti-capitalist intellectual elite, in short  - among  protesters.  However, 
no  clear alternative positions  on  european integration are found in these groups. 
At  the  present  time,  the  problems  of concern to  these groups  probably  do  not of-
fer anchoring  points  for fixed attitudes toward european unification. 
A cenainty is that the  readiness  to  make  a  commitment  in favor of eu-
ropean unification is systematically accompanied by a  hostile position  toward an 
eventual  abandonment  of the  common  Market  as it exists  tod~  •.  Therefore, it is 
around  favorable attitudes toward  the  present  European Community  that we  have  the 
best possibility of seeing favorable  attitudes  toward  the political unification 
of Europe crystallize. 
One  final  word  about youth.  It would  be mistaken to count  too much 
on  the active support  of youth in the efforts to bring about  political unifica-
tion and,  especially,  the  creation of an  elected assembly.  The  pro-european at-
titude of youth must  be  attributed much  more  to  the  absence of traditional kinds 
of resistance (nationalism,  ethnocentrism and,  to  a  certain extent,  conservatism) 
than to the attraction of european  and  democratic ideas. 
Among  the youngest  cohorts  (11  to 12  years old), we  observed the exis-
tence of a  state of mind which is not  the most  favorable to the development  of 
pro-european feelings,  nor to a  political  nommitment  in favor of european unifi-
cation.  In order to  modify  this situation in the relatively short  run,  educators 
and leaders of social movements  in education,  on  one side,  and  producers of radio 
and television programe,  on  the other,  must  be associated with  an intensive and 
concerted action program.  The  vain division separating the two  is harmfUl  to  the 
achievement  of works  which  should be  shared in common.  Moreover,  the sharing of 
this work  in a  joint  program  should contribute to carrying out  a  policy of conti-
nous  education which would  allow  each  and every  one  to  develop his  personality to 
his  own  liking throughout  life in his work  or in his leisure time activities u,y 
combining  them with  the digestion of information,  the resumption of studies and 
the  enhancement  of personal  experience. 
The  program  of action to be  conceived and carried out  might  deal with 
the  problems,  the  obstacles and the  consequences  of the uniting of Europe,  the 
role of nations,  regions  and countries in a  united Europe,  and the strength and 
the responsibilities of this united Europe in the world.  Without  fanfare,  yet 
without  timourness. 214 
No  matter from what  angle we  approaoh the  problems  at the center of 
this study on  the  determinants of favorable attitudes  toward the unification of 
Europe,  we  come  to the  conclusion that  the worst  possible position of rulers and 
other decision makers  would be to tack back and forth in the obscure waters of 
these  tacitly opposing currents of opinion,  Realism in democraoies  seems  to oo-
me  down  on  the side of audacity rather than timourness,  yet the choices  proposed 
must  be explicitly defined.  The  peoples  of Europe,  as known  tod~, have  almost 
come  of an  age  and  a  consciousness that we  should beware  of underestimating, .A  I 
APPENDICES A  2 
Appended  Table 1 
THE  IMAGE  OF  THE  UNITED  STaTES  OF  EUROPE  :  HOPES  AND  FEARS  (1) 
{complete results for persons  aged 16  and  older) 
1.  I  ann proud to be  ( • • •  name 
the respondent's nationality) 
- strongly agree 
- agree 
- disagree 
- strongly disagree 
- don't know  or no  response 
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4,  In the United States of Europe, 
the most  underprivileged seg-
ments  of the  population would 
have better chances  to  improve 
their status. 
strongly agree 
- agree 
disagree 
- strongly  disagree 
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27  26  I  21  i  26 
1  30  15 
23 
24 
36  - disagree 
- strongly disagree 
15  I  13 i  11  :  11  10  21 
11  8  I  9 
1  14  :  13  21  8 
I 
- don't know  or no  response  15  I  13  I  20  I  15  19  18  9 
Total 
1--+'  --+,----:----'-,  -t---+--i 
100  '  100  i  100  100  !  100  100  100  i 
7,  Nothing_c_an  __  b_e_d_o_n_e-to  __  c_h_ang---e--+----~----~----~~----~~,:---~----+-----,.il 
the  fact  that  the strong al- II 
ways  rule over  the weak.  I  '  ! 
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8.  I  have nothing, in principle, 
against  foreign workers,  but 
there are really too  many  in 
our country. 
- strongly agree 
- agree 
- disagree 
- strongly disagree 
- don't know  or no  response 
Total 
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9.  All is well with us  and the 
way  things are,  so  why  change? 
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- disagree 
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The  unification of Europe!  i 
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speak  different  languages; 
- strongly agree  6i 
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- disagree  29! 
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Appended  Table  2 
THE  DEGREE  OF  IMPORTANCE  ATTACHED  TO  VARIOUS  SOCio-POLITICAL  GOALS 
(2)  (complete  results for persons aged 16 years and older) 
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- absolutely  essential objective 
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(2) See  pp.  113 to 117. A 7 
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Appended  Table  3 
DEGREE  OF  TRUST  IN  ]'OREIGN  PEOPLES  ( 3) 
(  complete  results for  persons  aged 16  and older  ) 
·---- ---·-~-~ --~--------r 
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I 
I 
----
I 
l  I 
. 
i  2.  Americans  i 
I  !  I 
'  '  '  - a  lot of trust  23  '  29  25  12 
I  24  27  22  ' 
l 
I  I 
I 
i  - some  trust  '  46  48  44  47 
I  43  44  53 
I  - little trust  17  13  14  25  I 16  14  16 
'  .  - no  trust at all 
l  6  4  7  •  7  I 
9  4  3  '  I  I 
I 
I  -don't know  or no  response  •  8  6  10  9  8  11  6  '  ;  I  !  '  I  I  i·-- I  --. --
'  100  !  I 
Total  ; 100  100  • 100  100  I  100  100 
! 
I  i 
I  I  I  I 
I 
3.  '  British  I  I  I 
' 
I  ! 
I 
'  - a  lot of trust  12  17  19  i  6  9  l3  ll I  - some  trust  49  55  51  I 
49  40  52  50 
I 
I 
- little trust  21  17  i  1~  26  24  16  23  I  I  I 
~ no  trust at all  ~  5  7  9  14  7  ll l  I 
!  I  '  - don't know  or no  9  6 
I  10  10  '  13  12  5  response  I  j  - ---·  +  ---· 
Total  100  100  1100  100 r  100  100  100 
I 
I  I 
I 
'  '  4.  French 
I 
!  I 
! 
6  - a  lot of trust  8  10  I 
23  4  l3 
- some  trust  44 
I  48  51  39  50  45  .  '  !  - little trust  26  '  27  11  32  20  29  i 
'  I 
- no  trust at all  10  6  I  6  i  13  8  10  !  i  -don't know  or no  rssponse  10  7  '  9  i  '·  12  9  10 
j  i  I 
I 
I  .  - ··---
; 
I 
Total  __ jlOO 
; 
100  i 100  100  100  100 
I  .l  ..  -·---· 
(3)  See  pp.  116 - 121. Germans 
- .a  lot of trust 
- some  trust 
- little trust 
- no  trust at all 
-don't know  or no  response 
Total 
6.  Italians 
- a  lot of trust 
- some  trust 
- little trust 
- no  trust at all 
- don't know  or no  response 
Total 
---------------·--- -- .. - ---
1.  Russians 
- a  lot of trust 
- some  trust 
- 1i  ttle trust 
- no  trust at all 
- don't know  or no  response 
Total 
8.  Chinese 
- a  lot of trust 
- some  trust 
- little trust 
- no  trust at all 
-don't know  or no  response 
Total 
N 
10 
35 
25 
21 
9 
100 
B 
14 
38 
17 
22 
9 
'  100 
' 
! 
F 
' 
i  -· 
% 
!  9 
!  39 
I  26 
I  17 
I  9 
100 
--------· 
I 
I 
3  3 i  4  (  3 
28  23  37  31 
37  41  27  i  33 
22  24  19 
I 
I  21 
10  9  1 
·  100  ; -loo·-t--1oo 
3  i  12 
_j  ·-·· ---
I  100 
' 
I  -;- -·t-- -+-
4 
19  i 
32  1 
36  I 
9 ; 
1 
2  ! 
'  15  I 
33  I 
43 
7 
3 
6 
3 
17 
2 
4 
11 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I  ._ 
100  I  100  100 
- t 
l  I 
I 
2  1  '  1 
7 l  61  7 
19 i  21  i  14 
54 l  55 !  5 
1s  ~  17 I  19 
l-i 
9 
100  i  100 '  10  0 
l 
I 
I  j  j 
..__...____~_  -- --1--
4 
25 
36 
24 
11 
-~---
100 
1 
8 
21 
50 
20 
100 
i  8752 ! 2021 i 129  8  ! 2046 
i 
--------------· !  . - -- I 
A 10 bia 
I  I  L  N  I 
% 
i  % 
"' 
11  1  10 
I 
28  26  50 
25  28  21 
26  33  12 
10  11  7 
100  100  100 
I 
I 
I 
I 
2  3  I 
24  I 
29 
I 
I  i 
I 
36 
I 
I 
41  i  •  I 
25  I 
14  I 
13  13 
100  100 
6  1  3 
19  10  21 
29  30  31 
36  49  36 
10  10  9 
100  100  100 
3  1  1 
7  4  7 
15  13  19 
57  65  56 
18  17  17 
100  100  100 
1822  335  1230 Index  Total 
Score 
% 
+  6  12 
+  5  15 
+ 4  19 
+  3  l7 
+ 2  13 
+  1  11 
Indifferent  4 
Undecided  5 
- 1  3 
No  reply  1 
Total  100 
Mean  score  3,11 
N  8749  . 
~ 
e  pp.  1  94  - 1  98 
Appended  Table  4 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  SCORES  ON  THE  PRO-EUROPEAN  ATTITUDE  INDEX 
BY  DEGREE  OF  TRUST  IN  FOREJGN  PEOPLES 
Americans  (U.S.A.) 
A lot of  Some  Little  No  O.K.  A lot of  Some 
trust  trust  trust  trust  N.A.  trust  trust 
%  %  %  %  %  %  % 
16  12  11  6  5  17  16 
17  17  14  10  7  11  20 
20  21  18  15  11  16  23 
l7  18  18  15  13  18  16 
12  13  16  14  13  13  11 
9  9  12  19  15  12  8 
4  4  3  6  7  3  2 
3  3  4  7  21  4  2 
2  3  4  8  4  6  2 
0  0  0  0  4  0  0 
100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
3,43  3,27  3,02  2,30  1,93  3,07  3,64 
1970  4062  1480  539  698  299  1675 
Russians 
Little  No  O.K. 
trust  trust  N.A. 
%  %  % 
13  9  7 
17  13  11 
20  17  13 
19  18  14 
13  15  13 
9  12  14 
3  6  7 
3  5  16 
3  5  2 
0  0  3 
100  100  100 
3,32  2,78  2,22 
2751  3191  833 
>-' -~F-·-·  -~-----·------- ---~--- -=•=~--~-=--=-- -:~=---~-'" o~---~~- .  -
Index  Italians  Germans 
-
Scores  I 
Total  A  I  ot of  Some  Little  No  D. K.  Total  A'  lot of  c-C'mn  Little  No  D. K. 
trust  trust  trust  trust  N.A.  trust  trust  trust  trust  N.A. 
%  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
+  6  12  20  16  13  8  6  10  20  14  8  4  4 
+  5  15  17  18  15  12  10  15  20  19  13  10  9 
+  4  18  19  20  18  17  14  19  20  22  21  17  13 
+  3  17  15  17  17  17  15  18  20  18  20  19  14 
+  2  14  12  12  15  16  13  14  9  12  15  16  14 
+  1  11  9  9  11  14  14  11  7  8  12  16  15 
Indifferent  5  1  4  4  5  7  4  1  3  4  4  7 
Undecided  5  4  3  4  5  16  5  1  2  4  7  16 
- 1  3  3  1  3  6  4  3  2  2  3  6  3 
No  reply  0  - - - 0  1  1  0  0  0  1  5 
-
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
-~ 
Mean  score  3,06  3,56  3,49  3,14  2,67  2,25  3,04  3,87  3,51  2,96  2,43  2,16 
I 
-
N  6927  197  2007  2492  1423  808  6730  672  2497  1564  1372  625 
I  ·-- ---- ·~- -------
------~.-
t  > 
~ ·--~--- -~  '~~--- -----.  ~--.. ------- -"---- "------o-=--
French 
Index 
score  A  lot  of  Some  Little  No 
Tdtal  trust  trust  trust  trust 
%  %  %  %  % 
+  6  13  17  15  13  10 
+  5  16  18  17  16  14 
. + 4  19  20  21  20  14 
+  3  17  17  17  18  18 
+ 2  12  11  13  12  13 
+ 1  10  9  8  9  15 
Indifferent  4  3  4  5  4 
Undecided  5  3  3  3  5 
- 1  3  2  2  4  7 
No  reply  1  0  0  0  0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
Mean  score  3' 19  3,52  3,42  3,21  2,74 
N  6703  694  3059  1712  610 
-~-- L--~-------- ----~----- '~----- --
~ 
~~ - ..,.= -- --=- -- ~---- - - --- --- --------~·· 
Chinese 
O.K.  A  lot of  Some  Li tt  I  e 
N.A.  Total  trust  trust  trust 
%  %  %  %  % 
6  12  22  18  15 
11  15  15  16  19 
12  19  12  19  21 
13  17  12  19  16 
11  13  13  13  13 
14  11  10  7  9 
8  4  3  3  3 
20  5  2  2  2 
2  3  10  3  2 
3  1  1  0  0 
100  100  100  100  100 
2,19  3,11  3,20  3,51  3,50 
. 
628  8749  145  618  1588 
No 
trust 
% 
11 
15 
20 
18 
13 
11 
5 
4 
3 
0 
----~ 
100 
-
3,09 
-
4822 
D. K. 
N.A. 
% 
9 
13 
14 
16 
14 
13 
5 
11 
3 
2 
100 
2,66 
1576 
I 
I 
I 
' 
I 
I 
I 
--
-
_j 
I 
I 
I 
> 
>-' 
'-"' Annex  5 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(French version) 
INTEffi<ATIONAL  RESEARCH  ASSOCIATES-EUROPA 
4,  rue  de  la Chancellerie 
1000  BRUXELLES 
Ask  the questions  orally 
and  textually,  Write  down 
the full  response and/or 
circle the appropriate code. 
INT.  FOR  THE  INTRODUCTION,  SEE  YOUR  INSTRUCTIONS, 
A  14 
No'v  I 1 d  like to ask you the  composition of your household by  age  and sex, 
Would  you  please start with the oldest  docvn  to  the youngest,  not  forgetting, 
of course,  to count yourself, 
INT.  CIRCLE  THE  LETTER  CODE  OF  THE  R ON  THE  THIRD  LINE. 
2,  R's  Occupation  1  - farmer 
- salaried farm  help 
- head of firm 1  upper management,  eneineer 
- high civil servant,  professional 
-merchant,  craftsman  (artisan) 
-white collar worker,  mid-management,  low  or middle 
ranking civil servant 
- '.Vorker 
- student 
- housS\rife 
retired 
3  Occupation of head of household  : 
farmer 
salaried farm help 
- head of firm 1  upper management,  engineer 
- high civil servant,  professional 
-merchant,  craftsman (artisan) 
- '.Vhi te collar worker,  mid-management 1  low or middle 
ranking civil  servant 
- '.vorker 
- student 
- housewife 
- retired 
4.  Language usually spoken by 
the head of household  : 
Dutch 
French A 15 
5.  What  kind of educational institution did you last or are you now  attending  ? 
primary  school 
6.  Commune  1 
a  secondary college,  athenaeum or high school 
a  technical  or vocational  school 
a  non-university centre of higher education 
a  university or similar institution 
other (specify)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Province  1 
7.  Do  you know  the  names  of the countries 'Nhich  are  members  of the  common  Market, 
i.e.  of the European Economic  Co~nunity to use its official name  ?  (INT  :  DO  NOT 
PROMPT.  GIVE  THE  R.  TIME  TO  THINK.  WRITE  DOWN  ALL  THE  COUNTRIES  N.AYED.) 
a.  Suppose  a  referendum were  held today  in the  countries  of the common  Market  to 
decide upon  the  following issued.  Ho'N  would you vote  ?  Are  you for or against 
the  common  Market  evoluing  to',vard  the  creation of a  United States of Europe  ? 
for 
against 
don't know  (D.K.  ,  N.R.) 
9.  Are  you for or  ~ainst the entry  of Great  Britain into the  common  Market  ? 
for 
against 
D.K.  ,  N.R. 
10.  Are  you for or against the election of a  european  parliament  b,y  direct universal 
suffrage, i.e.  a  parliament  elected by all  the citizens of the member  countries  ? 
for 
against 
D.K. ,  N. R. 
11.  Would you accept  that  above  the  Belgian government  there be  a  European govern- • 
ment  responsible for  common  policy in the  areas of foreign affairs,  defense, 
and  economic  questions  ? 
for  (would accept) 
against  (would not  accept) 
D.K.,  N. R. 
• A 16 
12.  In the  event  of the election of a  president  of the United States of Europe 
by universal  suffrage, would you vote for a  candidate who  isn't a  Belgian 
if you  felt his personality and  program better suited your opinions  than tho-
se of Belgian candidates  ? 
- would vote for a  non-Belgian candidate 
-would not 
- D.K.,  N.R. 
13.  Would  you  say you're ver,r  favorable,  somewhat  favorable,  somewhat  unfavorable, 
or ver,r unfavorable  toward  european unification  ? 
- ver,r  favorable 
somewhat  favorable 
indifferent 
somewhat  unfavorable 
ver,r  unfavorable 
D.K.,  N. R. 
14.  Would  you be  favorable,  opposed or indifferent to the  proposal  that •••• 
the Belgian money  be  replaced 
b,y  a  european currency 
the Belgian olympic  team  sent 
to the next  games  be  dissolved 
into a  european team 
the Belgian flag be  replaced 
by  a  european flag in impor-
tant  ceremonies 
favorable 
1 
1 
1 
opposed 
2 
2 
2 
indifferent  D.K.,  N. R. 
3  4 
3  4 
3  4 
15.  Among  the  following countries which are not members  of the common  Market, are 
there  any you'd like to see  join  ?  Which  ones  ?  (HAND  OVER  CARD  A) 
1.  Denmark 
2.  Spain 
3.  East  Germany 
4.  Poland 
5.  USSR 
6.  Switzerland 
None  of those 
D.K. ,  N. R. 
J.._.)f A 17 
16.  Regarding the different wats  of Europe  may  unifY,  which of these three 
do  you  prefer  ? 
1.  "There's no  european government,  but  the governments  of each  country 
should meet  regularly to decide upon  common  policy." 
2.  "There's  a  european government  which  takes care of important matters,  but  • 
each country keeps its own  govern>tent  to handle  i te  own  special  problems," 
3.  "There's a  european government  which takes care of all important matters 
and the member  countries  no  longer have  national governments." 
None  of these ways 
D.K.,  N. R. 
17.  If to-morrow you were  told that  the  common  ~arket is being abandoned,  would 
you feel very  sorry,  a  little sorry,  indifferent or relieved  ? 
very  sorry 
a  little sorry 
indifferent 
relieved 
D. K. ,  H. R. 
16.  Would  you be willing to make  certain personal  sacrifices,  financially for 
example,  to  ensure that  european unification takes  place  1  would you be very, 
somewhat,  hardly or not  at all willing to  do  this  ? 
very willing 
- somewhat  w:i lling 
hardly willing 
not  at all willing 
D.K.,  N.R. 
19.  Do  you think that  so  far the  common  :.!arket  has  had  a  very  favorable,  some-
what  favorable,  somewhat  unfavorable,  or very  unfavorable  effect  on your 
standard of living ? 
very willing 
some•.vhat  willing 
hnrdl·:  'Villing 
not at all •Rilling 
D.K.,  ];.R. 
20,  .A:re  you satisfied with your  present  living conditione  ? 
- Yes 
No 
- D.K.,  N.R. 
21.  Do  you think your living conditions vlill  improve  a  lot during  the next  fi..-ve 
years  ?  Yes 
No 
D,K,,  N.R. 
• A 18 
22.  Talking  about  the United States of Europe,  one  hears  a  lot of things.  I'm 
going  to  read a  certain number  of opinions  one  hears.  For each  one,  I'd like 
to know  '~hether you strongly agree,  agree,  disagree  or strongly disagree. 
; StronglJ  .Agree  Disagree  Strongly  D.K., 
agree  disagree  N.R. 
1)  I'm  proud to  be  a  Belgian  1  2  3  4  5 
2)  The  United States  of Europe should  I 
become  a  third power as  strong as  the 
l 
I 
'  United States of America  and  the USSR  1 
I  2  3  4  5  i 
t  '  3)  All is well  with us  and the way  things 
are,  so why  change  ?  1  I  2  3  4  I  5 
4)  The  United States of Europe  would  be  a  I  first step toward world government 
which would  abolish war  1  2  3  4  5 
5)  The  unification is impossible because  '  I 
'  ; 
•.ve  speak  different  languages  1  2  3  4  I  5 
I 
6)  In  the United States of Europe,  the  ! 
' 
cost of living would  be  higher and  l 
there'd be  a  bigger risk of unemplo- '  I 
1  .  2  3  4  5 
' 
7)  Nothing can be  changed about  the  fact  '  I 
that  the  strong al  ''TB;V"S  rule  over  the  '  ' 
2~  I 
weak  1  4  5 
8)  In the setting of the United States  '  i 
of Europe,  european scientists could  '  I  I 
catch up with Americans  1  '  2  l  3  4  J 
5 
9)  I've got nothing,  in principle, 
I  I 
against foreign workers  but  there 
're really too  many  of them  in 
our country  1  ',  2  I 
3  4  l 
5 
I  I  l  10.  In the United States of Europe,  the  I 
I 
different.  peoples  run the risk of 
I  ' 
' 
I 
'  losir.g what's distinctive about  their  '  2  3 
1TB;V"  of life  1  I  4  5  : 
I  ! 
'· 
ll.  In the United States of Europe,  the  ' 
most  privileged segments of the  popu-l 
j  I 
! 
lation will  have better chances  of 
j  improving their status  1  2  3  4  5 
12.  In the United States of Europe,  the  I 
standard of living will  probably  be  I 
higher  1  2 
I 
3  4  5  ' A 19 
23.  Now  I'm going  to name  some  things  people may  like to see get  done.  For each 
one,  please tell me  if you  strongly hope it gets done, if you  feel  indifferent 
about ir or if you  tend to  be  against it. 
(INT  :  HAND  OVER  CARD  B) 
strongly  Indifferent  Against  D.K. , 
hopes  N,R.  _______________  , ___  -- ----------
1)  that  Belgium have  a  strong arli\Y  1  2  3  4 
-------- - -------- ---~- ··--
2)  that  there  be  no  more  world ware  1  I  2  3  4 
- --- - ------
3)  that  I  live in a  free  cour:>try  where  ! 
; 
'  everyone  can  freely  say what  he  thinks·  1  l  2  3  4 
----------------------. --"  - ----- -·- -- ------ -----<-- -----
-
'  4)  that I  can  travel  freely  in all  coun- '  ' 
I 
'  ! 
tries 1~ithout any  red tape 
!  1 
;  2  3  4  '  ---· -------------+--- -------~----------. 
I 
·-------
5)  that  Belgium  play  a  major role in  I 
world politics  1  I  2  I  3  4  I 
6)  that  I  haven't  any  financial  troubles 
\ 
I 
i  in buying a  car or a  house,  for  ex. am- ' 
ple  I  1  2  '  3  4 
7)  that  Belgium make  great  scientific  l 
'  I 
discoveries  '  1 
I  2  3  4  i  ' 
24.  Recently  there have  been large  student  demonstrations in many  countries. 
Generally speaking,  do  you  feel  very  favorable,  somewhat  unfavorable or very 
unfavorable  toward students who  demonstrate  ? 
- very  favorable 
- somewhat  favorable 
- somewhat  unfavorable 
- very unfavorable 
-D.K.,N.R. 
25.  On  this card  (SHOW  THE  CaRD)  are  three basic kinds  of attitudes via-a-vis 
the society we  live in.  Please  chose  the  one  which beat describes your own 
opinion. 
1) The  entire way  our  society is organized must  be radically changed by  revo-
lutionary  action. 
2)  Our society must  be  gradually  improved by  intelligent reform. 
3)  Our  present  society must  be valiantly defended against all subversive 
forces. 
4)  Don't know,  No  Response. 
• 
• 
• A  20 
26.  a)  Now  I'd like to  suggest  a  certain number  of concrete goals to you.  (INT  a 
HAND  OVER  CARD  D),  0£  the follo'dng  things,which are the  two  you feel are 
the most  desirable  ? 
1.  Ensure greater job security 
2.  Make  our society more  humane 
3.  Increase wages 
4.  Ensure the participation of workers  in business management. 
b)  :INT.  HAND  OVER  CARD  E)  And  of the following  things, which are  the~  you 
feel  are the most  desirable  ? 
1.  Maintain  law and  order 
2,  Improve  the participation of citizens in political decisions of the 
government 
3.  Fight rising prioes 
4,  Guarantee  the  freedom  of speeoh,  so  that  everyone  can freely say what 
he  thinks. 
27.  Now  I'd like to ask you some  questions  about  the trust that different  peoples 
throughout  the world instill in you,  I'll read the names  of different  peoples 
and  please tell me  if you  have a  lot, some,  little or no  trust at all in them, 
You  can answer with the help of this card,  (INT.  HAND  OVER  CARD  F) 
j  ~--A--l-ot  __  o_f  __  !_s_o_m_e  ____  L_i_t;;e·-.-N-o----~~--D-.-K-.-,-1 
I 
I  trust  trust  trust  trust  !l.  R. 
:  I 
cl.  Americans  (the United States)  ' 
1  2  3  i  4  5  I 
i 
2.  Russians  1  2  3  4  5 
----~-------------------------------~--------------~---~--~--~--+---~-4'  3,  Italians  i  1  2  :  3  4  5  j  ______________  _j_ __  ____._  ___________ +--+------
!  1  2!  3  !4  5  4,  Germans 
5·  French  l  1  2  1  3  :  4  5 
6,  Chinese  1  2  i  I  3  ,  4 
.  I  5 
-------------------------------------------·--------.i----+---------1 
7.  .British  i  1  2  3  .  4  /  5 
-,---------------·----·----+---·----------C  .. ------~--------+----
8,  Swiss  j  1  2  ·  3  ·  4  l  5 
I  i  i 
------------------------L----~---~-----~--~---1 A 21 
28.  I'd like to suggest  some  more  concrete  policy goals to you.  (INT:  HAND  OVER 
CARD  J).  For each objective,  I'd like to ask whether you feel it's an absolute-
ly essential objective,  an  important  objective,  an  objective of aeoondar,y  im-
portance,  or not  important at all. 
~--- ---- I  Absolutely  Important  Objective  Not  ~Lj  essential  objective  of seoon- impor- N.R. 
I  l  dary  im- tant  !  ' 
portanoe  at all  I 
I 
I  ; 
!  '  1.  Ensure greater  job security  1  '  2  3  4  5  '  i  i 
2.  Make  our society more  humane  I  1  2  3  4  5 
3.  Ensure  the  participation of 
I 
I  workers  in business  manage- '  I 
ment.  1  -+-
2  3  4  5 
4.  Help underdeveloped countries  1  2  3  4  5  I  I  i----t--- 2  ------
5.  Increase wages  3  4  5 
---
6.  Stop manufacturing atomic  bom~JS  1  2  '  3  4  5  I  I 
7.  Abolish  capitalism  1  2  I  3  4  5 
-
i  B.  Reform  the  educational  system  1  !  2  !  3  4  5 
-
'  9.  Fight  communism 
i  1  '  2  3  4  5  I 
\ 
I  - -- -----
10.  Guarantee the freedom  of speech  I  1  '  2  3  4  5  I  I 
-----------+-------
i 
'  11.  Maintain law and  order  I  1  2  3  4  5  i  I 
----.  -- -- ----- ···+ 
-~  12.  Foster private enterprise in 
I  I  !  !  economic  activity  1  \  2  3  4  I  5  I  ;  - ---
13.  Provide  jobs for young  people  1 
I  2  '  3  4  '  5  I  i  I  ---·-- -~----~- -- -- ·-·------ __ ,. ____________  -
I 
·' 
14.  Guarantee  decent  retirement 
' 
pensions  to old  people  1  l 
2  I  3  4  5 
• 
- • 
.. 
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29.  D~ you yourself participate in political activities, do  you follow politics 
with  some  interest without  participating actively or don't  politics interest 
you  especially or not  at all  ? 
participate  personally 
interested without  participating 
some  interest 
no  interest 
D.K.,  N.R. 
30.  Can  you tell me  who  presently is ••• 
... 
... 
the Prime  ~inister in Belgium  ? 
( INT  :  1-I'RITE  DOWN) 
the ''.Unister of Foreign Affairs  ? 
(INT  :  WRITE  DOWN) 
31.  Do  you watch  news  broadcasts  on  television ••• 
every  day 
several  times  a  week 
on"e  or twice  a  week 
less often 
never 
D.K.,  N.R. 
32.  Do  you  read  new·s  about  current  political events  in the newspapers  ••• 
every  day 
several  times  a  week 
once  or twice  a  week 
less often 
-never 
- D.K.,  N. R. 
33.  Do  you listen to  news  broadcasts  on  the  radio  ••• 
every  day 
several  times  a  week 
once or twice  a  week 
less often 
never 
D.K.,  N.R. 
34.  Have  you  ever traveled abroad  ?  (IF YES)  In what  countries did 
least  one  day  ?  (INT  1  INSIST  ON  ANSWERS  AND  WRITE  THEM  DOWN). 
ou  spend  at A  23 
35.  Among  present-~ay parties is there a  political party you feel  closer to than 
others  ? 
- Yes 
-No (GO  TO  Q.  37) 
- D.K.,  N.R.  (GO  TO  Q.  37) 
36.  Do  you feel  strongly or only weakly  attached to this party  ? 
- strongly 
- weakly 
-D.K.,N.R. 
37.  (HAND  OVER  CARD  H)  If general  elections were  held to-morrow to elect deputies, 
for which of the following  parties would you most  likely vote or for which  one 
would you vote if you had the right to vote  ?  (INT  :  THE  LAST  PHRASE  APPLIES  ON-
LY  TO  YOUNG  PEOPLE  BELOW  VOTING  AGE). 
- P.S.B. 
- P.s.c.;c.v.P. 
- P.L.P. 
- Comm. 
Socialist Party 
Christian Social  P. 
Liveral  P. 
Comnnmists 
- Rassemblement  Wallon  Wallon Movement 
- F. D. F.  Wall  on  Nationalist Party 
- V. u.  Flsmist Nationalist Party 
- Other party  (INT  :  WRITE  DOWN) 
. . . . . .  . . . . . . . 
-None  (GO  TO  Q.41) 
38.  Do  you know if your parents  had  a  preference for a  particular political party  ? 
- Yes 
-No  (GO  TO  Q.41) 
39.  Was  it a  political party of the  same  tendency  as you'd vote for now  or was  it of 
another tendency  ? 
- same  tendency  (GO  TO  Q.  41) 
- other tendency 
- D.K.,  N.R.  (GO  TO  Q.  41) 
40.  What  was  the political tendency  of your parents  ?  (INT  :  WRITE  DOWN) 
•• 
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41.  Do  you kno1v  whether  the  representati  vee  of • • •  ( INT  :  NAME  THE  PARTY  GIVEN  :m 
Q.  37)  •••  are  favorable  or not  to  european unification?  Choose your response 
among  the following  : 
- very favorable 
- somewhat  favorable 
- somewhat  unfavorable 
- very unfavorable 
- D.K.,  N. R. 
42.  If this party were  to take a  position  on  european unification contrar,r to your 
own,  do  you think it's certain,  likely, unlikely or very unlikely that you'd 
vote  for another party  ? 
- certain 
likely 
- unlikely 
- very unlikely 
- D,K.,  N. R. 
43.  Do  you  belong to  a  union  ? 
-Yes  (GO  TO  Q.  45) 
- No 
44.  Even  though you're not  a  member,  do  you feel  close to  a  union  ? 
- Yes 
-No (GO  TO  Q.  48) 
45.  What  union is that  ? 
- F.G.T.B. 
- c. s. c. 
C. G. S. L. B. 
Other  (INT  :  WRITE  DOWN)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
D.K.,  N.R. 
46.  Do  you  feel  strongly or only weakly  attached to this union  or not  at all ? 
- strongly attached 
- weakly  attached 
- not  at all 
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47,  Do  you kno·11  if the leaders of this union are very favorable,  somewhat  favor~ 
ble,  somewhat  unfavorable or very unfavorable to  european unification ? 
- very  favorable 
- somewhat  favorable 
- somewhat  unfavorable 
- very unfavorable 
-D.K,,N,R, 
48,  (INT  1  IF R,  IS  NOT  THE  HEAD  OF  HOUSEHOLD)  Does  the head of your household be-
long to a  union  ? 
- Yes 
-No  (GO  TO  Q,  50) 
49,  llfuich  union is that  ? 
- F.G,T.B. 
- c.s.c. 
- C.G.S.L.B. 
- Other ( INT  1  WRITE  DOWN) 
. . .  . . . . . . . 
-D.K.,N.R. 
50,  Do  you belong to a  religion ? 
- Yes 
-No  (GO  TO  Q.  53) 
51.  Which  one  ? 
- catholic 
- protestant 
- other (INT  1  WRITE  DOWN)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
52.  Do  you  go  to religious services  several  times  a  week,  onoe  a week,  several ti-
mes  a  year or never  ? 
- several  times  a  week 
- once  a  week 
- several  times  a  year 
- never 
53.  Would  you  please tell me  at  about  what  level you'd plaoe your family's finan-
cial means,  You  can answer by  indicating a  number  going from  l  to 7  on  this 
soale.  (INT  1  HAND  OVER  CARD  I).  The  number  l  means  a  poor family  ;  3•  a  fa-
mily vri th modest  means  ;  5,  a  well  off family  ;  and 7,  a  weal  thy  family.  The 
other numbers  give you an opportunity to choose intermediate positions.  (IBT  1 
CIR£LE  ~BEH  R. 2GIVES)  3  4  5  6  7 
poor  modest  means  fairly well off  wealthy 
.. 
.. 
• 
• 